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Abstract 
I will argue that the scientific investigation of philosophical intuition ('experimental 
philosophy') is of philosophical interest. I will defend the significance of experimental 
philosophy against two important types of objection. I will term the first objection 
'eliminativism' about intuitions: roughly, it is the claim that philosophical methodology 
does not in fact rely on intuition, and thus experimental philosophy's investigation is ill-
conceived—in the words of one such opponent, 'a big mistake.' I will then consider a 
second objection, the 'expertise' defense. The expertise defense argues that the expert 
intuitions of professional philosophers are distinct, and to be preferred to those of the 
'folk.' Against the eliminativists, I will argue that an ineliminable mental component 
remains that can be subject of fruitful empirical investigation. Against the expertise 
defense I will argue that, at least in the context of philosophy of language, expertise is 
itself a potential source of bias. Since expertise is domain-specific, however, a general 
rebuttal will not be given. I will conclude that experimental philosophy has much to 
contribute. 
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Chapter 1  
1 Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
In this dissertation I will argue that the scientific investigation of philosophical intuition 
('experimental philosophy') is of philosophical interest. I will defend the significance of 
experimental philosophy against two important types of objection. I will term the first 
objection 'eliminativism' about intuitions: roughly, it is the claim that philosophical 
methodology does not in fact rely on intuition, and thus experimental philosophy's 
investigation is ill-conceived—in the words of one such opponent, 'a big mistake.' I will 
then consider a second objection, the 'expertise' defense. The expertise defense argues 
that the expert intuitions of professional philosophers are distinct, and to be preferred to 
those of the 'folk.' While I will respond to eliminativism in general, my brief against the 
expertise defense will remain confined to the philosophy of language; this is because the 
objection must be considered contextually, as I will show. 
I will first provide an overview of experimental philosophy and the use of intuitions in 
philosophy, and then present a prima facie case for experimental philosophy's importance 
(chapter 2). I will then consider the eliminativist objection and argue that the objection 
fails (chapter 3). I will then turn my attention to the expertise defense in the context of the 
philosophy of language and argue that it, too, does not succeed (chapter 4). I will 
conclude that experimental philosophy is relevant to philosophy (chapter 5).  
In some more detail: In chapter 2, I will present a prima facie case for the significance of 
experimental philosophy. If intuitions are used in the course of philosophical theorizing, 
then we should wish for some account of this source of evidence in the specific form of 
an explanatorily adequate theory of the cognitive processes underlying intuition. Such a 
theory, I will claim, is interesting in its own right, separate from philosophical reliance on 
intuition as evidence: there has been a long-standing disciplinary interest in descriptively 
adequate psychology, which in turn affects philosophical theorizing in several fields. 
Given that philosophers do rely on intuitions, our interest is compound: experimental 
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investigation can help us assess the reliability, diversity, stability, and sources of 
intuition, allowing for better and more confident theorizing. 
Nothing turns on whether or not ‘philosophical intuitions’ are a distinct kind of judgment, 
or constitute a motley. Rather than defining ‘intuition,’ I will point to examples in the 
literature, saying only that this is what we wish to study, whatever it turns out to be. 
There will be a common thread across the examples presented, however: an agent has 
intuitions, and nothing can replace the agent’s having them (say, observation or 
experiment). This ineliminable mental component is enough to anchor the experimental 
project, even if uses of intuitions across philosophical subfields (language, logic, value 
theory, epistemology, and so on) turn out to be radically different from each other.    
Experimental philosophers have approached their investigation in two distinct ways. 
First, there is a metaphilosophical / methodological project that is concerned with the 
reliability of 'intuition' and intuitive evidence in the context of philosophical theorizing. 
The claim is that contemporary philosophical methodology relies on intuitive response to 
imagined cases, and some principled account of this source of evidence is required. Some 
experimentalists draw a sharply negative conclusion and contend that reliance on 
‘armchair intuition’ is to be abandoned on the basis of the variability and instability of 
intuitive response. Others contend that the patterns of intuitive response are themselves 
important to theorizing.   
This leads us to the second aspect, the ‘positive program,’ essentially a form of 
philosophically-inspired cognitive science. Experimental philosophers working in this 
vein should be understood as providing an explanatory account of the cognitive processes 
underlying intuition and judgments of conceptual application. The focus here is distinctly 
not metaphilosophical, but simply philosophical: it is claimed that fine-grained 
characterization of intuitive response is not only of intrinsic interest, but will lead to 
philosophical insight by making more explicit the factors driving intuitive judgment.  
Thus, as appeal to intuition is an important component of contemporary analytic 
methodology, a scientific understanding of intuitive faculties is in part motivated by a 
desire to understand and justify the methodology. But the experimental project goes 
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beyond this: far from being solely a metaphilosophical concern, experimental philosophy 
also directly contributes to positive theorizing in several areas of philosophy. This dual 
aspect—one methodological, one positive—is essential to understanding experimental 
philosophy's philosophical ambitions. 
Two broad types of objections are pressed to experimental philosophy. The first type of 
objection, what I termed eliminativism about intuitions, seeks to minimize any putative 
evidential role of intuitions in philosophy: if intuitions are not in fact part of 
philosophical methodology, there is nothing for experimental philosophers to do that is 
philosophically significant. The second type of objection acknowledges reliance on 
intuitions as evidence, but affirms the reliability of expert intuitions in philosophy. In this 
case, too, there is no need for the investigations of experimental philosophers. 
In chapter 3 I will critically discuss Herman Cappelen's Philosophy Without Intuitions, 
Timothy Williamson's The Philosophy of Philosophy, and a pair of papers by Max 
Deutsch that press distinct eliminativist arguments.1 I will argue that 'eliminativism' 
about intuitions typically defines 'intuition' out of existence, only to surreptitiously 
replace it with some equivalent notion that itself is sufficient to motivate experimental 
philosophy's methodological and positive projects. To the best of my knowledge, no one 
has of yet identified ‘eliminativism’ as a distinct challenge to experimental philosophy, or 
grouped together these critiques under one label.  
In particular, both Cappelen and Deutsch argue that experimentalists have assumed that 
intuitions play a foundational role in philosophical argument: concordance with intuition, 
they claim, has been put forward by the experimentalists as a necessary criterion for 
philosophical adequacy, the only way argument can proceed. The eliminativists find in 
practice no such foundational reliance. Indeed, conclusions putatively supported by 
                                                 
1
 Herman Cappelen, Philosophy Without Intuitions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Timothy 
Williamson, The Philosophy of Philosophy (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2007); Max Deutsch, 
"Intuitions, counter-examples, and experimental philosophy." Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1, no. 
3 (2010): 447-460; Max Deutsch, "Experimental philosophy and the theory of reference." Mind & 
Language 24, no. 4 (2009): 445-466. I will use shortened citations from here on. 
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intuition can in fact be supported by argument. The urgency and importance of 
experimental philosophy, however, turned on this foundational reliance on intuition. 
Without it, experimental philosophy appears to be wasted effort. 
I will dispute this picture. Experimentalists themselves typically view the methodological 
role of intuitions as substantially weaker than the eliminativists contend. Concordance 
with intuition and the deliverances of intuitive evidence are more often understood as a 
(defeasible) sufficient condition for adequacy. In such cases intuitions are deployed in the 
service of establishing a conclusion (by figuring as a premise in an argument). But 
intuitions are also pressed into service in other, more indirect, ways. They frame issues; 
raise a puzzle or apparent conflict; give us insight into what is conceivable and not; or 
simply provide data points that, once interpreted, guide and constrain theorizing. These 
uses of intuition do not fit the model proposed by eliminativists. Yet, as I will argue, all 
these uses are more than enough to justify the investigations of experimentalists.  
Williamson’s metaphilosophical claims will also come under scrutiny. Cappelen 
adumbrates several key points of the former’s The Philosophy of Philosophy during the 
course of his argument, and I will challenge these. Williamson rejects conceptual 
analysis, arguing instead that philosophical questions are about ‘things themselves.’ By 
sidestepping the issue of conceptual analysis entirely, Williamson can further argue that 
what we have termed ‘intuition’ is in fact ordinary counterfactual evaluation, no less 
reliable in the case of philosophy than its applications in our daily lives.  
In response, I will argue against both these claims: first, it is not clear that the kind of 
philosophical questions Williamson points to are only about things themselves; some 
conceptual mediation is inescapable. Second, even if there were no distinct faculty of 
‘intuition,’ the reliability of garden-variety counterfactual evaluation is not sufficient to 
ground such evaluation in the context of philosophical theorizing, where the epistemic 
standards are higher and the cases more complex, obscure, and fraught. A systematic 
account of counterfactual evaluation is more than warranted, and does not generalize to a 
form of global skepticism, as Williamson warns.    
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I will conclude, then, that intuitions can be scientifically investigated in virtue of the 
methodological role they play, despite the eliminativist objection. But suppose the 
eliminativists are right—or, for that matter, the negative wing of the methodological 
program—and that we do not (or ought not) rely on intuition as evidence. Does this leave 
experimental philosophy with nothing to do? 
No. To the contrary, the 'positive program' is of importance to philosophy independently 
of any methodological reliance on intuitions by philosophers. Thus, even if the 
eliminativist argument succeeded in showing that intuitions are not part of the 
methodological toolkit of philosophers, achieving 'explanatory depth' in characterizing 
patterns of pre-theoretic judgment is of intrinsic philosophical interest. It is crucial that 
this theorizing is not a form of 'conceptual analysis' by other means. The goal, rather, is to 
gain an understanding of what underlies ‘intuition’ by studying specific effects. To this 
extent the significance of experimental philosophy is not solely linked to philosophical 
use of intuitions-as-evidence, and the eliminativist challenge can be met even if we grant 
their own conclusion. 
In chapter 4, I will turn to a rather different objection: the expertise defense. Some 
experimental philosophers concerned with the methodology of intuitions worry about 
variation and instability in intuitive response. Absent a principled means of selecting the 
‘correct’ intuition among intuitive diversity, it is claimed that philosophical theories 
which have relied on variable and unstable intuition are undermined: why should we 
prefer the intuitions of professional philosophers?  
The expertise defense answers this by affirming the basic reliability of the appeals to 
intuition when conducted by relevantly-trained experts, that is, philosophers. 
Experimental philosophy’s methodological program misses the mark in this respect: by 
conducting experiments on non-experts, the data generated, however interesting, does not 
speak to the question of the reliability of intuitions in philosophy. Nor does it pose a 
challenge to appeals to intuition by philosophers. It is, rather, data about folk psychology. 
The expertise defense is primarily directed at experimental philosophy’s methodological 
program, and more particularly those within that program who are pessimistic about 
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appeal to intuition. However, it is also the case that if acquired expertise does provide a 
reason to privilege the intuitions of trained philosophers, there is every reason to suspect 
that the theories of the positive program will have marginal value to philosophers: the 
explanatory depth achieved will be about folk patterns of response, not expert response. 
In this way the expertise defense is a challenge to experimental philosophy’s 
methodological and positive projects. 
Responding to the expertise defense in a comprehensive way is difficult, and probably 
impossible. The reason is that ‘expertise’ is a tightly domain-specific notion. Experts in 
one area are not more reliable, in general, in areas outside their expertise. As a result, I 
will argue, expertise (and expertise defenses, plural) must be assessed on a case-by-case 
basis. Another complicating factor is that appeals to intuition in philosophy have few, and 
sometimes no, independent checks. This makes the specific context of argument all the 
more important. 
Keeping these problems in mind, I will focus on cases drawn from the philosophy of 
language and discuss expertise in this context, drawing some general morals at the end. I 
will begin by describing experiments conducted on intuitions of reference based on a case 
due to Kripke taken to disprove descriptivist theories. Experimental philosophers have 
argued that variability in intuitions of reference undermines not just the anti-descriptivist 
case, but all theorizing about reference that appeals to intuition.2  
The expertise defense in the context of referential intuitions is well-developed and serves 
as an ideal test-case. Friends of the expertise defense make two general moves: first, they 
offer an account of reliable intuition in terms of domain-specific acquired expertise.3 
Second, they explain the divergent, or ‘incorrect’ intuitions, in virtue of some aspects of 
the vignette or experiment design. In the case of reference, for instance, it is sometimes 
argued that the experimental set-up was ambiguous between speaker’s and semantic 
                                                 
2
 Machery et al., “Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style”; Mallon et al., “Against Arguments from Reference.” 
3
 I will most prominently discuss Devitt, “Experimental Semantics” and Ludwig, “The Epistemology of 
Thought-Experiments.” 
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reference, or that the question posed capture folk theories of reference (‘metalinguistic 
intuition’), not usage.4 
Experimental philosophers have criticized both aspects of the expertise defense. In the 
case of the latter, criticism of experimental design has been met with attempts to replicate 
the results while controlling for possible ambiguity.5 In the case of the former, 
experimental philosophers have argued that the notion of domain-specific acquired 
expertise is itself subject to empirical investigation. It has been suggested that expert 
intuitions are ‘reinforced,’ not ‘reflective,’ and that philosophical expertise is not 
analogous to other forms of expertise due to lack of clear, reliable feedback on which to 
train one’s intuitions.6  
While the responses are on the right track, in the specific case of semantic intuitions in 
the philosophy of language a better rejoinder can be made. I will argue that the expertise 
of philosophers is real, but that this expertise consists in the application of specific 
epistemic, logical and metaphysical commitments to semantics, yielding intuitions that 
are not descriptively adequate. Indeed, these commitments are normative: they are about 
the language we ought to have, not the languages we in fact have. For instance, the 
proponents of ‘expertise’ I discuss explicitly claim that predicates ought to be defined in 
terms of mind-independent theoretical significance, a view that has deep roots in the 
philosophy of language (via the seminal work of David Lewis).7 It is also claimed that 
thought experiments in philosophy should operate under specific “idealizations about 
language” such that natural language predicates which appear vague are assumed, 
                                                 
4
 Ichikawa et al., “In Defense of a Kripkean Dogma”; Martí, “Against Semantic Multi-Culturalism.” 
5
 Beebe, Undercoffer, “Individual and Cross-Cultural Differences in Semantic Intuitions”; Machery, 
Olivola, “Linguistic and Metalinguistic Intuitions.” 
6
 Machery et al., “Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style”; Weinberg, “Are Philosophers Expert Intuiters?” 
7
 David Lewis, “Putnam’s Paradox”; Weatherson, “What Good are Counter-Examples?”; Devitt, Coming 
to Our Senses.  
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instead, to be “semantically complete and consistent.”8 Likewise for theories of 
reference, which should be constrained by modal desiderata.  
Yet philosophers of language critical of experimental philosophy also agree that the 
target phenomena of semantic theory are the norms and conventions of public language 
as practiced by other competent speakers.9 I will argue that critics of experimental 
philosophy who endorse the expertise defense can’t have it both ways: they cannot both 
import philosophically-inspired semantic norms and claim to describe the conventions of 
actual speakers. The norms imported reflect theoretical utility for various scientific and 
metaphysical purposes, I will argue, while the norms of competent speakers are (or, more 
precisely, can be) indifferent to these.  
This latter claim is empirical. In support of it I will discuss work by James Flynn, who 
argues that ‘kind-categorization’ is just one of the things we do with language, a practice 
which requires training and education.10 Evidence from IQ testing shows an increase in 
average test scores over the past century that can only be explained by a gradual change 
in cognitive norms that reflects the desiderata of such tests: abstract classification, causal 
relationships, and analytical thinking most prominently. Through training, our experience 
of what is intuitive has shifted. This, in turn, has a dramatic effect on the intuitions of 
philosophers of language, who receive more such training than the average speaker. 
The notion of a ‘natural kind’ is tightly linked to causal theories of reference. Building on 
the work of experimentalists on reference I will extend my criticism of the expertise 
defense from natural kind predicates to the specific case of proper-name reference, which 
launched the discussion. I will argue that the philosophical intuitions supporting the 
causal theory are also normatively-governed, and that further empirical work is required 
to ascertain the actual referential practices of speakers. We need experiment, I will 
                                                 
8
 Ludwig, “The Epistemology of Thought-Experiments,” 134. 
9
 Devitt, “Whither Experimental Semantics”; Ludwig, “The Epistemology of Thought-Experiments.” 
10
 Flynn, What is Intelligence? 
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conclude, to determine what conventions are actually in play and, more broadly, what is 
possible in language. I will suggest that an important direction of investigation in this 
regard will be semantic internalism, for the gap between philosophical norms and speaker 
conventions could plausibly be a gap between ideal theory and natural language / 
psycholinguistics. This would also give traditional philosophers of language and 
experimental philosophers distinct projects, which would resolve the dispute. 
In the conclusion I will argue that experimental philosophy is likely to remain an 
important subfield of research in the years to come. The two objections I have considered 
ultimately do not succeed; and experimental philosophy’s dual aspect, while intuition-
focused, offers fecund prospects for further research. I will close with some general 
remarks on the investigation of intuition. There is no genuine consensus on what 
intuitions are. Despite this, competing accounts share a certain ‘family resemblance.’ I 
will argue that the features that make up the intuition ‘family’ allow for scientific 
investigation in almost all extant permutations in the literature across a wide variety of 
topics. The idea is not to abandon or replace intuitions, but to understand them, and 
integrate this understanding into philosophical research inasmuch as our intuitive 
judgments figure as an aspect of our methodology. 
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Chapter 2  
2 The Prima Facie Case for Experimental Philosophy 
Experimental philosophers, like most philosophers, believe that empirical facts can be 
relevant to philosophical theorizing in some non-trivial sense. What is distinct is three-
fold: first, that experimental philosophers believe that science delineates a class of 
empirical facts of particular importance; second, that experimental philosophers carry out 
their own experiments rather than waiting on their colleagues in other disciplines; third, 
these experiments are (usually) directed at understanding “the internal psychological 
processes that underlie” conceptual application.11 Thus, at first gloss, 'experimental 
philosophy' is philosophy that is not only guided by scientific data, but also produces said 
data in both a philosophically-inspired project of cognitive science and a 
metaphilosophical project. 
In contemporary terms, this picks out a group of philosophers who began by critically 
examining reliance on intuition: this first generation, largely methodological and 
metaphilosophical in orientation, was spear-headed by Stephen Stich, Edouard Machery, 
Joshua Knobe, Shaun Nichols, Jonathan Weinberg and others, has now led to a 
remarkable proliferation of 'second-generation' work building on earlier success.12 This 
second-generation work is often closer to philosophically-inspired cognitive science than  
'metaphilosophy.' I will distinguish, then, between the 'methodological' and 'positive' 
projects: 
The Methodological Project: Given philosophy's reliance on intuition, scientific 
assessment of the reliability of intuition is crucial to producing a defensible 
                                                 
11Josh Knobe, Shaun Nichols. “An Experimental Philosophy Manifesto,” 8. 
12See, e.g., the collection of papers in Joshua Knobe, Shaun Nicholas, Experimental Philosophy and 
Experimental Philosophy, Vol. II; or the bibliography of Thomas Nadelhoffer, Eddy Nahmias, “The Past 
and Future of Experimental Philosophy” for 'first-generation' work. More recent work can be accessed via 
the Philpapers 'experimental philosophy' topic page. 
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metaphilosophy: “the ultimate hope,” experimentalists write, is to “determine whether the 
psychological sources of [intuitive] beliefs undercut the warrant for the beliefs.”13 
The Positive Project: To provide an empirically adequate explanatory account of 
'intuition' in terms of the “internal psychological processes” that “influence applications 
of a concept.” The goal is not to “characterise the actual pattern of people's intuitions” 
but, rather, “achieve explanatory depth.”14 
What unites both projects is an ongoing scientific focus on 'intuition', broadly defined. 
The methodological project examines the use commonly made by philosophers of 
intuitions. The positive project examines patterns of intuitions with a deeper explanatory 
goal. 
2.1 Some Examples of Intuitions in Philosophy 
The roots of experimental philosophy can be found in a dawning suspicion of reliance on 
intuition in philosophy, viz., what I've termed the 'methodological project.' Appeals to 
intuition, the story goes, figure prominently in philosophical argument: a case or scenario 
is described and considered, generally asking “what would we say if...?” and a 
spontaneous 'intuitive' judgment is issued, typically (but not necessarily) a judgment of 
'conceptual application.' We might intuitively judge that a hypothetical case is not an 
instance of 'knowledge' or of genuine 'intentionality.' But what is intuition? And how is it 
used in philosophical argument? 
It is difficult to define 'intuition' in an uncontroversial way. Accounts vary and conflict: 
some claim intuition is a sui generis faculty that plays a central and indispensable role in 
a priori philosophical methodology; others deny that 'intuition' is anything distinct from 
ordinary judgment; some deny that philosophy has ever relied on ‘intuition.’  I will look 
at some of these controversies below. For now, rather than wade into complex 
                                                 
13Joshua Knobe, Shaun Nichols. “An Experimental Philosophy Manifesto,” 7. 
14Ibid, 5. 
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definitional disputes, I will provide some examples of the use of intuition in philosophical 
argument. 
The underlying methodological assumption made by experimental philosophers is that 
many philosophical theories are grounded in philosophers' response to imagined cases. 
Most often, a situation or scenario is described with stipulated features meant to elicit an 
'intuition' or judgment in the reader about the applicability of a concept in that situation. 
In this way intuitions can both serve as counter-example to, and evidence for, 
philosophical theories. It is commonly held that a something's being intuitive carries 
evidential weight for a theory. If this is correct, then investigation into the psychological 
processes that underlie intuitive response is of significant interest.  
Intuitions can be deployed in several different ways in the course of philosophical 
argument. They can demonstrate some truth. They can provide a counter-example to a 
theory. Finally, they can provide evidence for a theory. I will provide an example of each.  
First, intuitions might demonstrate some truth: intuitions about 'Twin-Earth' cases are 
taken to show that externalism is true of at least some mental content. Considering the 
case shows us that there is more to meaning than 'what's in the head.' 
We are to imagine a planet just like ours in every respect---a 'Twin Earth'---with the 
exception that the liquid found in lakes, oceans, bottled and drank by inhabitants, etc., is 
not H20 but some other chemical compound ('XYZ'). Further, imagine an inhabitant of 
our planet and his perfectly identical counter-part on Twin Earth. Both are using the term 
'water' to talk about their respective liquids. Yet they do not mean the same thing: 
intuitively, an inhabitant of Earth refers to H20, and an denizen of Twin-Earth refers to 
XYZ.15 There is nothing 'in the head' of either agent to distinguish between their concepts 
(suppose the year is 1750, prior to modern chemistry): yet their concepts are intuitively 
different, showing that 'meaning' is individuated by more than mental content. Causal 
                                                 
15Hilary Putnam, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” 139-141. 
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relations to the external environment matter, as reflection on the imagined case 
demonstrates. 
Crucial to this case is an appeal to intuitive facts about 'use.' While the Twin Earth case 
purports to show that “the meaning of ‘water’ as used by Mary is externally individuated 
in terms of environmental features,” the claim about use is at least as important as the 
claim of external individuation.16 It is possible that a speaker could use 'water' as a 
functional term that covers both H20 and XYZ; that we in fact do not is a claim that 
requires an intuition about the status of 'water' as a natural kind term while reflecting on 
Twin Earth. 
This bears repeating. There surely are possible worlds where a competent speaker could 
use 'water' (or any term!) to refer to any stuff with water-like properties. For such 
speakers, 'water' is not a kind term with a chemical essence, but a functional or cluster 
term, like 'paint' or 'rubber.' This possibility is admitted by all parties to the discussion: it 
just so happens that this possibility is not actual.17 We use 'water' as a natural kind term; 
and because we do, the meaning of ‘water’ is individuated in virtue of external, 
environmental features. How do we know that 'water' is so used? Well, reflection on 
Putnam's case brings this fact to the fore: in other words, we have an intuition (about 
what we intend with the term 'water'). This aspect simply cannot be removed: reflections 
on linguistic intentions are necessarily psychological. In particular they are not social, 
even if there is social coordination of public meaning. The methodology of a case like 
Twin-Earth requires individual reflection on what convention has been adopted, and 
consideration of what this implies in an imagined case. 
Second, intuitions can accentuate the negative: Gettier cases tell us that accounts of 
knowledge as 'justified true belief' are wrong or incomplete. The scenario presented in a 
                                                 
16Jesper Kallestrup, Semantic Externalism, 60. The emphasis is mine. 
17The counterfactual's possibility is indeed explicitly endorsed: “If it should turn out that only philosophers 
baulk at classifying XYZ as water, I am ready to defer in my usage to the non-philosophical majority and 
say that ‘water’, like ‘glue’, is not the name of a kind with a chemical essence.” (Christopher Hughes, 
Kripke: Names, Necessity and Identity, 63.) 
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Gettier case serves as a counter-example to an analysis, but it does not demonstrate some 
positive fact (as in the Twin Earth example above). Again, reliance on intuition is crucial. 
The scenario asks us to imagine an entailment of a justified false belief. The entailment, 
by chance, happens to be true. Most philosophers agree that belief in the entailment is not 
a case of 'knowledge,' even though the imagined subject's belief seems to satisfy the 
conditions of the justified true belief account. 
Suppose, for instance, that Jane acquired an autographed copy of David Foster Wallace's 
Infinite Jest from a reputable bookseller that vouchsafed its authenticity. As it happens, 
the signature is a clever forgery; nevertheless, Jane is justified in believing “I own an 
autographed copy of Infinite Jest.” She explicitly believes, too, the further proposition “I 
own at least one autographed book” on this basis. As it happens, her copy of Cormac 
McCarthy's The Crossing is autographed unbeknownst to her. Jane's belief that she owns 
one autographed book is both justified and true; but, most philosophers agree, she doesn't 
know she owns at least one autographed book. Therefore, justified true belief is not 
sufficient for knowledge, proved by counter-example. 
One interesting feature of the Gettier scenario is that it is not 'far-fetched' in the way 
sometimes derided by critics of intuitions.18 Timothy Williamson is fond of remarking 
that the Gettier scenario can be brought about trivially in real-life situations: 
The modal element in Gettier cases is not even essential. For Gettier cases have 
actually occurred. Just to make sure of that, I recently brought one about when 
giving a visiting lecture on intuitions.19 
But there is no advantage to bringing about a 'live' Gettier case during a visiting lecture, 
or in any other circumstance. It is not as if, by making a Gettier scenario actually occur, 
one could then independently verify the presence or absence of 'knowledge.' No 
apparatus or instrument could detect 'knowledge': as in the Twin Earth case, a agent must 
judge. As Williamson notes, “a real-life Gettier case makes almost no difference to the 
                                                 
18Dennett has been particularly forceful on this, e.g., Daniel Dennett, Intuition Pumps… 
19Timothy Williamson, “Armchair Philosophy, Metaphysical Modality, and Counterfactual Thinking,” 12. 
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epistemic status of the result that justified true belief is insufficient for knowledge,” result 
which, for Williamson, rides on a general capacity for agents to handle counterfactual 
conditionals. Williamson denies that such judgments are 'intuitions' inasmuch as 
intuitions are understood as special or sui generis; there is nothing distinct about 
'intuition' in “any sense that would distinguish it from other judgements.”20 
Williamson's particular brand of eliminativism can be contrasted with the view that 
philosophical intuitions do indeed form a distinct kind of judgment, which, for epistemic 
and methodological purposes, can be treated together. The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy's entry on 'intuition' claims with no further ado that “it is plausible (and will 
be assumed here) that the intuitions of interest in philosophy constitute a single epistemic 
and psychological kind,” which would then bring together moral, logical, 
epistemological, semantic, modal, and metaphysical intuition under one tent.21 
Yet, for experimental philosophy nothing rides on whether or not intuition is sui generis 
and a 'kind' or not. What is important for our present purposes is that some mental 
phenomenon underlies evaluation of the case, and nothing else (no possible independent 
instrumentalization, and no interesting epistemic distinction between imagined and real 
cases). It is the characteristically mental aspect of 'intuition' that allows experimental 
philosophy some purchase: it takes an agent to intuit, and the agent cannot be substituted. 
This is why, in the end, Williamson, Cappelen and Deutsch’s attempts at eliminativism 
will fail (chapter 3). 
Often, this process of mental evaluation produces a seemingly deductive result that takes 
the form of a straight counter-example. By 'deductive result' I only mean the intuitive 
judgment issued is used as a premise appearing in reasoning of the 'deductive' form. So 
'negative' use of intuitions is, roughly, a modus tollens: a theory P implies Q; intuitively, 
not-Q; therefore, not-P. We see this form of argument in the Gettier scenario: justified 
true belief (JTB) accounts of knowledge predict that Gettier cases are instances of 
                                                 
20Ibid. 
21Joel Pust, “Intuitions.”  
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knowledge; but they are not. Therefore, the JTB account is false.22 But this 'deductive 
form' is not an essential feature of the use of intuition, either. 
Indeed, a third way intuitions have been used in philosophy is by providing a form of 
'inductive' evidence for a theory's correctness: a theory's concordance with our intuitions 
is evidence that the theory is correct, a compelling-but-defeasible theoretical virtue. Such 
views are often expressed in philosophy of language and value theory; less often in 
analytic epistemology or metaphysics. 
For instance, a recent discussion of the pragmatics of counterfactuals by Sarah Moss 
takes the reader through several cases of intuitively 'felicitous' and 'infelicitous' sequences 
of counterfactual sentences ('reverse Sobel sequences'): our intuitions balk, to varying 
degrees, at certain formulations but not so much others. It is particularly interesting that 
the problem discussed by the paper has to do with reversing the ordering of 
counterfactuals, resulting in an unexpected intuitive clash. Consider the pair of sentences 
(2a) If Sophie had gone to the parade, she would have seen Pedro. 
(2b) But if Sophie had gone to the parade and been stuck behind a tall agent, she 
would not have seen Pedro. 
“Intuition,” Moss affirms, “says that the counterfactuals in (2) can be true together.”23 
However, if we reverse the order, intuitions change: 
(3a) If Sophie had gone to the parade and been stuck behind a tall agent, she 
would not have seen Pedro. 
(3b) #But if she had gone to the parade, she would have seen Pedro. 
Intuitively, if (3a) is true, then (3b) can't be: we have what an experimental philosopher 
might call an 'ordering effect.' But extant theories of counterfactuals do not take order 
into account: it shouldn't matter which member of the pair we consider first. Intuitively, 
                                                 
22Or, to take another example, descriptivist theories of reference predict that in the Gödel-Schmidt case, we 
refer to Schmidt; but, as Kripke writes, “it seems to me we are not. We simply are not.” Saul Kripke, 
Naming and Necessity, 84. The logical form is another modus tollens. 
23Sarah Moss, “On the Pragmatics of Counterfactuals” 562. 
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however, it does. For Moss, and indeed the literature she adroitly discusses, these sorts of 
intuitions are simply taken to constrain an adequate theory of counterfactuals: “It is a 
virtue of my theory that it fits the contours of our judgments,” she writes, later 
summarizing that “my theory accounts for our intuitions about felicious and infelicitous 
reverse Sobel sequences.”24 A philosophical theory should account for our judgments; 
and our judgments, or 'intuitions', about cases, are the data points the theory must 'fit.' 
The theories Moss criticizes fail to account for our intuitions about reverse Sobels; hers 
does so account; and so her theory is the better. Importantly, when considering sets of 
complex cases, there are 'degrees' of naturalness, and we can always doubt whether 
judgments accurately 'signal' truth and falsity.25 
Approaches such as Moss' are not unusual at all. In a similar methodological vein, 
Soames says of a clash between intuition and his semantic theory that 
The conflict between this intuitive response to examples ... and the semantic 
theses I have adopted is not to be taken lightly. On the one hand, the intuitions are 
persistent and widespread. On the other hand, the semantic theses I have adopted 
are highly motivated; it is not at all easy to see how they could be wrong...26 
Soames' methodological proposal is to carefully investigate the 'sources' of the 
conflicting intuitions, and weigh them against the arguments presented for his semantic 
claims; we may find that the intuitions were ill-motivated in comparison to the 
conclusions they conflict with. Intuitions serve as an important source of information to 
the theorist: intuitive conflict or concord is evidence that a theory is, or isn't, on the right 
track. Crucially, the evidence is 'defeasible': a strong theory might lead us to 'revise' our 
intuitions, or to make a serious attempt to diagnose their source. Yet this 'defeasibility' is 
in turn very weak, as intuitions are taken as 'strong' evidence: perhaps not on the order of 
direct counter-example, but, as Soames claims, “not to be taken lightly,” either.27 
                                                 
24Ibid, 578. 
25Ibid, 584. 
26Scott Soames, Beyond Rigidity, 142. I've elided the details of the actual cases, which are complex. 
27Soames is similar to Kripke, unsurprisingly: the latter famously opined that “something's having intuitive 
content” is a “very heavy evidence.” (Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity, 42, my emphasis). I will discuss 
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We've seen three ways intuitions are deployed in the course of philosophical theorizing: 
directly establishing a result; directly invalidating a result (by counter-example); and 
indirectly providing support for a result. In practice the distinctions are blurry. Twin-
Earth cases could be interpreted as primarily showing that internalism is false (and the 
externalist's being right requires the enthymeme premise that either internalism or 
externalism is true, exclusively). The negative mode is certainly more prevalent, as 
intuitions lend themselves more readily to the elaboration of counter-examples than 
theories. Typically an intuition is elicited to show than an existing theory is incorrect, and 
following this a new or modified theory is elaborated that is intuitively acceptable. 
Mature subdisciplines tend to generate indirect modes of intuitive argument, as 
theoretical complexity rises and cases multiply. Often the transition from 'direct' to 
'indirect' use of intuition in a subdiscipline is imperceptible. The classic Gettier case is a 
direct 'counter-example'; yet the current literature features a bevy of 'Gettier-like cases' 
that require fine-grained sifting of multiple intuitions in the indirect 'data-point' vein.28 
The point, however, is that intuitions, whatever they are, are used in philosophical 
argument; and if we are not sure how to define them, we can always point to these 
instances as the thing we want to study, whatever it turns out to be in the end. Following, 
one might think, the 'causal-historical' mode of reference typical of scientific 
investigation: we wish to know about that. The examples serve as reference-fixing 
descriptions that may be ultimately dispensed with. 
Further, as should be clear now, intuitions are evidently a mental phenomenon, however 
they are deployed. An agent has intuitions, and nothing can substitute for the agent 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
later a paper due to Cumming, Variabilism, which establishes its conclusion in a similar way. I submit that 
this ‘indirect mode’ is by far the most common use of intuition, but it is also ignored by proponents of 
eliminativism. 
28See John Turri, “Knowledge Judgments in 'Gettier' Cases,” for overview and experimentally-oriented 
discussion. 
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(except, perhaps, many agents). For the purposes of philosophical methodology, it makes 
no difference whether or not the case is 'far-fetched' or trivially realizable: evaluation of 
the case requires an agent making a judgment in order to generate knowledge (or a 
knowledge-claim). Epistemically speaking we might legitimately worry that 'far-fetched' 
cases might tax our judgment, resulting in a higher failure rate—yet the procedure in 
both 'realizable' and 'far-fetched' cases is essentially the same. 
It is important to remember that not all thought-experiments are such that the scenario 
described requires an agent’s judgment to generate knowledge: an intuition might be 
sufficient in such cases, but not necessary. In many instances of 'physical' intuition we 
can substitute a real experiment for the 'thought-experiment' and observe to determine 
whether or not our intuitions 'match up' with the physics. A famous example is Galileo's 
'falling objects' thought-experiment, which was conducted on the moon by Apollo 15 
astronauts—confirming, once again, Galileo's 'intuition.' 
It is sometimes claimed that philosophical intuition is really no different that the sort of 
intuition routinely used in the sciences. Putative similarities between thought-experiments 
in science and philosophy are belied by the fact that in many of the most famous thought 
experiments in philosophy no observable physical facts discriminate between the possible 
states of affairs the intuitions are speaking to, and this so even if the imagined scenario 
can be made to occur in 'real life.' 
An example of a thought-experiment with no physical correlates is the logical possibility 
of phenomenal zombies: a zombie world is by stipulation not physically different from 
ours. Alternatively we might not be able to observe instead of intuit when the scenario is 
not feasibly realizable, such as Swamp-Man or Searle's Chinese Room.29 Though in all 
these cases, as so with the Gettier or Twin-Earth, even if we could meet Swamp-Man, 
build a Chinese Room, or visit a supposed zombie world, there are no experiments that 
could determine whether or not the 'zombie' has conscious experience; whether Swamp-
                                                 
29David Chalmers, The conscious mind; Donald Davidson, “Knowing one's own mind”; John Searle, 
"Minds, Brains, and Programs." 
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Man refers to anything; whether the Chinese Room understands Cantonese. In such cases 
the 'intuition' is necessary for the generation of a knowledge-claim. Again, no position on 
the exact nature of intuition need be taken. It is enough that there are imagined cases in 
philosophy such that there is no substitute for an agent evaluating the case in order to 
generate a knowledge-claim. 
In light of this, experimental philosophers have argued that, given the important role 
intuitions have played in philosophical theorizing, 'intuitions' (or whatever label we 
assign the mental phenomenon underlying judgment of this sort, sui generis or not) 
should be scientifically investigated to determine whether they are widely shared, 
whether they are reliable, what factors influence them, and what cognitive processes give 
rise to them. “This sort of question becomes especially pressing,” experimentalists write, 
“in cases where the intuitions are actually serving as evidence for a particular 
philosophical view.”30 This is so because, should certain intuitions prove variable, 
unstable, or produced by unreliable processes, they cannot well support philosophical 
theories in the ways described above. 
Recall that 'intuition' is the only method of generating a knowledge-claim in many of the 
cases considered by philosophers. Widespread variability and instability of intuitive 
response concerning some case should make us cautious about the epistemic status of 
intuitions about that case, and, in turn, theorizing on this basis. On the other hand, lack of 
variation and robustness is some evidence that the intuition is reliable. Note that the 
'truth-maker' of the intuition isn't the fact that majorities have the intuition under 
experimental conditions. Rather, experiment would provide evidence for something's 
being genuinely intuitive. Hopefully, what makes an intuition correct is that it describes 
what is the case, and that intuitiveness tracks this somehow. Widespread variation and 
instability in intuition and intuitive response makes it harder to discern which intuitions 
are 'tracking' what is, in fact, the case. 
                                                 
30
 John Knobe, Shaun Nichols, “An Experimental Philosophy Manifesto,” 8. 
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The major concern of the first phase of experimental philosophy was to conduct this sort 
of research, and we will look at some examples shortly. But, as I've emphasized, there is 
also the intrinsic interest of an explanatory account of intuition, independent of any 
metaphilosophical scruple; I will outline an example of the positive project in (iv), below. 
First I will make the prima facie case for the significance of experimental philosophy. 
2.2 The Prima Facie Case 
All this gets us the prima facie argument for the relevance of experimental philosophy. 
Earlier I divided up experimental philosophy in two related projects: one methodological, 
one positive. They are linked: the methodological project requires the input of the 
positive program. Conversely, the methodological project creates positive data. In light of 
this the prima facie case is an argument with a methodological conclusion, with the 
positive program appearing as a pair of premises (4 & 5). It goes like this: 
Premise 1. Philosophers use 'intuitions' as evidence to guide their theorizing.31 
Premise 2. These 'intuitions,' however we define them, are at the least a mental 
phenomenon: an agent has intuitions. 
Premise 3. Good theories include an account of their sources of evidence. 
Premise 4. Mental phenomena, including 'intuitions,' can (in principle) be 
accounted for. 
Premise 5. The best way to do so is by using normal methods of science. 
Conclusion: Good philosophical theories should include some scientific account 
of the source(s) of intuitive evidence they use. 
We've already discussed why the first two premises might be true. It is easy to find 
examples of 'intuition' guiding philosophical theorizing; and, further, it is clear from the 
                                                 
31While it may seem that only 'indirect' uses of intuitions are 'evidence,' we can adopt a wider notion of 
'evidence' that also captures the notion of the 'intuitive counter-example.' Opponents of experimental 
philosophy certainly balk at this sort of formulation. It might be strange to say of a premise in a deductive 
argument that it is 'evidence' for the conclusion derived. But of course we must distinguish between validity 
and soundness and ask after the latter: the soundness of an 'intuitive' premise is an evidential matter. 
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examples discussed above that nothing non-mental could 'substitute' for an intuition. It 
takes an agent.32 
The third premise I take to be an unassailable truism of the philosophy of science, one 
whose relevance to philosophical intuition has already been noted: “every scientific 
subdiscipline spends a good deal of effort identifying and correcting errors and artifacts” 
in their sources of evidence, as Robert Cummins notes, going on to suggest that there is 
no way to do so in the case of philosophical intuition.33 A telescope's heavenly 
deliverances are likely reliable if, when pointed at local mountains we see familiar peaks, 
if we have a sound theory of optics, and so on. There being no equivalent procedure for 
intuition, Cummins argues that we must forgo the theoretical virtue of understanding this 
source of evidence, a significant drawback. 
Yet perhaps, on this, he is incorrect: even if we cannot have “nonintuitive access to its 
[intuition's] targets,” as he puts it, investigation into the mental phenomena of intuitive 
judgement could bear some fruit, as premise 4 asserts. Here the idea is to test for the 
robustness, universality, and sources of intuitive judgment, as an indirect means of 
ascertaining their reliability. To some extent this reflects existing disciplinary 
commitment: when professional philosophers are themselves split over a case, appeal to 
intuition falters.34 Experimentalists propose to go further and not just catalog intuitive 
variation, but, in the context of the positive project, craft hypotheses that explain patterns 
of intuitive response. 
The indisputable success of science in such areas, I think, justifies the fifth premise; 
ultimately, the proof is in the doing, and hopefully extant positive research will show that 
it has been worthwhile. These two premises, (4) and (5) are at the heart of the positive 
                                                 
32Which is not to say that a philosophical conclusion that happens to be supported by an intuition cannot 
also be supported by argument. 
33Robert Cummins, “Reflections on Reflective Equilibrium,” 116. 
34The Philpapers survey results highlights interesting cases of intuitive disagreement such as Newcomb's 
paradox or the possibility of p-zombies. 
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program, for they affirm the possibility of a study of “the internal psychological factors” 
that “influence applications of a concept.”35 
Thus I wish to affirm the prima facie case for experimental philosophy. It merely states 
that experimental philosophy's two projects are of some philosophical importance. 
Opponents have resisted, typically, premises 1 or 5. 
Recall the eliminativist objection, which denies that philosophers rely on intuitions as 
evidence in the course of theorizing. It is then claimed that experimental philosophy is 'a 
mistake', because the significance of experimental philosophy was conditional on 
philosophical reliance on intuition. Some eliminativists claim that philosophical theories 
are not theories of intuition, or even of something's being intuitive, but of a priori truths. 
Intuition is one route to the a priori, but we should not mistake evidence with a source of 
evidence.36 Thus there is no sense in studying 'intuition,' which could only give us a 
posteriori psychological facts about 'intuitiveness,' but would not tell us anything of 
philosophical significance. 
Deutsch's argument, for instance, is that philosophy does not rely on intuition because its 
conclusions are a priori. Intuition qua mental phenomena is a posteriori psychology; but 
there is such a thing as a priori knowledge; Deutsch therefore concludes that 
experimental philosophy is attempting the impossible task of studying the latter via the 
former, resulting in an irrelevant folk psychology of concepts, poorly conducted to boot. 
Both aspects of experimental philosophy are wasted efforts.37 
In defence of the prima facie case for experimental philosophy, I will argue that 
philosophy does rely on a scientifically tractable notion of 'intuition,' the study of which 
is relevant to philosophy both methodologically and positively. Note that this prima facie 
case can be stated independently of any 'sceptical' result about the use of intuition: should 
                                                 
35Josh Knobe, Shaun Nichols. “An Experimental Philosophy Manifesto,” 5. 
36Max Deutsch, “Experimental Philosophy and the Theory of Reference.” 
37Others reject the methodological project but cautiously accept the positive program in a limited way: e.g., 
Timothy Williamson, “Philosophical Criticisms of Experimental Philosophy.”  
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intuitions 'hold up' under empirical scrutiny, friends of intuitions would have occasion to 
celebrate, for this would increase confidence in philosophical theorizing—an obvious 
good. The prima facie case only states that it would count as a metaphilosophical virtue 
to have a scientific account of intuitive evidence. 
Second, I will argue that the philosophical significance of the positive project is 
independent of any philosophical reliance on intuitions as evidence in theorizing: thus, 
even if 'eliminativism' was right about the metaphilosophical issue, there remains an 
interesting, substantive question about the nature and structure of pre-theoretic judgment. 
The positive project contributes to the methodological one to the extent that philosophy 
does use 'intuition,' broadly defined; but the interest of the former does not ride solely on 
that of the latter. 
Before considering the objections outlined above, however, I will explain in some further 
detail what it is that 'experimental philosophers' do in practice. This context is necessary 
to understand the critiques to come. 
2.3 What Experimental Philosophers Do 
The immediate precursor to contemporary 'experimental philosophy' is Stich's 1988 
Reflective Equilibrium, Analytic Epistemology and the Problem of Cognitive Diversity. In 
the paper, Stich argues that the set of cognitive practices privileged in analytic 
epistemology amount to an undefended ethnocentrism, for the relevant practices may 
well be different, and equally justified, in other cultures.38 The deliverances of intuition, 
then, reflect contingent, culturally acquired practices, threatening the method of intuitive 
armchair analysis. In a footnote, Stich writes that 
Evidence on this point, like evidence about cross-cultural differences in cognitive 
processes, is hard to come by and hard to interpret. But there are some intriguing 
hints in the literature.39 
                                                 
38Stephen Stich, “Reflective Equilibrium…”  
39Ibid., fn. 13 p. 111. 
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Stich points to the Yoruba, a West African people, as a possible example: lacking a 
distinction between knowledge and true belief (viz., our concept of 'justification'), the 
Yoruba nevertheless distinguish between beliefs acquired by immediate experience and 
beliefs not so acquired: “the Yoruba categories of epistemic evaluation,” Stich concludes, 
“are significantly different from our own.”40 The worry, then, is that intuition will simply 
reflect local categories, not a genuine 'kind.'41 This argument contains the seeds of the 
'methodological project' as I've defined it, for Stich's paper raises the specter of 'intuitive 
diversity' as a potential problem for philosophical reliance on intuition. 
This worry, in turn, ultimately derives from psychological work by Rosch and others 
suggesting that we do not represent concepts and categories in terms of sets of necessary 
and sufficient conditions.42 If this is so, 'intuition' may reflect local epistemic concepts 
that could very well differ in their specific 'genetic make-up' (metaphorically speaking) 
across the broad family of possible concepts that could be had. But, Stich acknowledges, 
more empirical evidence is required that this postulated 'genetic diversity' of epistemic 
concepts in fact exists. It is this reliance on 'scientific' data that distinguishes Stich's 
argument as an early form of 'experimental philosophy,' and the thought that philosophers 
could themselves produce the desired data was not far behind. 
Stich re-wrote and expanded on this argument in his book The Fragmentation of Reason. 
In a review by Alvin Goldman (a central target of Stich's) the following year, Goldman 
echoes Stich's concern over the relative paucity of evidence, writing that 
                                                 
40Ibid., fn. 13 p.111. 
41There is a great deal of research in linguistics about 'evidentials,' grammatical elements that indicate the 
nature of evidence for a given statement: one-quarter of the world's languages use some form of 
grammatical evidentiality, some quite complex, with five terms or more (Alexandra Aikhenvald, 
Evidentiality). 
42Eleanor Rosch, Carolyn Mervis, “Family Resemblances.” The classic 1975 article was re-printed in 
1998’s Re-Thinking Intuition. Experimental philosophers have conducted studies on 'psychological 
essentialism,' arguing that essentialist intuitions are “are culturally dependent, demographically variable, 
and easily malleable.” Edouard Machery, et al., “Is Folk Essentialism a Fundamental Feature of Human 
Cognition?” 
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...one wishes there were more definite evidence that there are cross-cultural 
differences in epistemic concepts. The one example Stich discusses ... is pretty 
inconclusive, a mere 'hint' as he himself puts it.43 
Searching for this evidence was seen as the first task of experimental philosophy, in the 
context of a 'negative' metaphilosophical / methodological project that criticized appeals 
to intuition in philosophy. Cross-cultural studies in epistemology followed in due course, 
with a sharply negative metaphilosophical bent. 
For example, 2001's Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions argues that there is no reason 
to think that intuitions have “real (as opposed to putative) normative force” in 
epistemology when it is not only possible, but actual, that epistemic intuitions differ 
widely between groups of people.44 The article presented evidence of systematic 
differences in epistemic intuitions between samples drawn from Western and East Asian 
populations on several variations of the 'Truetemp,' 'Gettier' and 'Fake Barn' cases. The 
experimental philosophers predicted such variations would be present based on work 
from Nisbett demonstrating systematic differences in various cognitive tasks between 
these populations. This is what the experimentalists found: populations drawn from East 
Asia (EA) exhibited systematically different intuitive responses from Westerners (W). A 
smaller sample size drawn from the Indian subcontinent differed from both EAs and 
Ws.45 
If epistemic intuitions differ, so will epistemic theories, for—as we've seen— intuitions 
are taken to constrain acceptable theories. So the experimentalists ask “why should we 
privilege our intuitions rather than the intuitions of some other group?”46 What makes a 
theory we've intuitively derived 'correct' other than we've derived it from our intuitions? 
The authors argue that the 'intuition-driven romanticism' of analytic epistemology 
                                                 
43Alvin Goldman, “Review: The Fragmentation of Reason,” 189. 
44Jonathan Weinberg et al., “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions,” 434. 
45Ibid, 439-441. 
46Ibid, 435. 
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amounts to a “culturally local endeavour ... what we might think of as ethno-
epistemology.”47 Conclude the authors, 
Intuition-Driven Romanticism (IDR) seems a rather bizarre way to determine the 
correct epistemic norms. For it is difficult to see why a process that relies heavily 
on epistemic intuitions that are local to one's own cultural and socioeconomic 
group would lead to genuinely normative conclusions.48 
Such conclusions are typical of the first phase of experimental philosophy, which focused 
primarily on intuitive variation as a challenge to philosophical methodology and its 
reliance on the intuitions of members of the profession. 
Variation was not solely demographic, moreover: while intuitive variation between 
individuals and groups might be one reason to remain wary of reliance on intuition, 
experimentalists have also found that many intuitions are not 'robust.' By this it is simply 
meant that an individual's intuitions about cases can be affected by apparently extraneous 
factors: the order cases were presented in, the specific wording of the case, features of the 
environment (smell, disorder, noise, font) and so on. For example, one study 
demonstrated significant 'framing' and 'ordering' effects on responses to Trolley-type 
scenarios.49 Even with identical outcomes, participant responses differed dramatically 
whether the words 'save' or 'kill' were used in the presented vignettes. It is difficult to 
maintain that one or the other wording is the 'correct' way to present the case: any 
'neutral' formulation is just another way of biasing the outcome (if we believe that 
affective content matters in moral judgment, say). These kinds of difficulties are 
pervasive and there is every reason to believe that we have only begun to discover 
unanticipated cross-dependencies of the sort above.50 
                                                 
47Ibid, 454. 
48Ibid, 454. 
49Lewis Petrinovich, Patricia O'Neill, “Influence of Wording and Framing…” 
50S. Matthew Liao et al., “Putting the Trolley in Order” presents original research and summarizes existing 
literature on the robustness of trolley-intuitions, which are susceptible to ordering effects, framing effects, 
etc., concluding that “undermines the supposed evidential status of intuitions about the loop case.” (661) 
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Not that such conclusions went unchallenged: opponents of this first phase either 
affirmed the reliability of reflective or 'expert' intuitions, or denied that intuitions as 
understood by the experimentalists played any significant role in contemporary 
philosophy. But also an interesting thing happened: put in practice, experimental 
philosophy turned out to be properly philosophical, and not just metaphilosophical. The 
results gathered in the methodological project were soon understood to be significant in 
their own right. This is the second, 'cognitive science' phase of experimental philosophy. 
The contrast between first and second generation work can be found in the table of 
contents of two anthologies published a decade apart. The widely-discussed 1998 volume 
Rethinking Intuition is wholly focused on the metaphilophical, methodological critique. It 
might be somewhat anachronistic to consider the book 'experimental philosophy' at all: 
no studies are conducted by philosophers, and the papers were all published well before 
the term 'experimental philosophy' was coined. Yet the basic approach is there: the 
relevance of psychology and cognitive science to the methods of analytic philosophy are 
discussed in detail.51 Several contributors are pessimistic about intuition-based methods 
(Stich, Cummins, Horowitz); others are more sanguine (Bealer, Sosa, DePaul). All would 
go on to debate the relevance of 'experimental philosophy' proper. 
Ten years later, with the publication of the collection simply titled Experimental 
Philosophy, only four of the twelve compiled papers are concerned with the 'negative' 
metaphilosophical project.52 More strikingly, in the period 2009-2013, of the 453 studies 
conducted by experimental philosophers compiled by Joshua Knobe and his student Ike 
Silver, very few at all were engaged in criticizing intuition: 
A number of experimental philosophers present their work as contributing to a 
‘negative’ program, which aims to show that people’s intuitions are 
fundamentally unreliable. These experimental philosophers have always described 
                                                 
51Michael DePaul, William Ramsey, Rethinking Intuition. The anthology's subtitle: 'The Psychology of 
Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry.' 
52Josh Knobe, Shaun Nichols (eds.), Experimental Philosophy. The 2013 follow-up, Experimental 
Philosophy Volume II, devotes only one of its five sections to 'metaphilosophy': three papers, one of them 
critical. 
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their approach, extremely accurately, as just one among the various different 
projects within the broad field of experimental philosophy. However, some 
metaphilosophical work by non-experimental philosophers seems to proceed on 
the assumption that this negative program is the main focus of contemporary 
experimental work. This assumption turns out to be wildly incorrect. In actual 
fact, contributions to this negative program account for only 1.1% of empirical 
studies in experimental philosophy in the past five years. The remaining 98.9% of 
studies aim to make some sort of positive contribution.53 
There is, of course, a reason that the 'negative methodological program' garnered so much 
attention: the claim was bold, the alleged consequences profound. Stich in particular was 
forceful, arguing that “the venerable tradition that views philosophy as a largely a priori 
discipline that can be pursued from the armchair is untenable” without intuition.54 This 
'first-phase' work is certainly still around.55 It should not, however, be identified with the 
whole of experimental philosophy. As Knobe and Silver note, 'positive theorizing' 
accounts for the overwhelming majority of research. 
What do experimental philosophers working on the 'positive project' do? A typical paper 
by experimental philosophers will take up a philosophical vignette or thought-experiment 
and pose the vignette to a number of subjects under several different conditions in an 
attempt to understand what cognitive processes underlie the intuitive responses 
generated. The guiding assumption is that the intuition probes will yield measurable and 
replicable context-sensitivity that, in turn, will help experimenters gain insight into 
aspects of human cognition. Hitherto unsuspected and robust 'interaction effects' between 
what appeared to be conceptually distinct items, experimentalists claim, tell us not only 
about how our minds work, but what constraints might be placed on philosophically 
adequate theories. 
An example is in order to show how this is supposed to work. In their 2010 paper 
Investigating the Neural and Cognitive Basis of Moral Luck, Young, Nichols and Saxe 
                                                 
53Josh Knobe, “What Experimental Philosophers Actually Do.”  
54Stich, “Experimental Philosophy and the Bankruptcy…” 
55Edouard Machery's upcoming book-length work entitled Metaphilosophy promises to extend first-phase 
arguments in light of a decade's worth of research in experimental philosophy. 
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produce experimental evidence in favour of what they term a 'rationalist account of moral 
luck.' Moral luck refers to a phenomenon whereby an agent can (rightly) be held as an 
object of moral judgment even though much of the judgment turns on factors that were 
outside of the agent’s control. Intuitively, we tend to find agents more blameworthy in 
situations with unlucky bad outcomes than with lucky good outcomes even if they 
performed the same action. This appears to violate a metaethical principle that we should 
only be held responsible for things that are in fact under our control (the ‘control 
principle’), and therefore that blameworthiness should not be influenced by luck, good or 
bad. Even worse, since in any given situation there are any number of factors that we 
cannot control, the problem of moral luck threatens to generalize: “it is impossible to 
morally assess anyone for anything if we adhere to the Control Principle” rigorously.56  
The experimentalists argue that the problems raised by the Control Principle require an 
empirical premise about the nature of moral judgment: that our moral judgments indeed 
track factors outside of an agent’s control, creating Control-violating asymmetries in 
moral judgment between lucky and unlucky outcomes. This premise is disputed. Instead, 
the experimentalists advance the ‘rationalist hypothesis,’ which is that moral luck 
asymmetries are not driven by outcome evaluation, but rather by mental state assessment, 
i.e., whether the agent had a justified belief that their actions wouldn’t have a harmful 
consequence.57 This move does not deny the existence of moral luck, but argues instead 
that moral evaluation proceeds on the basis of what we think an agent would reasonably 
believe in the circumstances presented: if one could reasonably anticipate the unlucky 
outcome but proceeds anyway, one is blameworthy, regardless of whether the unlucky 
outcome occurs. The hypothesis is ‘rationalist’ because the explanation is about beliefs, 
not outcomes. If this is correct, our moral intuitions do not directly violate Control, 
resolving the apparent paradox. 
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 Dana Nelkin, “Moral Luck.” 
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 Young et al., “Investigating the Neural and…” 333. 
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The hypothesis is then put to the test. We should keep in mind that such tests are not 
meant to be the final word in the issue; it is part of the implicit methodology of analytic 
philosophy to present conclusive arguments in an attempt to settle the matter definitely. 
Empirical research is different, and the authors of this paper are aware of this difference 
(as experimental philosophers are generally). The open-ended nature of empirical 
conclusions is not a drawback, but just a general feature of such research.  
That being said, the paper has all the hallmarks of good experimental philosophy: an 
intuition-driven philosophical literature, a clever experimental set-up, a discovered 
'interaction effect' assumed to be psychologically real, and a philosophically-relevant 
conclusion. Let's look at these in turn. Notice the absence of any 'methodological 
skepticism' about intuition, showing the positive program to be indeed distinct. 
First, let’s take a deeper look at the intuitive problem. As Nagel sets it out in Mortal 
Questions: 
Prior to reflection it is intuitively plausible that people cannot be morally assessed 
for what is not their fault, or for what is due to factors beyond their control ... 
Without being able to explain exactly why, we feel that the appropriateness of 
moral assessment is easily undermined by the discovery that the act or attribute, 
no matter how good or bad, is not under the agent's control ... So a clear absence 
of control, produced by involuntary movement, physical force, or ignorance of the 
circumstances, excuses what is done from moral judgment.  
But what we do depends in many more ways than these on what is not under our 
control ... and external influences in this broader range are not usually thought to 
excuse what is done from moral judgment, positive or negative ... The things for 
which people are morally judged are determined in more ways than we at first 
realize by what is beyond their control. And when the seemingly natural 
requirement of fault or responsibility is applied in light of these facts, it leaves 
few pre-reflective moral judgments intact. Ultimately, nothing or almost nothing 
about what an agent does seems to be under his control.58 
Paradox. Reflection on moral luck in light of the Control Principle seemingly removes 
the very possibility of moral judgment. The issue of moral luck does “appear to grow 
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inevitably from the consistent application of ordinary standards,” as Nagel has it.59 The 
principle that moral judgments ought not to depend on luck appears to imperil all moral 
judgment, since 'moral luck' is a ubiquitous feature of life. Nagel says the principle itself 
is 'intuitive'; and a similar appeal to what we “usually think” is deployed when he claims 
that a broad range of external factors do not “excuse what is done from moral 
judgment.”60 The entire discussion, and the very idea of 'ordinary standards,' is couched 
in the extended vocabulary of intuitive plausibility. 
As such, the literature seemed a fruitful target for experimental investigation. Recall that 
the main goal of the 'positive project' was to achieve explanatory depth in accounting for 
the actual patterns of people's intuitions. This was precisely what Young et al. set out to 
do. They note that the traditional accounts of moral luck “suggest that moral luck reflects 
the direct influence of the outcome on moral judgments,” such that bad outcomes 
independently entail more moral blame.61 The experimentalists, however, offer a 
different hypothesis:  
...moral luck depends primarily on observers’ assessment of the beliefs and 
intentions of the unlucky agent. That is, people’s different judgments of lucky and 
unlucky agents are due primarily to the difference between true and false beliefs, 
rather than neutral and bad outcomes.62 
The experimentalists suggest that the actual pattern of intuitive response to cases of 
moral luck is better explained by such a 'rationalist' account over an outcome-based 
account. Our moral judgments, the hypothesis goes, are primarily driven by the fact that 
we view the (false) beliefs of unlucky agents as less justified in virtue of the bad outcome 
(and not driven by the bad outcome directly). Young et al. tested this hypothesis in a 
clever way: they presented experimental subjects with a vignette in which an agent was 
'extra-lucky' (as opposed to unlucky) in a way that undermined the justification for his 
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 Ibid, 27. I take all talk of ‘ordinary standards,’ of what we ‘usually think,’ etc., to be part of the broad 
vocabulary of intuition. 
60Ibid, 25, 27. 
61Liane Young et al., “Investigating the Neural and Cognitive Basis of Moral Luck,” 334. 
62Ibid. 
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belief, though the outcome was 'neutral' and not bad. Subjects responding to the vignette 
did indeed hold the agent morally blameworthy in the absence of a bad outcome, 
suggesting that the lack of justification drives the judgment. 
Actually, the experimental set-up was more complicated: 54 different vignettes were 
tested, testing multiple combinations of background, belief, and outcome in the context of 
two separate behavioral experiments (one asking a question about justification, and 
another about blameworthiness) and one fMRI experiment. In essence, the 
experimentalists wanted fine-grained data about intuitive response to 'moral luck cases' 
controlling for the agent's reasons for belief, the truth of the belief, and the outcome of 
the action based on the belief.   
This is exactly what we should want if we are to use 'intuition' as a constraint on 
theorizing as a point of good methodology: instead of focusing on one 'crucial' case, 
multiple variants are tested to check for unexpected cross-dependencies and results. This 
is especially important if we reflect on the fact that surprising counter-examples have 
structured philosophical argument in the past: the 'right' case can steer research and guide 
discussion for, it seems, decades. By exploring more variant cases and searching the 
'possibility space' more systematically, experimental philosophers are increasing our 
chances of finding the sorts of cases and arguments that result in better theories. 
The vignettes here were all variations on a 'bathtub' case where a parent ('Mitch') is about 
to give a bath to their two-year old. The phone rings, and Mitch tells the child to stay put 
and leaves to answer the phone. The child could listen (good outcome); could climb into 
the bath (neutral); or could climb into the bath and subsequently drown (bad). The parent 
could also have varying degrees of justification in their belief that the child would listen 
and stay put. Importantly the vignette sought to control for any contributions to moral 
judgment made by false belief and by poor outcome. As the authors put it, 
To compare the contributions of false beliefs and bad outcomes to moral luck, we 
therefore introduced an “extra lucky” condition, in which the agent’s belief was 
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false but the outcome was neutral (e.g., Mitch’s son climbs into the tub but ends 
up, luckily, fine).63 
Again, in line with the intentions of the positive project, the experimentalists working on 
moral luck sought further 'explanatory depth' in the pattern of intuitive response and 
found that beliefs, not outcomes, account for judgment in cases of 'moral luck': 
As predicted, we found that false beliefs contribute more to moral luck than bad 
outcomes: the difference in moral blame for false versus true beliefs was greater 
than the difference in moral blame for bad versus neutral outcomes. Agents with 
false beliefs were judged to be more blameworthy than agents with true beliefs, 
even when no bad outcome occurred. For example, Mitch was blamed more when 
his belief was false (e.g., his son gets in the tub) than when his belief was true 
(e.g., his son stays put), even when no harm came to his son in either case.64 
Interestingly, the authors suggest that in the subset of cases where differences in 
outcomes do lead to differences in moral judgments, the order of explanation is reversed: 
moral judgments seem to influence mental state judgments, so that harsh moral 
judgments leads to a critical view of the agent's justification, perhaps because we wish to 
find a rational justification for our ‘gut’ moral judgment.65 But such cases are typically 
already those of clear-cut negligence or recklessness involving agents “who are already 
unjustified to think they won't cause harm.”66  
The experimentalists conclude that bad outcomes are not the primary drivers of 
judgment. Indeed, it turns out that 
When assigning moral blame, we care mostly about whether agents are justified 
in thinking that they won’t cause harm. To the extent that moral luck asymmetries 
are driven by such mental state assessments, we may be able to defend a rational 
approach to morality.67 
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This is a philosophically significant conclusion, if correct. The paradox raised by Nagel 
was that 'external factors' outside of agent control always impinge on outcome. Outcome, 
in turn, influences moral judgment; yet we shouldn't be held accountable for factors 
outside of our control. What Young et al. show is that outcome is secondary to evaluation 
of an agent's belief-states, defusing the paradox: there is such a thing as 'moral luck,' of 
course, but moral evaluation proceeds via evaluation of an agent's justification in a 
context, not luck.   
This paper is a perfect example of what experimental philosophers engaged in the 
positive project are doing. First we begin with a genuinely philosophical issue that has 
primarily been discussed in terms of broad intuition-vocabulary (including, e.g., 
'ordinary' evaluations and principles, what 'we usually think / say,' what 'we would think 
if...' and so on). Then we have an alternative hypothesis derived from extant literature in 
cognitive science, which is put to the test in a fine-grained way. As I’ve emphasized, of 
particular importance is the move away from single examples towards multiple variations 
of vignettes to control for all possible factors (away from deployment of intuition as a 
kind of 'crucial thought-experiment').68 In this case the data, it is claimed, lends credence 
to a 'rationalist' hypothesis whereby moral evaluation tracks the beliefs of agents, not 
lucky or unlucky outcomes.  
But the conclusion is not merely a conclusion of cognitive science: it is of philosophical 
significance. In showing that mental-state assessments are more important than outcomes 
in moral judgment, the 'problem' of moral luck appears potentially soluble rather than 
paradoxical. The issue, recall, was that the pervasive phenomenon of moral luck, together 
with the Control Principle, seemed to conflict with our ordinary judgments of 
blameworthiness. If asymmetries in judgment are driven by outcome bias, adherence to 
the Control Principle tells us such judgments are wrong; the point generalizes, for all 
outcomes are subject to moral luck, and all moral judgments suspect. But what if the 
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antecedent is false? What if intuitive moral judgment is not driven by outcome bias, but 
by consideration of the mental states of agents and what they could reasonably be held to 
believe (and how justified they are in believing so)? While the paper does not definitely 
establish this is so—and, moreover, does not pretend to sort out normative issues which 
cannot be settled by experiment—the problem of moral luck can be re-interpreted in a 
different light. It might have been a mistake to assume outcome bias generates a deep 
puzzle.  
Experimental philosophy asks us to re-consider the crucial ‘agential’ aspect of the issue, 
just as I argued in the prima facie case. Consider, again, the basic issue: 
Moral luck occurs when an agent can be correctly treated as an object of moral 
judgment, despite the fact that a significant aspect of what he is assessed for 
depends on factors beyond his control.69 
The critical assumption examined by the experimentalists was precisely ‘what he is 
assessed for,’ which turned out to be, plausibly, not the outcome, but relevant beliefs and 
their justification. This is the specific point in the question where our judgments figure (it 
takes an agent to morally evaluate; but what it is that we are evaluating, precisely?). And, 
just as the prima facie case argued, a better understanding of the sources of our judgment 
led to a certain measure of additional theoretical insight that is applicable to philosophy. 
In this way 'experimental philosophy' is, indeed, both. Let us turn, then, to some 
detractors. 
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Chapter 3  
3 Eliminativism About Intuitions 
3.1 The Eliminativist Objection (in brief) 
The prima facie case in favor of experimental philosophy relies on premises that may be 
disputed. The first premise states that philosophers routinely use intuitions, without, 
however, specifying the exact nature of this use, or indeed what intuitions are. The 
eliminativist objection, meanwhile, denies that philosophers rely on intuitions as 
evidence. This is taken to show that experimental philosophy is a confused project (a 'big 
mistake') as the significance of experimental philosophy was conditional on philosophical 
reliance on intuition. 
We distinguish two related versions of eliminativism about intuitions in philosophy. The 
first, is a straight-forward rejection of premise 1 of the prima facie case: that philosophers 
do rely on intuitions as evidence. If we can eliminate intuition-talk entirely, and show that 
philosophical argument nowhere appeals to intuition, then the entire case for 
experimental philosophy fails to get off the ground. This is so for the 'positive' but 
especially the 'methodological' projects: in the case of the latter, if there are no appeals to 
intuition in philosophy, we don't need to worry about the reliability of intuitive evidence 
or indeed are obligated to provide any account of intuition. In the case of the former, it is 
claimed that empirical study of intuitiveness is not properly philosophical, but a part of 
another discipline (sociology, psychology, etc). 
This is the position of Cappelen, who has forcefully argued that, because philosophy does 
not rely on intuition at all, there is nothing for experimental philosophers to study; it has 
all been wasted effort. As Cappelen writes, “if philosophers don't rely on intuitions, then 
the project of checking people's intuitions is philosophically pointless.”70 
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An interesting variant is Williamson's eliminativism, who assimilates 'intuition' into a 
more general capacity to 'handle counterfactuals.' Philosophy does not rely on a special 
sort of rational insight ('intuition') but does often leverage a very prosaic sort of ability: to 
imagine counterfactual circumstances and evaluate features of them, which is not 
exclusively a priori. The reliability of this sort of evaluation is generally taken for 
granted in our everyday life. Why reserve a special scepticism for philosophy's 
counterfactuals?   Absent a principled reason, experimental philosophy's methodological 
scepticism over-generates scepticism about counterfactual evaluation across the board, 
surely an intolerable result. The upshot is the same for both Williamson and Cappelen: 
philosophy does not rely on 'intuition,' even a little, though they disagree with each other 
on what philosophical methodology is.71 
Deutsch's brand of eliminativism is somewhat different. He does not directly reject 
premise (1) of the prima facie case, but argues that what really supports philosophical 
theorizing is a priori knowledge, of which intuition might be a 'causal source.' He denies 
that something's being intuitive is evidence for its truth; in this sense, philosophy does not 
rely on intuitive evidence. It relies on a priori knowledge. Crucially, however, no amount 
of empirical work could shed light on the a priori via investigation of intuition; this is 
simply a category mistake. Therefore, the entire project of experimental philosophy rests 
on a simple conceptual confusion.72 
I will respond to Cappelen, Williamson and Deutsch in what follows. Against Cappelen, I 
will argue that intuition, understood as an irreducibly mental phenomenon, is an aspect 
that cannot be eliminated from philosophical methodology's use of cases. Cappelen's 
argument for eliminativism effectively defines intuitions out of existence by placing 
implausible constraints on that intuitions are and how they support theories; but close 
examination of cases vindicates the view that intuitions do play a role. Williamson’s 
argument that experimental philosophers ‘over-generate’ skepticism I will dispute by 
marking a distinction between theoretical contexts and ordinary evaluation. Finally, 
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against Deutsch, I will (roughly) argue that apriority plays a methodologically equivalent 
role, and is as such is vulnerable to my rebuttal to Cappelen. Along the way, in each case 
I will have more to say about the arguments and frameworks presented by these authors. 
3.2 Philosophy Does Not Rely On Intuitions 
3.2.1 A Preliminary: The Thesis of ‘Centrality’  
Cappelen’s version of the eliminativist objection denies that philosophers rely on 
'intuition' in any form. Above, we've seen a few examples of the deployment of intuitions 
in philosophy: two famous cases (Twin Earth, Gettier) and a less-known case (Sobel 
sequences). I've already argued that, in all three cases, an ineliminable mental component 
remains: an agent has to judge the case, and nothing can substitute for the agent. I did not 
provide a definition of intuition; instead I looked to these examples, in effect saying that 
this is the target of investigation, whatever it should turn out to be. 
In the case of Twin Earth, the argument requires an intuition about linguistic intent: 
whether 'water' was indeed used as a natural kind term. The Gettier scenario requires us 
to intuit whether or not it constitutes a case of knowledge. The seemingly innocuous fact 
that the Gettier scenario is easily made to occur in reality leads us to realize the important 
role intuitive judgment indeed plays: as Williamson noted, actualized Gettier instances do 
not offer independent access to the presence or absence of 'knowledge' in a way purely 
imagined scenarios do not. Finally, Moss' discussion of Reverse Sobel Sequences 
explicitly and self-consciously relied on the relative intuitive acceptability of sets of 
ordered sentences in order to develop an adequate pragmatic theory. Perhaps all these 
judgments form a distinct kind; perhaps they are a motley; nothing rides on this. The 
important thing is that 'intuition' and its extended vocabulary ('judgment,' 'acceptability,' 
'ordinary talk,' 'what we'd say,' etc.; I identified a similar feature in the case of moral 
luck) features at least sometimes in philosophical argument, and it not obviously 
replaceable by something else. 
For some philosophers, appeal to intuition is the distinctive method of philosophy: as 
Bealer puts it, 
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it is truistic that intuitions are used as evidence (or reasons) in our standard 
justificatory practices … it is safe to say that these intuitions—and conclusions 
based on them—determine the structure of contemporary debates in 
epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of logic, language, and mind. Clearly, 
it is our standard justificatory procedure to use intuitions as evidence (or as 
reasons).73 
Bealer's conception of philosophy is as a distinctly a priori field that is, at least in 
principle, autonomous and authoritative in virtue of intuition as a “basic source of 
evidence” with a reliable modal tie to truth.74 
My argument in the prime facie case, however, does not rest on intuitions being 
distinctive of philosophical methodology (any more than it rests on philosophical 
intuitions constituting “a single epistemic and psychological kind.”75) Nor on intuitions 
being especially prevalent or on any particular substantive view of intuition. The only 
crucial fact is that examples can be offered of the practice, and that that is the thing we 
wish to study (scientifically, if possible). I will not focus on views such a Bealer's, then, 
since they are not crucial to the argument. 
The multiple competing and conflicting accounts of what intuition consists of provides 
some evidence that the practice exists: it is hard to imagine that not only Bealer, but 
Goldman, Jackson, Sosa, Kornblith, BonJour, Papineau, Nagel, and Chalmers (to name a 
few!), in offering distinct positive accounts of intuition, are really theorizing about an 
illusion, something that does not really exist.76 Appealing to consensus is not definitive, 
of course, but given how widespread the view that intutions do figure in argument is, the 
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burden of proof is thereby increased. Of particular importance to the game of shifting 
burdens is the fact that ‘intuition’ is not posited to exist in order to serve some 
explanatory burden: friends of intuition do not infer that there are intuitions (as one might 
infer a planet from observation of gravitational anomaly); they (claim to) experience the 
having of intuition, which then plays an important role in argument. 
Faced with such apparently clear-cut cases of appeal to intuition, and the seeming 
disciplinary consensus about their existence, it might be difficult to imagine anyone 
endorsing straight eliminativism. Yet Cappelen's Philosophy Without Intuitions does just 
this: 
Our alleged reliance on the intuitive makes many philosophers who don’t work in 
metaphilosophy concerned about their own discipline: they are unsure what 
intuitions are and whether they can carry the evidential weight we allegedly 
assign to them. The goal of this book is to argue that this concern is unwarranted 
since the claim is false: it is not true that philosophers rely extensively (or even a 
little bit) on intuitions as evidence. At worst, analytic philosophers are guilty of 
engaging in somewhat irresponsible use of ‘intuition’-vocabulary.77 
Cappelen's basic argument takes aim at a thesis he calls centrality: 
Centrality (of Intuitions in Contemporary Philosophy): Contemporary analytic 
philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence (or as a source of evidence) for 
philosophical theories.78 
There are several points of ambiguity in Cappelen's articulation of 'centrality,' to which 
he admits. This a reflection of the methodological situation in analytic philosophy: there 
is too little agreement to generate a target that is both clear and wide-ranging. For 
instance, 'centrality' does not tell us whether philosophical reliance on intuition is 
distinctive of philosophy; whether it is the sole source of evidence for philosophical 
theorizing; whether it is a normative or a descriptive thesis.79 He does provide a 
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'diagnostic' for the presence of intuition: that they have a special phenomenology and 
foundational epistemic status deriving solely from conceptual competence. Cappelen 
argues that when we attend to apparent appeals to intuitions more carefully, we see that 
these 'diagnostics' are in fact absent: there are no intuitions to be found. Thus 
philosophers do not appeal to intuitions.  
The importance of experimental philosophy, Cappelen argues, depends on the assumption 
of centrality. Cappelen grants that, if centrality were the case, “we should find out 
whether the intuitions philosophers appeal to are representative and reliable.”80 He terms 
this ‘the conditional insight of experimental philosophy.’ His argument against centrality 
thus turns into a modus tollens against experimental philosophy. 
My own strategy in the prima facie case was to point to concrete examples of appeal to 
intuition and forgo any attempt at diagnostic or definition, with one exception: what we 
found in common across the Twin Earth, Gettier and Sobel cases was an ineliminable 
mental aspect. An agent has intuitions, and nothing substitutes for the intuition. Cappelen, 
for his part, considers several concrete cases of his own, and comes to the opposite 
conclusion: no appeal to intuition can be found.81 
I will proceed as follows. First I will argue that Cappelen's argument against intuitions, 
and experimental philosophy, is far more radical than he lets on. This is because he not 
only denies that intuitions plays any role in philosophy, but also endorses Williamson's 
view that there are no conceptual / analytic truths. This view is congenial to many 
experimentalists who also deny the possibility of conceptual analysis, though on different 
grounds. The problem with Cappelen's argument is that it requires, implausibly, that 
philosophers were doubly mistaken about what it is they do: about intuitions, and about 
analysis. 
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I will then argue that Cappelen's case studies are mistaken in this regard: there is an 
ineliminable mental component present in many such cases, plausibly labeled 'intuition'; 
that this component plays an important dialectical role, which Cappelen unhappily 
mischaracterizes; and, finally, that this role can be investigated, using the methods of 
normal science, in the context of both the methodological and positive projects. 
3.2.2 Cappelen’s Reliance on Williamson 
First, then, we should note a striking aspect of Cappelen's view: he does not only deny 
that philosophy relies on intuition, but also militates against the practice of conceptual 
analysis. Cappelen endorses arguments due to Williamson to the effect that “there is no 
philosophically interesting phenomenon plausibly labeled as a conceptual truth or 
analyticity … the search for conceptual justification is like the search for unicorns.”82 
Cappelen denies that successful analyses of concepts such as “truth, freedom, knowledge, 
reference, causation, consciousness, forgiveness, agenthood, etc.” could be given.83 I 
wish to make two points about Cappelen's position on conceptual analysis in relation to 
experimental philosophy. 
One, it is true that many experimental philosophers engaged in the 'methodological' 
project believe that intuitions are not reliable, and should not be used as evidence for 
philosophical theories. Often these philosophical theories take the form of proposed 
analyses of concepts. For some, such as Stich, the ultimate upshot is that the practice of 
conceptual analysis in analytic epistemology is without foundation; as such it is to be 
abandoned.84 The same basic argument has been extended to other areas of philosophy, 
such as reference in the philosophy of language.85 
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In effect, many of the experimental philosophers who see in intuitions no evidential value 
agree with Cappelen that conceptual analysis is to be abandoned in many areas. 
Superficially it seems that while they agree on the issue of conceptual analysis, they do so 
on different grounds. But, point two, in fact the respective positions are surprisingly 
close. Cappelen endorses Williamson's argument against 'analyticity' which relies on a 
premise about possible variation in the evaluation of cases. The only difference is that 
Williamson, and Cappelen, do not think the variation in question is variation in 'intuition' 
or 'intuitive response.’ But I think that both are working with a too restrictive account of 
intuition. Williamson’s argument against analyticity, as we will see, holds that an agent 
can always understand a candidate analytic proposition in such a way as to hold it to be 
false. I’ve been describing ‘intuition’ broadly: chiefly by example, while stressing that 
agents have intuitions. Williamson’s case against analyticity is, in effect, arguing that we 
should expect variability across agent judgments about cases, and draws a negative 
conclusion from this: there are no analytic truths. This is quite compatible with 
experimental philosophy; to show this I will explain Williamson’s argument in a little 
further detail. 
Cappelen agrees with Williamson that “there is no such thing as conceptual possibility or 
conceptual necessity,” and therefore there are no conceptual truths relevant to 
philosophy.86 This is because 'nothing at all' is epistemically available solely on the basis 
of linguistic or conceptual competence, and so there is nothing to ground analyticity. 
Williamson observes, correctly in my view, that “metaphysical conceptions of analyticity 
do not themselves imply that linguistic or conceptual competence constrains one’s 
attitudes to analytic sentences or thoughts.”87 My point is that these notions (linguistic 
and conceptual competence) are the kind of agent-centric mental phenomena 
experimental philosophy aims to investigate. There is a rapprochement in the negative 
arguments of Williamson’s that Cappelen endorses; one’s interest in the empirical 
investigation of these factors as they relate to analyticity, or conceptual truth, may vary, 
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of course, but they surely fall within the domain of experimental philosophy. What I want 
to draw out here is that Cappelen endorsing Williamson on analyticity means he also 
endorses Williamson’s premise that empirical facts about linguistic and conceptual 
competence impinge on the evaluation of propositions (in this case, candidate analytic 
truths). This is probably enough to get the prima facie case off the ground. 
More specifically, how does Williamson make his case? To begin, friends of analyticity 
hold that understanding leading to assent is a marker of something's being analytic: 
…if someone is unwilling to assent to the sentence “Every vixen is a female fox,” 
the obvious hypothesis is that they do not understand it, perhaps because they do 
not understand the word “vixen.” The central idea behind epistemological 
conceptions of analyticity is that, in such cases, failure to assent is not merely 
good evidence of failure to understand; it is constitutive of such failure.88 
Consider an even simpler example, the sentence S: “Every Vixen is a Vixen.” Anyone 
who understands it, assents to it. Williamson argues that it is perfectly possible to 
understand S but withhold assent. Suppose Peter believes that universal quantification is 
existentially committing, and does not believe foxes exist (perhaps he is a very strange 
sort of conspiracy theorist). Peter understands, and rejects, S.89 Or perhaps Stephen has a 
truth-gap theory of vague predicates and believes there are borderline cases of foxhood---
evolutionary ancestors who are not clearly foxes or non-foxes—such that for some x, 'x is 
vixen' is neither true nor false. This entails that 'if x is a vixen, then x is a vixen' is neither 
true nor false.90 This leads Stephen to reject S, on the basis of a sophisticated (though 
controversial) theory of vagueness; but more controversial still, Williamson claims, is a 
construal of 'understanding' such that every gap-theorist of the sort does not understand 
the predicates and logical constants they fluently deploy, and argue over, in their 
language: in effect the epistemological conception of analyticity implies that only those 
who have a fully complete and correct logic understand much of the language they speak. 
This is too strong. 
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Therefore, concludes Williamson, we cannot ground analyticity in understanding and 
assent, for failure to assent to a sentence is not constitutive of not understanding. This is 
because, roughly, other (logical, semantic, conceptual, etc.) commitments may lead to a 
failure of assent that is not indicative of misunderstanding. Writes Williamson, 
The underlying style of argument against links from understanding to assent or 
dispositions to assent is quite general. For each candidate one must still find 
appropriate counterexamples … nevertheless, with a little ingenuity one always 
succeeds.91 
In essence, what Williamson is arguing here is that, for any putative analytic truth, there 
is a way of 'understanding' the terms involved that denies the candidate analytic truth. 
This is, again, because linguistic and conceptual competence do not constrain judgments 
or attitudes and thus cannot ground analyticity. 
But then, one might object, how are we to account for meaning at all? What gives the 
multiple uses and understandings of a term a common meaning, if not some invariant 
feature(s)? Williamson claims that “the complex interrelations of the constituents, above 
all, their causal interrelations” is enough to make a “unity out of diversity” of linguistic 
practice.92 
I claimed above that linguistic and conceptual competence’s relation to understanding 
and assent was itself a subject of empirical investigation. Here the resemblance was to the 
methodological program, and the conclusion akin to the negative wing: since a variety of 
judgments could be made about candidate analytic sentences in virtue of agent-centric 
facts about competence, we should abandon the notion of analytic truth, and, further, the 
project of giving conceptual analyses. Now this might be right or wrong; but it doesn’t 
show that experimental philosophers have nothing to do.  
In this instance Williamson’s positive account of linguistic meaning (the ‘complex 
interrelations’) lends itself to empirical scrutiny, now more akin to the ‘positive’ 
                                                 
91Ibid, 120. 
92Ibid, 123. 
47 
 
program. Experimental philosophers, in the terms of Williamson’s metaphilosophy, are 
investigating aspects of these 'complex interactions' as they play out cognitively, in a 
systematic effort to understand the conceptual evaluations that are actually made. As I 
argued in the case of ‘moral luck,’ sometimes the patterns uncovered are philosophically 
interesting. In fact the prevailing pattern of research findings in the positive program is 
finding surprising causal interrelations in response. Most famously, perhaps, in the case 
of the ‘Knobe effect’, which postulates that attribution of intentional action shows “a 
systematic sensitivity to moral considerations.”93 More specifically, it seems there is an 
important asymmetry: we are more likely to say some side-effect was done intentionally 
if it brings about harm than if it helped. It’s a good example of these ‘complex 
interactions’ at play.  
I do not mean to endorse the specific claims and conclusions of Williamson’s 
metaphilosophy. Rather I am arguing the key claims Cappelen relies on in the course of 
his anti-experimental argument are compatible with experimental philosophy, and do not 
undermine the explanatory ambitions practitioners have given themselves. Instead the 
key premises of the prima facie case can be easily translated into the metaphilosophical 
picture provided by Williamson, provided we keep to the broad use of intuition I have 
recommended.     
Cappelen downplays the significance of this apparent mutual concord by claiming that 
philosophy has never relied on ‘intuition,’ and that conceptual analysis is (and always 
was) a marginal, at best, activity within analytic philosophy—so that the concord on the 
negative thesis is of minimal significance. 
Again, this seems at odds with philosophy's self-conception, but Cappelen is unmoved by 
appeal to self-conception: 
The case studies showed no evidence of conceptual analysis being an activity 
philosophers actively try to engage in. Just as philosophers have false beliefs 
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about the role of intuitions in philosophy they have false beliefs about the role of 
conceptual analysis in philosophy.94 
At this point we might suspect a sleight of hand on the part of Cappelen: his argument 
that philosophy does not rely on intuitions, nor on conceptual analysis, is largely based on 
arguments to the effect that there are no such things as 'intuitions' (only irresponsible uses 
of intuition-vocabulary) and no such thing as conceptual analysis (only false beliefs about 
concepts and analyses). But of course it is possible to rely, mistakenly, on fictions: there 
never were such a thing as phlogiston, but early modern scientists routinely relied on 
phlogiston to explain combustion. It would be a bizarre argument to claim that 17th-
century theories of combustion did not rely, even a bit, on phlogistons, since phlogistons 
do not in fact exist. Cappelen wishes to avoid commitment to this argument and seeks to 
explain away intuition-talk, redescribing what appears and is described as 'appeal to 
intuition' as normal argument. 
In effect, he is arguing that philosophy ought not adopt the metaphilosophical view that 
appeal to intuition is a significant part of the analytic toolkit, since there are no such 
things, and we do not in fact use them even when we think we do (there has only been 
loose, careless talk of intuition, then mistakenly reified). At the level of descriptive 
practice there are no genuine 'appeals to intuition.' Philosophy is in order (and has always 
been); metaphilosophy has been led astray. 
But this move—and this is my second complaint about Cappelen's radicalism—is in 
tension with his position on conceptual analysis. This means that it is not just 
metaphilosophy that has been led astray. Cappelen's argument against intuition targeted a 
metaphilosophical misconception; but Williamson's argument against analyticity is 
directed at the level of philosophical practice, not metaphilosophy. And so Cappelen 
wishes, too, to re-interpret philosophical practice as not really being about conceptual 
analysis. This requires two sets of false beliefs on the part of philosophers: one, a 
erroneous metaphilosophical theory about the methods employed in the course of 
argumentation ('intuition'); second, a dual mistake about analyticity and what the 
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philosophical arguments themselves are attempting to establish (an 'analysis'). It is rather 
different to say “that's not an intuition, but really a (disguised) argument,” than “here is a 
philosophical argument showing there are no analytic truths.”  The first re-describes 
practice. The second exhorts us to switch practices.95 
The problem is that the absence of analytic truths does not show that philosophy does not 
at least attempt to provide analyses, the way that the non-existence of intuitions might 
show that philosophy does not in fact rely on intuition (provided an appropriate re-
description can be provided). Yet if philosophers are attempting to provide analyses, they 
are issuing judgments of conceptual applicability—e.g., phlogiston-like 'intuitions.' Now, 
as it turns out, these intuitions are not reliable for the project of conceptual analysis, 
because there are no relevant analyticities to ground (or justify) them—perhaps that 
makes them merely ersatz intuitions, not 'genuine' ones, since there are none. But reliance 
even on ersatz intuitions goes against Cappelen's argument, which is that philosophy does 
not rely (and has never relied) on intuitions, ‘even a little.’ And reliance on ersatz 
intuitions is an inevitable by-product of conceptual analysis, misguided or not. 
Cappelen’s eliminativism is not that philosophers should abandon intuitions, but that 
intuitions were never really appealed to; they were an illusory metaphilosophical 
construct all along. 
For consistency’s sake, Cappelen's attempt to re-describe methodological reliance on 
intuition-talk thus requires that conceptual analysis, too, can be relevantly re-described, 
and further that many philosophers held 'false beliefs' about what they were doing: not 
conceptual analysis, but something else. Cappelen's case against intuitions in philosophy 
rests not only on being able to describe intuition-talk in other terms, but on showing that 
purported instances of (attempts at) conceptual analysis were, all along, something else, 
despite philosophers taking themselves to be doing conceptual analysis. Sometimes quite 
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vociferously so!96  In sum, it is far more plausible than intuition-talk was misdescribed, 
and misleading, than the entire project of conceptual analysis really being something else 
all along. But Cappelen really does claim that philosophers have had false beliefs about 
analysis—and not just engaged in a fruitless endeavour, but mistaken about the nature of 
the endeavour itself. On this point he writes that “just as philosophers have false beliefs 
about the role of intuitions in philosophy they have false beliefs about the role of 
conceptual analysis in philosophy.”97 As I’ve been stressing, however, there is an 
important difference between eliminating intuitions by claiming that intuition-talk can be 
relevantly re-described (so that we have never, in fact, relied on intuition) and arguing 
that conceptual analysis is wrong-headed—which is not an eliminativist argument.  
To recapitulate, Cappelen's rejection of analytic truths does the following three things: (1) 
it agrees with some conclusions of the negative methodological program, viz., that 
armchair conceptual analysis should be abandoned (offering an argument from 
competence that is, itself, subject to experimental philosophy's investigations); (2) it does 
so by endorsing Williamson's positive picture of meaning as sets of complex, causal 
inter-relations, which can be relevantly re-described in terms familiar to the 
experimentalist of the positive program; (3) it implausibly suggests that the abandonment 
of intuition-talk and conceptual analysis is not radical, but an uncontroversial (re-) 
description of contemporary philosophical methodology, though the former and the latter 
are importantly different. 
Of these three things, the last is most important. Even if there are no 'real' intuitions, the 
practice of conceptual analysis appeals to 'ersatz' intuitions as a matter of course: this is 
why Cappelen must marginalize the practice. If Cappelen is right that philosophers do 
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not, and have never, relied on intuitions, and do not, or have rarely, sought to give 
conceptual analyses, then experimental philosophy’s methodological project does lose 
some purchase. Aspects of the positive program may yet remain, perhaps as adjunct to 
philosophy of mind or cognitive science.  
Nevertheless I think that Cappelen is wrong here: there are intuitions, and philosophers 
do, often enough, seek to give conceptual analyses. Moreover, these two are separable: 
intuitions can (and do) play a role outside of conceptual analysis; and, further, it is not a 
marginal (or marginalizable) practice. (Below I argue that Cappelen's case studies fail to 
show that intuitions do not figure.) 
Williamson's own methodological proposal is worth discussing in this latter regard since 
he does not definitely establish that his 'non-conceptual' understanding of philosophy 
eschews any appeal to conceptual content that might render experimental philosophy 
otiose. The reason he wishes to banish conceptual analysis and analyticity stems from a 
dissatisfaction with 'the linguistic turn,' when the proper focus of philosophical activity is 
theorizing about the modal and logical features of mind-independent reality: 
On a natural view, concepts constitute only a small fraction of a largely mind-
independent reality. That the goal of philosophy is in some sense to analyze that 
small fraction is no platitude … Most thoughts are not about thoughts. To make 
philosophy the study of thought is to insist that philosophers’ thoughts should be 
about thoughts. It is not obvious why philosophers should accept that restriction 
… Much contemporary metaphysics is not primarily concerned with thought or 
language at all. Its goal is to discover what fundamental kinds of things there are 
and what properties and relations they have, not to study the structure of our 
thought about them – perhaps we have no thought about them until it is initiated 
by metaphysicians.98 
The reason why Williamson dismisses conceptual analysis is because philosophical 
activity is not primarily directed at the analysis of our own concepts, our thoughts, or our 
language: we are interested in the nature of what there is, really. We might investigate 
this by reflecting on cases, Williamson admits. Such counterfactual evaluation is not 
about the conceptual, it is about what there is: “philosophy is in no deep sense a linguistic 
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or conceptual inquiry, any more than physics is,” and when we reflect on, say, the Gettier 
case, we are reflecting on Knowledge, not our concept 'knowledge.'99 
If this is indeed the self-image of many contemporary philosophers, the earlier problem I 
posed might appear less urgent: abandoning both intuition and analyticity is just part and 
parcel of abandoning the linguistic/conceptual turn in favor of 'reality,' requiring less 're-
reading' and revision that one might initially suspect.  
This is not necessarily the case. The shift from concepts to things does not immediately 
mean that intuitions are not appealed to. Williamson's admonition is to replace 'intuition' 
with counterfactual evaluation, a move which does not affect the prima facie case. 
Williamson argues that 
We have a general cognitive ability to handle counterfactual conditionals […] we 
have no good reason to expect that the evaluation of ‘philosophical’ 
counterfactuals uses radically different cognitive capacities from the evaluation of 
ordinary ‘unphilosophical’ counterfactuals. 100 
He also denies that there is any 'special' faculty of intuition. Williamson concludes that “a 
reasonable speculation is that their applications in philosophy have roughly the same 
degree of reliability as their applications elsewhere,” which is to say good: we use 
counterfactual evaluation constantly.101 
Since there is no distinction between philosophical uses of 'intuition' and ordinary 
counterfactual evaluation (and even non-counterfactual, but actual, evaluation), 
Williamson claims that 
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experimental philosophers’ critique of reliance on philosophical intuitions will 
become a global scepticism, at odds with their conception of their general 
enterprise as a positive contribution to naturalistic inquiry. 102 
I disagree. We do not over-generate 'skepticism' when giving an account of our sources of 
evidence in the context of theorizing. This last qualifier is important. No one is 
suggesting that we suspend ordinary judgment or perception. Rather, given that 
'intuition,' 'evaluation,' 'judgment' (however one wishes to describe it!) is used to theorize 
about the fundamental structure of reality—in metaphysics, epistemology, language, 
logic, etc.—a higher-than-ordinary standard of evidence is required. If, as Williamson 
suggests, the 'gap' between philosophy and science is not so wide, then this aspect of the 
prima facie case can't be neglected. Williamson argues that because intuition can't be 
defined in contrast to 'ordinary' modes of evaluation, global skepticism threatens. But we 
don't require an unassailable definition of philosophical intuition, we just need a 
common-sense understanding of philosophical uses of intuition / evaluation. The context 
of theory is held to a higher epistemic standard as a matter of course.  
It is as if we were arguing against double-blind experiments because this would threaten a 
'global skepticism' about perception, since there is no 'principled' way of defining or 
distinguishing scientific observation from ordinary perception.  But such an argument is 
without force. Ordinary evaluation is distinct from theorizing. This should be obvious, 
yet the argument 'from skepticism' is popular. Sosa makes the same case, and it is wrong 
for the same reasons.103 Or, to make another analogy, to probe at the weak spots in vision 
does not undermine visual evidence (rather, it strengthens it). 
Williamson's argument against the linguistic turn is also suspect. His argument that 
questions such as “Was Mars always either dry or not dry?” are about Mars and Dryness 
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itself, and not about vague predicates in natural language contexts, is not wholly 
satisfying. While Williamson offers a thorough discussion of the truth-conditions of 
vague predicates in the context of classical, intuitionistic, three-valued, and fuzzy logics, 
the claim that the question is about the referents of 'Mars' and 'Dry' is tersely defended: 
What is the original question about? “About” is not a precise term. On the most 
straightforward interpretation, a sentence in a context is about whatever its 
constituents refer to in that context … Since the original question contains no 
metalinguistic expressions, it is not about the name “Mars” or the adjective “dry.” 
Evidently, the original question is not explicitly about words. 104 
Williamson takes the 'context' to be the sentence itself, not its appearance in a book of 
philosophy.105 This is evident in his argument that many sentential equivalents are not 
taken to be about language, nor are translations (into German, or French) of the sentence; 
but the point is not that there are translational equivalents, but that Williamson is 
explicitly discussing how vague predicates in general operate, with dryness on Mars as 
example. 
In ordinary every-day language, questions that take the form of 'always x or not-x,' 
typically are querying whether there is a third intermediate value that is relevant (or one 
is cognizant of a third value, and inquiring whether it has ever held).106 One could ask 
whether Mars has always been dry, given that it is dry; or always not-dry, given that it is 
not dry. The question Williamson raises arises only in a philosophical context, so we 
cannot easily avail ourselves of a 'straightforward' referential interpretation. (How do we 
refer to the law of excluded middle?) 
Williamson might claim that metaphysical facts about mind-independent reality impinge 
on the content of natural language predicates such that their meaning is constrained by 
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the correct logic (classical logic, for instance). This seems to be what he is arguing in the 
following passage: 
Some philosophers, often under the influence of the later Wittgenstein, deny the 
relevance of formal semantic theories to vague natural languages. This attitude 
suggests a premature and slightly facile pessimism. No doubt formal semantics 
has not described any natural language with perfect accuracy; what has not been 
made plausible is that it provides no deep insights into natural languages. 107 
This seems to get the direction of explanation backwards. As Emmon Bach noted in his 
seminal Natural Language Metaphysics, the ontological question raised by formal 
semantics is: 
What do people talk as if there is? What kinds of things and relations among them 
does one need in order to exhibit the structure of meanings that natural languages 
seem to have?108 
The way you get ‘at’ ontology via formal semantics is by looking at how speakers use the 
language, and see what this implies about what exists: for instance, one might look at 
tensed statements to see what needs to be the case for tensed statements to come out as 
true (and false).  
Williamson says that questions such as “Was Mars always dry or not dry?” aren't about 
language, but the things themselves, and motivates this by appeal to formal semantic 
theory. Yet formal semantic theory takes as its starting point a natural language such as 
English and asks: what needs to exist given sundry semantic aspects, not the other way 
around.109 Bach says, after all, “what do people talk as if there is” thus constraining the 
possible metaphysical answers. Meanwhile, Williamson’s analysis of vague predicates 
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says at the outset that thinking of “the question as implicitly about thought or language 
turns out to be a mistake.”110 
In effect, Williamson can’t motivate his view by appeal to formal semantics. When 
Williamson says suspicion of his project is suspicion of formal semantics generally—a 
very successful theoretical framework, and not something we should wish to besmirch—
he glosses over a crucial difference between his project and that of formal semantics. He 
claims philosophical inquiry is about thing-in-themselves first, and then arguing that 
language must be that way. But Bach is more cautious: 
I've now said a little (but perhaps more than enough) about some of the kinds of 
things we seem to need in our ontology for English and a little bit (not near 
enough) about how we might get them into a semantics for English. It would be 
immoral of me as a linguist (I'm stealing a phrase from Montague) to make claims 
one way or the other about whether or not these sorts of things correspond to real 
things in the world, perceptual or conceptual categories that are independent of 
language, or nothing at all. 111 
Despite his caution, Bach does think there is a connection between language and reality: 
Do the fundamental distinctions that are reflected in the overt and covert 
categories of natural language correspond in any way to the structure of the 
world? How could they not? 112 
This is not the place to answer the rhetorical question; there have been many answers. 
The point is that Williamson can't help himself to formal semantics to show that 
questions like “Was Mars always either dry or not dry?” aren't about language. From the 
point of view of formal semantics, such questions are most assuredly about language. The 
more difficult question is about the relation between language and 'the (real) structure of 
the world,' which Bach carefully raises—through his question ‘what do people talk as if 
there is.’ And since we all agree language is (in part or in whole) a psychological 
phenomenon, we do not escape the mental aspect that in turn motivates the prima facie 
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case; so we return to experimental philosophy. Williamson’s appeal to formal semantics 
fails.  
This has obvious repercussions for Cappelen's appropration of Williamson's 
metaphilosophy. Even when we don't do conceptual analysis, linguistic mediation is 
inescapable. And if this sort of mediation occurs, we will expect the mental to figure in a 
way that motivates the prima facie case. This is exactly what we will find turning to 
Cappelen's case studies. So we turn away from Williamson and back to Cappelen. 
3.2.3 Cappelen, Cases and Centrality 
How does Cappelen support his argument against 'centrality'? Recall he defined centrality 
as the thesis that “contemporary analytic philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence (or 
as a source of evidence) for philosophical theories,” which does not in fact claim that 
intuitions are 'central' to philosophy, just that reliance occurs.113 Later on Cappelen is 
more explicit about the 'central' role intuitions are supposed to play when he articulates 
the 'method of cases' (MOC): 
MOC: A theory of some philosophical topic X, T, is an adequate theory only if it 
can account for (or explain or predict) intuitions about X in actual and possible 
cases. 
114
 
This characterization of the 'method of cases' is too strong. In section (1.ii) I looked at 
some examples of intuitions: Twin-Earth, Gettier, and Sobel Sequences. It is not required 
that a theory would be adequate only if it could account, predict, or explain intuitions 
about possible cases. In the Sobel case, Moss was explicit that it was a theoretical virtue 
that her account fit the countours of our intuitive judgment.115 Theoretical virtues of the 
sort lend strong credence to a theory, but are not requirements of their adequacy. 
Cappelen's 'only-if' definition of the method of cases makes it a requirement of adequacy 
that (RA) intuitions are accounted for, or explained, or predicted (IA): 
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a. Cappelen's 'strong' MOC: RA → IA 
'If a theory of X is adequate, then it will account for intuitions about X.' 
b. Plausible 'weak' MOC: IA → RA 
'If intuitions about X are accounted for, then the theory of X is prima facie and 
defeasibly adequate.' 
'Weak' MOC is, I think, a better characterization of the actual MOC employed by 
philosophers and investigated by experimentalists. This is especially so in cases where 
intuitions are used as 'evidence' in the indirect mode, though I will argue that the 'direct' 
mode does not endorse strong MOC either. The 'indirect' mode solicits many intuitions 
and attempts a theoretical 'best fit.' The 'direct' mode uses an intuition as a premise in a 
deductive argument.  
We should also note it is left unspecified in both the weak and strong MOC which 
intuitions are the target. It seems implausible to saddle the method of cases with the 
responsibility of handling or accounting for everything we can label ‘intuition.’ We might 
wish to separate out reflective from unreflective intuition, or expert from non-expert 
intuition. This is fair enough, and does not affect the basic distinction between the weak 
and strong construals of the method of cases: on the stronger version, a theory is adequate 
only if it accounts for some subset of intuition (reflective intuition, for instance); on the 
weak version, accounting for that subset is a sufficient and defeasible condition for 
theoretical adequacy. I emphasize defeasibility here because a theory’s concordance with 
intuition is ‘sufficient’ only absent defeaters. In many cases, intuitions are all we have to 
go by: as I discussed earlier (2.1), many thought-experiments are stipulated such that no 
observable physical facts can impinge on the scenario. The conceivability of 
‘philosophical zombies’ is one such scenario. In these cases the ‘intuition’ of 
conceivability is assumed to be sufficient to establish the metaphysical possibility of 
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philosophical zombies, though the possibility of a defeater is acknowledged.116 This all 
in line with what I term the ‘weak’ method of cases.  
To begin with indirect uses and the ‘weak’ method. Moss and Soames, as I discussed in 
chapter 2, are explicit on this point: a well-motivated theory can lead us to discard (some) 
intuitions. Under Cappelen's 'strong' MOC philosophical theories can never discard 
intuitions on pain of modus tollens: a theory is adequate only if it accounts for intuitions. 
No other theoretical virtues or evidence can trump accounting for intuition. This is surely 
too strong. This version makes it necessary for a theory's adequacy that it accounts for 
intuitions: it is the method for establishing a philosophical conclusion. 
The weak version makes accounting for intuitions defeasibly sufficient, which is surely 
correct in the case of indirect uses of intuition. Indeed it is difficult to justify, as a 
methodological principle, the view that one source of evidence (intuition) must be always 
accounted for as a necessary condition for adequacy. This baldly denies the possibility of 
confirmation holism in philosophy; of any countervailing input to intuition. Cappelen's 
view on the 'strong' MOC is in line with his view that intuitions are treated by 
experimental philosophers as a sort of 'bedrock', a court from which there is no appeal or 
alternative. We should not be surprised he fails to find such a thing. 
What about 'direct' uses, when an intuition figures as a premise in a deductive argument? 
In the 'Gettier' case, for instance, the JTB analysis is shown to have an intuitive counter-
example, demonstrating that knowledge is not equivalent to justified true belief. Here the 
situation is more complicated. It might seem that an adequacy condition for an analysis is 
that it necessarily accounts for intuitions inasmuch as no counter-examples should be 
found for a successful analysis, e.g., the 'strong' MOC. 
Are Gettier cases, and those like it, instances of the 'strong' MOC Cappelen describes? 
There are two problems with an answer in the affirmative. First, the Gettier case is a 
                                                 
116
“I am braced for the information that is going to make zombies inconceivable, even though I have no 
real idea what form the information is going to take.” Stephen Yablo, “Textbook Kripkeanism and the 
Open…” 119. 
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counter-example to a proposed analysis, but Cappelen claims there are no conceptual 
analyses and no analytic truths. This line runs into the problems I discussed, above: it is 
one thing to re-describe intuition-talk in terms of some other, non-intuitive vocabulary, 
and another thing entirely to make a philosophical case against analyticity. This assumes 
a much greater level of self-deception about disciplinary practices. 
Cappelen argues that if philosophers rely on intuitions as experimentalists claim, they do 
so using the strong MOC; but they do not in fact rely on the strong MOC; therefore they 
do not rely on intuitions (and, corollary, experimental philosophy is 'a big mistake.') How 
do we know they can't rely on strong MOC? Well, for one, there are no conceptual 
analyses or analytic truths to ground such strong reliance. But this is, to say the least, 
controversial; and even if there were no analytic truths, philosophers who take 
themselves to be engaged in analysis could mistakenly be engaged in ersatz intuition-
mongering, a practice to be abandoned, not re-described—as many experimental 
philosophers urge. 
And in any event the argument runs into a second problem: it is not the case that if 
philosophers rely on intuitions, they endorse strong MOC, even in the 'direct' mode. For 
one thing, many instances of the direct mode, over time, drift into indirect 'best fit' 
arguments: there are many Gettier-like cases now, requiring discernment and balance.117 
Further, there are certainly theories where no intuitions are present one way or another. 
Are these theories inadequate because they account for no intuitions? According to strong 
MOC, there are, because philosophical theories are adequate only if they account for, 
predict, or explain intuitions. In effect strong MOC, combined with ‘centrality,’ claims 
that accounting for intuitions are a necessary desiderata of all philosophical theorizing: it 
is the distinct method of philosophy, and the deliverances of intuitions settle 
philosophical issues with no higher appeal. Again, this is implausible.  
                                                 
117P. Blouw et al., Gettier Cases: A Taxonomy. 
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Even 'counter-examples' are more methodologically akin to weak than strong MOC. The 
reason is simple. We can, for the sake of argument, agree that an analysis is adequate 
'only if' there are no counter-examples. But this is not the same as endorsing the strong 
MOC, which asserts that 'accounting for intuitions' is a necessary condition for theoretical 
adequacy. The reason is simple: a counter-example need not be intuitive, nor an intuition 
necessarily yield a counter-example. Counter-examples and intuitions are distinct. 
For an instance of the latter: the Banach-Tarski 'paradox' yields the counter-intuitive 
result that a sphere can be decomposed and re-assembled into two identical spheres. The 
'paradox' crucially relies on the axiom of choice in set theory. But it is not assumed that 
this counter-intuitive result shows the axiom of choice is mistaken. Thus it is not the case 
that a theory is adequate only if it accords with our intuitions; otherwise the Banach-
Tarski result would show that the axiom of choice is mistaken. 
Likewise, not all counter-examples are intuitive. The Condorcet voting paradox shows 
that ranked preference systems can violate transitivity, such that A can be preferred to B, 
B to C, and C to A, yielding cyclic preferences. This counter-example to transitivity in 
ranked voting systems is more than a little counter-intuitive; it takes some working out. 
Again this shows us the difference between counter-examples and intuitions. We can 
consistently hold that absence of counter-examples is necessary for the adequacy of a 
proposed analysis, while holding that accounting for intuitions is only a sufficient 
condition for adequacy. The dialectical role of intuitions is weaker than Cappelen 
suggests.  
In effect we need to separate out the notion of 'counter-example' from that of 'intuition.' 
Plausibly, a necessary condition of theoretical adequacy is the absence of successful 
counter-examples. What makes for a successful counter-example is a complex question 
that goes beyond intuition and the intuitive. For instance, dialetheists (who hold that 
propositions can be both true and false) claim that the liar paradox is a counter-example 
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to the law of non-contradiction.118 The claim is counter-intuitive if anything is, though 
other theoretical considerations are taken to trump this. 
There are counter-intuitive counter-examples, and counter-intuitive non-counter-
examples, and so on. Perhaps, all other things being equal, we should prefer successful 
counter-examples to intuitions. But it is not always possible to generate counter-
examples, nor is it always trivial to distinguish a counter-example from an unexpected 
consequence. There is such a thing as the ‘intuitive counter-example,’ too: the classic 
Gettier case might be one: here the evidential weight of intuition supports the claim that 
the counter-example is successful. (For the dialetheist, the counter-example labours 
against intuitive weight.) 
The basic upshot is that we can consistently endorse something like the 'strong method' 
for counter-examples and the 'weak method' for intuitions. The existence of the former 
does not demonstrate that we do not use intuitions as evidence, ever: it is obvious that the 
possibility of one kind of argument does not preclude another; and the existence of links 
between the phenomenon of 'intuitiveness' and the status of counter-examples does not 
collapse the distinction, either. 
Cappelen's argument against centrality (and against experimental philosophy) leans on 
the assumption of the strong MOC in the case of intuitions, but it is not at all clear that 
philosophical reliance on intuition has been construed as such by philosophers, including 
experimental philosophers. So it is not surprising that Cappelen finds no evidence of 
strong reliance on intuitions in the literature, for no one really holds that theories are only 
adequate if they fully account for our intuitions or some privileged subset thereof. Rather 
a theory's accounting for intuition is, prima facie, defeasibly sufficient for adequacy; 
while counter-examples are another matter altogether. 
                                                 
118Graham Priest most famously; the discussions in the collection The Law of Non-Contradiction 
demonstrate the difference between counter-example and intuition (the latter are appealed to as the former 
is sought). Graham Priest, JC Beall, Bradley Armour-Garb (eds), The Law of Non-Contradiction. 
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Indeed, it is clear that experimental philosophers themselves do not endorse strong MOC. 
In Against Arguments from Reference Machery et al. provide a definition of the MOC as 
they find it in the literature on intuitions of reference. It is rather different than 
Cappelen's:   
The method of cases: The correct theory of reference for a class of terms T is the 
theory which is best supported by the intuitions competent users of T have about 
the reference of members of T across actual and possible cases.119 
In this instance the methodological role intuitions play is the 'indirect' mode I outlined 
earlier. Note that the experimentalists are explicit that the case method, when being used, 
should seek for the theory best supported by competent users across many cases. To 
paraphrase the experimental version of the MOC: a theory is correct if (not only if) it is 
the one best supported by the intuitions of competent speakers across cases. Cappelen's 
argument against experimental philosophy fails to describe their own account of 
methodology. 
Further, experimental philosophy's account of the evidential uses of intuitions are often 
context-specific. In epistemology, the authors of Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions 
describe the role of intuitions in even weaker terms than the 'weak' MOC I gave in 
contrast to Cappelen's. In this context, an intuition-driven strategy in normative 
epistemology, they claim, requires only three minimal conditions: first, that epistemic 
intuitions serve “as data or input;” second, that the strategy “produce, as output, explicitly 
or implicitly normative claims or principles about matter epistemic;” finally, the output 
“must depend, in part, on the epistemic intuitions it takes as input.”120 This dependency is 
left unspecified; in particular it is not claimed that the resulting theory must directly 
account for intuitions, but only that a change in input results in a change of output in 
some way.121 Again we see that 'strong' MOC is not accurate, and a means of loading the 
                                                 
119Ron Mallon et al., “Against Arguments from Reference,” 333. 
120Jonathan Weinberg et al., “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions,” 20. 
121
e.g., this dependency could well be 'make the output the negation of the input.' 
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issue in favour of eliminativism by defining phenomena out of existence via stringent 
criteria. 
3.2.4 Cappelen’s Case Studies 
This is especially clear if we attend to Cappelen's case studies. His basic strategy is to 
claim, first, that the typical features of the intuitive are not present in the original texts 
where cases were first presented; second, that the conclusions drawn from the cases were 
explicitly argued for and thus did not rely on 'intuition.' 
Two points about this strategy in general before going into more detail. One: we may 
genuinely worry about close reliance on original texts while eliding the secondary 
literature; the claim that philosophers do not rely on intuition, 'even a little,' surely 
includes not just seminal papers, but subsequent discussion. It is much harder to motivate 
eliminativism when one attends to the vast secondary literature 'canonical' case have 
generated. Second, we should be wary of a move that distinguishes between intuition and 
argument as mutually exclusive. Part of the dialectical strategy of intuition is to use 
intuitions as premises in arguments; we don't have intuitions of theories, we make 
intuitive judgments that then figure as premises in arguments. So it is no surprise that 
Cappelen finds arguments in the vicinity of canonical cases. I will argue that intuitions, in 
the weak mode, figure in these arguments. 
A good example of this is Cappelen's discussion of Trolley cases. I already discussed 
briefly in section 2.3 that our moral 'intuitions' in such cases can be pushed around by 
ordering effects, wording of vignettes, and so on. Experimental philosophers wish to 
understand these sorts of effects: the goal is to provide a theoretical framework of such 
judgments that achieves 'explanatory depth' in the language of cognitive science. Nothing 
in Cappelen's discussion shows that this goal is, as he puts it, a 'big mistake.' Indeed, 
Cappelen immediately grants that Thomson appeals to a 'pre-theoretically accepted' 
common ground.122 She does this, he claims, not because these intuitions are a form of 
                                                 
122Herman Cappelen, Philosophy Without Intuitions, 161. 
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rock-bottom justification: rather “the goal of the paper is to look for reasons and evidence 
beyond the pre-theoretic judgment,” he writes.123 
But this line does not show that intuitions are not appealed to. In fact, it shows the 
contrary. Cappelen's own characterization of the Thomson article is that the tension 
between the Trolley case and the Transplant case shows further investigation is required. 
They have the same outcomes; but while we are willing to throw the switch in the Trolley 
case, we are not so willing to save five patients by transplanting organs from one healthy 
donor. Cappelen writes: 
A central goal of Thomson’s paper is to question the answers given to questions 
asked about the cases. There is a tension between the two answers and that 
tension shows further reflection and investigation is needed. Thomson and Foot 
articulate the reasons that can be given for the initial answer.124 
This directly contradicts Cappelen's claim that philosophers do not rely on intuitions, 
'even a little.' Cappelen takes for granted that the pre-theoretic answers given to the 
Trolley and Transplant cases show a genuine philosophical tension requiring a 
philosophical analysis. In order to generate the tension in the first place we must believe 
that the pre-theoretical answers have some epistemic weight. Otherwise there would be 
no puzzle to 'solve.' Worse yet the 'puzzle' to be solved is the articulation of reasons for 
why we should accept the intuition despite the tension: it is not just that we accept the 
intuition as prima facie evidence that there exists a genuine philosophical puzzle (and not 
a pseudo-problem generated by faulty moral judgment) but that the intuitions should be 
preserved in a satisfactory resolution to the puzzle.  
The Trolley argument relies on intuition to state the puzzle, and relies on the epistemic 
weight of these intuitions to sustain it and motivate a specific solution. If we did not care 
about moral intuition, the asymmetry in judgment between the Trolley and Transplant 
cases would not require an analysis. We'd only care about what our moral theory states, 
                                                 
123Ibid. 
124Ibid, 160. 
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and simply assume our intuitions about these cases are wrong—but this is not how the 
argument proceeds.  
Cappelen's version of the MOC requires that intuitions be a sort of rock-bottom 
justification, a court with no higher appeal. This is not what we have identified in the 
Trolley case, and this is not the way intuitions are typically deployed by philosophers. 
Rather, as in the Trolley / Transplant contrast here, they are a sort of raw material to be 
analyzed, granted a certain epistemic weight but not absolute authority. The question 
experimental philosophers ask is simple: 'where are you sourcing this raw material from?' 
on the perfectly reasonable methodological assumption that philosophical output bears 
some relation to its input. 
Nothing in Cappelen's discussion of the Trolley case shows that intuitions are not part of 
the input, or that they bear no relation to the output, as experimental philosophers 
understand appeal to intuition. But because Cappelen thinks that the significance of 
experimental philosophy rests on the assumption that intuitions are a foundational source 
of justification (the feature he calls 'rock'), absence in philosophical practice of such uses 
shows that experimental philosophy is misguided.125 But this is wrong. Intuitions can 
play a role in philosophy without being 'rock-bottom' justification; and scientific 
investigation of intuition can be relevant to philosophical practice by enhancing our 
understanding of this 'raw material,' however used. This is the explicit approach of 
experimental philosophers, who defend their approach only on the grounds that, 
methodologically speaking, intuitive input bears some relation to theoretical output.126 
This basic problem appears again and again in Cappelen's case studies. His discussion of 
Chalmer's version of the 'Zombie Argument' against materialism denies that any premise 
in the argument bears the hallmark features of the 'intuitive.' The obvious candidate 
                                                 
125Cappelen identifies three 'diagnostic' feature of the intuitive: one, a special phenomenology, two, a 
special epistemic status, and three, a reliance on conceptual competence (ibid, 112-113). Absence of these 
features, he says, “is evidence of absence of a reliance on the intuitive” (ibid, 114). It should be clear that, 
even absent these features, appeal to pre-theoretic judgment as in the Thomson article is the kind of thing 
that could be empirically studied, even if we call them “schm-intuitions” instead. 
126Jonathan Weinberg et al., “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions,” discussed above. 
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premise is that 'the zombie world is conceivable'; indeed, conceivability judgments 
appear to be perfect examples of conceptual competence providing a compelling kind of 
justification for a belief. Cappelen's move once more is to separate out pre-theoretic 
judgment from his definition of the 'intuitive,' arguing that we might have the former, but 
certainly not the latter. What's really at play in the Zombie case is conceivability under 
ideally rational reflection, and 
What is conceivable on ideal reflection is not something that we can settle without 
careful reflection and argumentation and so will be a conclusion we reach 
inferentially [...]. There’s an interesting phenomenon that we pre-theoretically 
would characterize as the prima facie conceivability of a zombie world.127 
As I discussed with regard to the Trolley case, pre-theoretic judgment is an appropriate 
target of empirical investigation, and of philosophical importance to the extent that such 
judgments figure in philosophical argumentation. It is hard to deny that this 'pre-theoretic' 
conceivability is what motivates the debate about 'ideal conceivability': if philosophers 
did not have, in fact, this prima facie intuition of the conceivability of a zombie world, 
they would not be motivated to ascertain whether or not this conceivability stands up to 
scrutiny under 'ideal conditions.'128 If we replace the target of experimental philosophers 
from Cappelen-intuitions to 'pre-theoretic judgments' we get the exact same project, viz., 
an empirical account of this form of judgment and a subsequent discussion of any 
possible methodological implications. 
Suppose that we discard any reliance on pre-theoretical judgment and focus on 'ideal 
conceivability,' or 'ideal reasoning' generally. Does this mean that there is nothing at all 
intuition-like in the vicinity? Cappelen asserts that ascertaining what is the case under 
‘ideal reflection’ is necessarily inferential, since it requires “careful reflection and 
argumentation.”129 A belief's not being inferential is a diagnostic feature of the intuitive 
                                                 
127Herman Cappelen, Philosophy Without Intuitions, 186, 187. 
128Those philosophers who do not have the 'intuition,' such as Daniel Dennett, argue as such: “My 
conviction is that the philosophical tradition of zombies would die overnight if philosophers ceased to mis-
imagine them,” he writes. (Dennett, “The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies” 323.) 
129Herman Cappelen, Philosophy Without Intuitions, 186. 
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that follows from its status as 'rock,' or foundational. I will grant this for the sake of 
argument. Here Cappelen again makes the mistake of supposing that because there are 
arguments present, intuition, or anything intuition-like, must be absent. 
From the perspective of a non-ideally rational agent, working out the 'ideal solution' will 
naturally require some inferential work. It should also be clear that 'ideal rationality' is a 
promissory note: we have no such account.130 Ideal reasoners are typically idealizations 
governed by context-sensitive assumptions: the ideally rational economic agent is 
assumed to wish to maximize their utility, the ideally rational chess player wishes to win 
via legal moves, and so on. What is it to be the ideally rational conceiver, or just ideally 
rational simpliciter? Perhaps they should reason using only truth-preserving rules of 
inference, and are able to do so without cognitive limitation with perfect information. 
Such an ideal agent might not have 'intuitions' (or perhaps every truth, and only truths, 
would strike them as intuitive!).  
The question we should consider relevant is whether or not, in the course of trying to 
determine whether or not something is indeed ideally conceivable, something intuition-
like would be appealed to at any point. I think there are several such points: as I've 
already noted, the pre-theoretic conceivability motivates the question in the first place. 
Chalmers' own conception of methodology admits this: even if we do use strictly “a 
priori methods to draw conclusions about what is possible and what is necessary,” such 
arguments, Chalmers claims, comprise of three distinct steps: 
...first, an epistemic claim (about what can be known or conceived); from there to 
a modal claim (about what is possible or necessary); and from there to a 
metaphysical claim (about the nature of things in the world).131 
As I've argued already, the first 'epistemic' step is explicitly about some studiable mental 
phenomena. To the extent that what agents can conceive, or claim to know (in particular 
cases and circumstances) structures philosophical argument, the prima facie case for 
                                                 
130Chalmers, quoted in Cappelen, defines the ideal reasoner as “free from all contingent cognitive 
limitations” or as “undefeatability by better reasoning ,” (ibid). 
131David Chalmers, “Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?,” 145. 
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experimental philosophy argues that we have an epistemic obligation to study and 
understand the mental phenomena underlying 'conceivability.' Cappelen's argument 
denies the first premise, that intuitions play a role in philosophical methodology, but 
(importantly) not the further premise which asserts that intuitions ought to be studied. 
What he does argue is that the significance of experimental philosophy rides on 
'centrality' being the case; but centrality is much too strong, and misdescribes actual 
philosophical practice. A more accurate account of the use of intuitions, while 'weaker' 
than centrality of the 'strong MOC' is sufficient to vindicate the prima facie case. 
This much is clear not just from Chalmers' own argument but from what would 'count' as 
an objection, a second 'intuition-like' feature we can draw out of the notion of 'ideal 
acceptability.' Indeed Chalmers claims that 
…the only route available to an opponent here is to claim that in describing the 
zombie world as a zombie world, we are misapplying the concepts, and that in 
fact there is a conceptual contradiction lurking in the description. 132 
For his part, Chalmers claims that “I can detect no internal incoherence; I have a clear 
picture of what I am conceiving when I conceive of a zombie.”133 Note that Chalmers' 
having a 'clear picture' of the conception is evidence for the lack of any internal 
incoherence. If I tried to picture a four-sided triangle, I would have no such clear 
conception; it is not so for the possibility of a materially exact duplicate being lacking 
consciousness, for which a 'clear picture' is possible.134 Note, too, that despite 
Williamson's Cappelen-endorsed case against conceptual analysis that conceptual 
competence is a criterion of a successful 'first epistemic step' in the argument. 
This appeal to a type of inner experience (of 'clarity') based on conceptual content is 
similar to my earlier case studies (Twin-Earth, Gettier, Sobel Sequences): first, an agent 
                                                 
132David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind 99. 
133David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind 99. 
134I myself lack this clear picture in the Zombie case: it strikes me as contradictory precisely the same way 
a 'materially identical computer' to mine but not running a word processor is contradictory. So it goes. I am 
interested in what factors give rise to such sharply distinct judgments. 
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reflects on a case and reports a judgment, and, second, nothing could substitute for the 
agent doing this. Which is not to say that an argument for this same conclusion could not 
be given: but that in this instance, Chalmers does make an appeal to 'intuition,' even if it 
does not meet Cappelen's particularly stringent criteria. Further questions could be raised 
about this intuition: whether or not it reflects ideal competence, whether or not 
conceivability is a genuine route to possibility, and so on. Cappelen is right to conclude 
that the intuition does not settle the matter: it is not 'bedrock.' As I've emphasized, 
however, it does play a significant dialectical role. In virtue of this it is a reasonable 
target of methodological analysis, for the intuition figures as a premise in the over-all 
argument.135 
At this point I will turn to another form of eliminativsm: Deutsch's. 
 
3.3 Deutsch: Apriority, Not Intuitiveness 
3.3.1 A Similarity: Deutsch and the Strong MOC 
In a pair of recent papers, Max Deutsch has also argued that experimental philosophers 
have mischaracterized philosophical methodology by asserting that philosophical 
arguments somehow depend on the 'intuitiveness' of propositions. As Deutsch puts it, 
My argument begins with the observation that it is common, even outside of 
experimental philosophy circles, to misrepresent arguments in philosophy as 
depending on the intuitiveness, or counterintuitiveness, of some proposition or 
other.136 
As I noted earlier, something's being intuitive is not necessarily the same thing as being a 
'genuine counter-example.' According to Deutsch it is the latter, not the former, that 
philosophers are really after:  “rational enquirers everywhere attempt to falsify 
                                                 
135Chalmers himself responds to Cappelen in a broadly similar way, though our arguments differ on a 
number of points. See his Intuitions: A Minimal Defense, Philosophical Studies. 
136Max Deutsch, “Intuitions, Counter-Examples, and Experimental Philosophy,” 448. 
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generalizations with counterexamples,”137 he writes, further arguing that “whether these 
counterexamples are intuitive for anyone is a separate, and purely psychological, 
matter.”138 That a proposition strikes an agent as intuitive or not is some empirical fact 
about psychology. But philosophers do not take their conclusions to be susceptible of 
refutation by an opinion poll about intuitiveness, or any other empirical observation. 
According to Deutsch, a (genuine) counter-example is an instance of 'direct' a priori 
knowledge, which has little to do with the psychological phenomenon of intuitiveness. 
Deutsch's basic position is subject to some of the same criticisms I presented to 
Cappelen's argument. Deutsch claims, as Cappelen does, that experimental philosophers 
believe that philosophical methodology is such that it requires intuitive assent: per the 
strong MOC, a theory is adequate only if it accounts for our intuitions. For example, 
Deutsch maintains that experimental philosophers believe “that Gettier’s anti-JTB 
argument requires that we find it intuitive that the agents in his cases fail to know despite 
justifiably and truly believing,” but “the characterization is a misrepresentation.”139 
Likewise, when discussing Kripke’s Gödel-Schmidt case, Deutsch claims that 
experimental philosophers believe that “Kripke has refuted descriptivism only if his cases 
are intuitive counterexamples.”140 
I have already argued that this is too strong: experimental philosophers do not believe 
that accordance with intuitions is required for theoretical adequacy, or that theories are 
adequate only if they account for intuitions. I won't rehearse the case here.  
                                                 
137
 Max Deutsch, “Experimental Philosophy and the Theory of Reference,” 446. 
138
 Max Deutsch, “Intuitions, Counter-Examples, and Experimental Philosophy,” 448. 
139Ibid. The emphasis on 'requires' is Deutsch’s, not mine. 
140
 Ibid. The emphasis on ‘only if’ is Deutsch’s, not mine. 
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3.3.2 Opinion Polls and Intuitiveness 
Instead I will focus on three further elements. First, Deutsch claims that philosophers 
don't take their theories to be refutable by 'opinion poll,' showing that the psychological 
phenomenon of intuitiveness is not really at play: 
When a philosopher claims that p is intuitive, we should not understand this as, 
‘Most people would pretheoretically judge that p.’ After all, if it were understood 
in that way, how could anyone fail to recognize the relevance opinion polls might 
have to the claim? Instead, the claim is best interpreted as, ‘I know p directly, 
without inference.’ … It is therefore also a mistake to think that intuition surveys 
and their results might pose a threat to this or that conceptual analysis.141 
Instead, Deutsch proposes, we shouldn't worry about intuitiveness, but about genuine 
counter-examples: 
…it is precisely by failing to keep questions about whether an alleged 
counterexample is genuine separate from questions about whether an alleged 
counterexample is intuitive that allows experimental philosophy to gain a 
foothold.142 
I agree that counter-examples need not be intuitive. I disagree that in the kinds of cases 
Deutsch is considering that intuitions play no role. The basic problem is that counter-
examples and intuitions are not mutually exclusive: both can be appealed to in the course 
of philosophical argument, with intuitions as a mere sufficient and defeasible condition 
for adequacy. Since in many cases there is nothing else to go on but the judgment of an 
agent in a case, empirical investigation into intuitive judgment could provide indirect 
insight into philosophical issues even while granting the distinction between intuitiveness 
and counterexample. It is not typically the case that the results of ‘surveys’ are taken to 
demonstrate that some theory or other is the correct one: rather, as I’ve discussed, 
experimental philosophers seek ‘explanatory depth’ about judgment, which then is 
applied to philosophical theorizing in different ways. It is never suggested, either in the 
literature surrounding theories of reference, Gettier cases, moral judgment, or indeed any 
                                                 
141Max Deutsch, “Intuitions, Counter-Examples, and Experimental Philosophy,” 454. 
142Ibid, 448. 
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other topic, that we should read our theories off the results. Instead the evidence is to be 
carefully integrated, along with other evidence, into a broader argumentative framework. 
Deutsch claims that if intuitions played any evidential role (distinct from being counter-
examples), these intuitions would be some sort of studiable psychological phenomena 
(something's 'being intuitive') and, as such, philosophers should be swayed by 
majoritarian 'surveys.' But, second premise, philosophers are not so swayed. Conclusion: 
intuitions play no role. I’ve already argued that experimental philosophers do not 
generally understand their methodology in such terms. 
Even on his own assumptions, however, Deutsch is not entitled to his second premise. In 
philosophy of language, for instance, it is often granted that the meaning of a term is a 
fact about the conventions speakers have adopted about it. If this is so, philosophers 
should defer to the majority on particular descriptive semantic issues. As a result, many 
in fact do grant the relevance of 'survey results.'143 Commenting on the Twin-Earth case, 
Hughes writes that 
If it should turn out that only philosophers baulk at classifying XYZ as water, I 
am ready to defer in my usage to the non-philosophical majority and say that 
"water", like "glue", is not the name of a kind with a chemical essence.144 
The underlying issue is that it is water's being a natural kind term that subtends the a 
posteriori necessity that is of philosophical significance. But being either a natural kind 
term or another kind of term is a contingent fact about the conventions speakers have in 
fact adopted. This by itself of course does not show that there are no natural kind terms, 
or that there are no a posteriori necessities. What it does show is that the structure of the 
Twin-Earth argument isn't solely a priori counter-example. It relies, in its particular 
choice of example, on an 'intuitive' premise about the meaning of a specific term.  
                                                 
143There is often a casually dismissive tenor to these remarks: they are not experiments, just 'surveys' or 
'opinion polls.' The distinction is important to keep in mind. 
144Christopher Hughes, Kripke: Names, Necessity and Identity, 63. 
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This is not exactly the kind of 'intuition' Deutsch and Cappelen claim experimental 
philosophers think is crucial or 'central' to philosophical methodology. But, as with their 
characterization of the use of intuitions, their definition of intuition is far too stringent. 
Intuitions can play a lesser epistemic role, as pretheoretic, prima facie evidence, while 
remaining an important target of empirical investigation. In the case of Twin-Earth, 
empirical data about the actual status of the term is directly relevant to evaluation of the 
case; the intuition figures as a premise in the argument, not something from which one 
can, or should, read a conclusion off directly. 
Of course if 'water' turns out to not be a particularly good example of a natural kind term, 
so be it: there probably is a better one anyway. That's not the point. Deutsch denied any 
reliance on 'intuition,' and in particular denied that empirical facts about intuitiveness as 
collected in survey data could possibly impinge on philosophical argumentation. To his 
claim that only counter-examples matter there is a counter-example: survey data could 
show that a putative natural kind term isn't in fact one, and so the specific proposed 
counter-example fails. This possibility is explicitly granted in the secondary literature. 
Similarly uncontroversial is the view that intuitions (broadly defined) can generate 
evidence for the linguistic conventions in play in a population. 
The point generalizes beyond philosophy of language. Individual reflection on the 
content of our concepts structures the ensuing investigation in many domains of 
philosophy, as closer inspection of Cappelen’s case studies showed. This is a valid target 
for empirical investigation.   
Suppose, for instance, that the majority of competent users of 'know' turned out to be 
intuitive contextualists; then perhaps the term 'to know' in that language is, indeed, 
countextually sensitive.145 Even if the intuition did not decide the issue, pre-theoretic 
input conditions theoretical output by framing the issue and, in effect, setting the agenda. 
This is the weakest possible interpretation of the role of intuition in philosophy that 
                                                 
145Indeed, a slim plurality of philosophers are contextualists (40%) per PhilPapers, ahead of the 
invariantists (31%). 
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remains mildly plausible; in many cases, I think, intuitions do play a much stronger role. 
Yet even on this weak version eliminativism fails, and empirical study of intuition is 
worth pursuing.  
Moreover, typically such investigation is not pursued in an attempt to ‘settle’ what 
conceptual contents competent speakers actually have: what experimental philosophers 
are after is “an account of the factors that influence applications of a concept,” more 
precisely, the “internal psychological processes that underlie such applications.”146 The 
goal of investigation is thus not to determine which philosophical theories are intuitive, or 
which intuitions are common in some population or other. Instead, the goal is to 
understand the phenomenon of intuitive judgment: whatever it is that agents cognitively 
do when they consider a case. The resultant theories of conceptual application are then 
used to philosophical effect, as in the case of moral luck (2.3). It is not typical of 
experimental methodology to proceed as Deutsch suggests, that is, to conduct a survey 
and read a philosophical theory directly off the results.  
3.3.3 Causal Routes to, and Grounds for, Apriority 
Deutsch wishes to avoid this line of argument by claiming that what is at issue isn't 
anyone's concept 'knowledge,' but Knowledge, itself. How do we access knowledge of 
Knowledge? 
The traditional answer is: By thinking about the case. Giving this answer appears 
to commit one to the existence of a priori knowledge. And not just a priori 
knowledge of the content of our concepts or the meanings of our words—the 
knowledge in question appears to be knowledge about knowledge itself, not 
merely about the concept knowledge, or the meaning of the English word 
‘knowledge.'147 
This brings us to our second issue, the methodological question of 'direct a priori 
knowledge' acquired by 'thinking.' Isn't this just what an intuition is? Yes, it is, Deutsch 
                                                 
146Joshua Knobe, Shaun Nichols, “An Experimental Philosophy Manifessto,” 5. 
147Max Deutsch, “Experimental Philosophy and the Theory of Reference,” 459. Deutsch is not claiming 
that all deliverances of ‘thinking’ are a priori knowledge,  
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replies, but this is not problematic: an intuition could be the causal source of a priori 
knowledge without being its justificatory source: 
I do not mean to be distinguishing ‘knowing directly’ from ‘intuiting' …  Intuition 
may be the causal source of the judgment without being its justificatory source, 
and without the fact that the judgment is intuitive serving as a premise in an 
inference to the judgment’s truth. 
[…] 
...there is nothing to prevent philosophers from maintaining that, on at least some 
occasions, the belief that a counterexample is genuine qualifies as direct, 
noninferential knowledge that the counterexample is genuine. The intuition that p 
would not be evidence for p, on this metaphilosophical picture, but would instead 
be a manifestation of one’s direct knowledge that p.148 
This is surely too quick. For one, the methodological role intuitions play in philosophy 
might not be 'justificatory' in the sense that, necessarily, from p's being intuitive we infer 
that p is true; as I noted above, most experimental philosophers take the weaker position 
that intuitive input and theoretical output bear some defeasible relation. If we do accept 
that intuition is a legitimate, though non-justificatory causal route to the a priori, it is also 
clear that the intuitions of philosophers will play an important role in structuring the 
debate by declaring what is the case in the form of ‘direct knowledge.’ 
Deutsch's picture immediately invites regress: a “manifestation of one’s direct knowledge 
that p,”  in order to not be doubted, to be used, acted on, argued from, etc., must be 
known to be known. In virtue of what is it so? We could say that 'direct knowledge' is 
such that it is foundational just in the right way to prevent regress. How do we realize we 
are having direct knowledge, and not being mistaken? Just by ‘thinking.’ Then it seems 
we are right back to having intuitions according to Cappelen's diagnostic criteria: 'direct 
knowledge' is a non-inferential, foundational (in that it blocks regress) and has a 'special 
phenomenology' of thought. Deutsch, in other words, does nothing to distinguish 'direct 
knowledge' from intuition except to say it does not have a justificatory role. 
                                                 
148
 Max Deutsch, “Intuitions, Counterexamples, and Experimental Philosophy,” 454; 453. 
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That it is not justificatory is hard to sustain. 'Causal routes' are indirect forms of 
justification just in virtue of their assumed reliability in use qua manifestation of 
knowledge: so we are back more or less where we began, with a question about the 
reliability of intuition even if they are 'manifestations' of knowledge rather than evidence. 
It is not a question of internalism against externalism in epistemis justification: we may 
or may not have access to the actual basis of one’s ‘direct knowledge that p.’ Rather, 
Deutsch is faced with a dilemma: either intuitions qua manifestation of a priori 
knowledge are a reliable (though non-justificatory) indicator of knowledge or they are 
not.149 If they are, then I can rely on intuition, the investigable psychological phenomena, 
to guide me to knowledge (and the prima facie case proceeds as usual: what are the 
parameters of this reliability? Are there cases where reliability breaks down?, etc.) If they 
are not so reliable, we should abandon the deliverances of ‘thinking about a case’—for 
recall that Deutsch does “not mean to be distinguishing between ‘knowing directly’ and 
‘intuiting’.”150 
Suppose we do accept Deutsch's picture. If intuitions are not justificatory, how do we 
justify our counter-examples if, for some reason, we are pressed? There is no one single 
answer: 
The answer foisted on philosophy by its experimental philosopher critics is that 
we know whether a counterexample is genuine by checking to see whether it is 
intuitive … It presupposes that there is some one way according to which we 
know whether a counterexample is genuine. There is no one way.151 
Of course, experimental philosophers are not committed to the view that intuitions are the 
one way to verify whether a counter-example is genuine. Again, the claim is that given 
the relation between intuitive judgment and theoretical output, which everyone grants, the 
                                                 
149
 Deutsch distinguishes, in other words, the justification of some judgment from the judgment’s causal 
source, which is intuition (“Experimental Philosophy and the Theory of Reference,” 451). Fair enough: we 
should also wish to distinguish honey from the causal source of honey viz., bees. Yet I might be inclined to 
think honey is close by if I see a beehive; likewise I might be inclined to think I am justified in believing 
that p if I intuit it. An example might be the conceivability of philosophical zombies (3.2.4). 
150
 Max Deutsch, “Intuitions, Counterexamples, and Experimental Philosophy,” 454. 
151Ibid. 
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sources of intuitive judgment are worth investigation. Perhaps Deutsch's view is that 
intuitions are in a sense part of the 'context of discovery' while the 'context of 
justification' is a motley of reasons that can be given for accepting the intuition. 
This leads to my third point in regards to Deutsch's 'eliminativism.' Deutsch claims that 
while intuitions are not justificatory, proposed counter-examples are typically supported 
by 'reasons,' or sundry arguments, to show that the counter-example are genuine. One 
might wonder why these arguments don't support the conclusion directly, or why have a 
theory that intuitions are a non-justificatory causal source of 'direct, noninferential' a 
priori knowledge when it would suffice to claim that the conclusions of philosophers 
were in fact supported by argument all along (as Cappelen argued). 
The obvious move Deutsch could make would be claim that what we thought of as 
appeals to intuition were in fact examples, or illustrations of arguments. But this would 
involve an implausible re-reading of the original texts, hence the need for some account 
of 'intuition.' (As Deutsch writes, “the causal source of Kripke’s judgment about the 
Gödel case is intuition; this much is fairly clear.”152) However, Deutsch's claim that 
arguments justify counter-examples stands in tension with the claim that there is direct, 
uninferential a priori knowledge. We are left with the strange methodological view that 
intuitions are a non-justificatory causal route to a priori knowledge then post facto 
justified by standard inferential argument, though of course it was knowledge all along. 
One might reasonably worry that whatever the 'context of discovery' serves up will end 
up being subject to such post facto justification as can be found; or what it even means to 
have an unjustified source of 'direct, noninferential' a priori knowledge. If common-sense 
'intuitiveness' doesn't play an evidential role in justifying 'direct knowledge' we still have 
a very peculiar mental phenomena on our hands and no account of its deliverances. It 
seems a mistake, thus, to conflate the common-sense meaning of 'intuitiveness' (the folk 
psychological phenomenal feeling) which surely is not 'necessarily justificatory,' with the 
                                                 
152Deutsch, “Experimental Philosophy and the Theory of Reference,” 451. Exegetically speaking Deutsch 
realizes how much work is involved in reading intuition completely out of the literature—Cappelen’s 
heroic attempt nonwithstanding. 
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special philosophical sense, which was introduced just to talk about so-called direct a 
priori knowledge—which, after all, is an agent's. 
Leaving that aside: Deutsch does claim that reasons, or grounds, can be offered in the 
service of identifying genuine from spurious counter-examples. Yet no one has ever 
seriously claimed that only intuitions can support philosophical arguments, but that 
intuitions have done so, and prominently.153 If Deutsch means to argue that we should 
not rely on intuitions, then he is sure to find friends within the negative wing of 
experimental philosophy's methodological project; it also does not affect the positive 
project, which seeks to understand patterns of intuitive response (and there are such 
things, whether or not they are used in philosophical argument). It is unclear what 
Deutsch means to do precisely: is it that we have both direct knowledge and independent 
reasons for accepting particular philosophical conclusions, or that the 'grounds' are the 
reasons for accepting the 'direct knowledge'? 
He writes that 
reminding ourselves of these differing grounds will help dispel the impression 
that the case for the genuineness of the counterexamples bottoms out in an appeal 
to what is or is not intuitive.154 
This suggests the former: we have direct a priori knowledge, but, when pressed, can offer 
other reasons. What kind of grounds can be presented in favour of philosophical 
conclusions? This depends on the specifics of the theory. Deutsch considers two 
examples: the Gödel-Schmidt and Gettier cases, offering three 'grounds' for accepting 
that both cases are 'genuine' counter-examples. 
On the Gödel-Schmidt case, we have an imagined scenario that appears to refute 
descriptivism for proper names. Suppose all one knows of Gödel was that he proved the 
incompleteness theorem. But in fact Gödel stole the proof from Schmidt, who really 
                                                 
153Even arch-intuiter Bealer has said it is the standard justificatory procedure, not the only one possible. 
154Max Deutsch, “Intuitions, Counterexamples, and Experimental Philosophy,” 455. As I’ve stressed 
repeatedly, experimental philosophers are not committed to the view that intuitions are foundational. 
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proved the result. If proper names like 'Gödel' refer via description, the satisfier of the 
description is in fact Schmidt. But, our intuitions say, we refer to Gödel via 'Gödel,' not 
Schmidt. Descriptivism is thus refuted. 
Deutsch argues that we have grounds for accepting the genuine nature of the 
counterexample since (a) there are real-life analogues to the case “in which we correctly 
judge”155; (b) descriptivism also suffers from the problem of 'unwanted necessity'; and 
(c) there is an alternative theory, causal-historical reference, that explains the 
counterexample's intuitive pull. Fair enough; but as I've already argued, the possibility of 
other routes to the conclusion is not enough to show that 'intuition,' however defined, 
doesn't play a role worth investigating. 
These 'grounds' are not enough by themselves to show that there is no room for any 
empirical work on intuitive judgment, however. The first 'ground' suggests that real-life 
analogues to the case are evaluated the same way, against descriptivism. Yet 
experimental work on reference has suggested that there is demographic variation in 
intuitive judgment, with some populations more likely to have the 'wrong' descriptivist 
intuition; ipso facto it is worth asking whether 'real-life' analogues match, or fail to match 
up, with the hypothetical cases for these populations.156 
Consideration of hypothetical cases plays a larger role than Deutsch lets on even on his 
own account. It is typical of methodology in semantics to consider cases as 'empirical 
data,' not as a priori counter-examples; in other words, to take the 'indirect mode' and use 
'intuition'-like information as evidence for and against theories. An excellent example of 
this sort of procedure is found in a recent paper arguing for the view that proper names 
are best represented as variables, which have their referents assigned to them by Kaplan-
                                                 
155
“All that many of us ‘know’ about Peano is that he was the discoverer of certain axioms concerning the 
natural numbers. But it turns out that Dedekind discovered those axioms. If descriptivism is true, many of 
us have been referring all along to Dedekind with our uses of ‘Peano’. But we have not been referring to 
Dedekind with those uses.” Ibid. 
156Machery et al, “Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style.” I have also long worried that there are no real-life 
analogues to the 'pure' Gödel-Schmidt case, e.g. since the Dedekind-Peano case in fact evaluates a larger 
and well-established social practice. 
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style157 contextual parameters. The argument is that certain verbs (like 'think') act as 
operators that introduce 'hyperintensional' contexts. In these cases, names no longer act as 
rigid designators, but “vary their reference,” which “conforms to the intuition that the 
content of attitude ascriptions encapsulates referential uncertainty.”158 
The position outlined by the article is largely motivated by intuitive consideration of a 
panoply of cases, generating evidence that the author explicitly considers empirical: he 
writes in the concluding paragraph of the paper that “I have shown that substantial 
inroads can be made by the careful assessment of a variety of empirical data,” including 
intuitive data about 'concealed questions;' the occurrence of bound names in discourses of 
more than one sentence; and licensed inferences in the scope of hyperintensional 
operators.159 The details are interesting in their own right; for our current purposes, it 
shows that, in practice, the philosophical literature on the semantics of proper names does 
rely on intuitive data.160 Deutsch would be hard-pressed to argue that in every 
acceptability judgment presented by Cumming in “Variabilism,” there corresponds an a 
priori counter-example justified by independent argument. It's just not how the argument 
proceeds. 
This is particularly so in philosophy of language, where 'intuitive data' is somewhat akin 
to the 'acceptability judgments' of linguists. Just in the literature on proper names, in 
addition to the Gödel-Schmidt case, we have Ibn Khan's Urn, Julius (inventor of the zip), 
Jonah, Dedekind/Peano, Pierre (who thinks London is ugly), Hesperus and Phosphorus, 
and so on; almost every paper either discusses a case, or proposes one. What intuitively 
seems to be the case can constrain a theory, show a theory is implausible, implicitly 
propose a new theory, or just raise a puzzle. 
                                                 
157Kaplan, who wrote in the preface to his classic paper on Demonstratives that the goal was “providing a 
treatment … which does not distort our intuitions about their proper use.” David Kaplan, “Demonstratives,” 
483. 
158Samuel Cumming, “Variabilism,” abstract. 
159
 Ibid., 550. 
160The Cumming paper counts 19 instances of the intuit- stem: intuition, intuitive, and intuitively. 
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Deutsch's brief against experimental philosophy proceeds by claiming that intuitiveness 
qua psychological phenomenon simply does not figure in philosophical argumentation. 
(Intuitiveness is a question “for a social scientist,” but is not a “properly philosophical 
project.”161) In philosophy of language, at least, this claim is inaccurate. Judgments about 
cases are everywhere, and they are not best understood as a priori counter-examples: 
rather, philosophers reflect on specific linguistic phenomena, and draw appropriate 
generalizations. 
Deutsch's second 'ground' for the causal-historical intuition is the problem of 'unwanted 
necessity.' The basic claim is straightforward: for (almost) any descriptive property we 
associate with some entity (considered de re), it could be the case that the entity had not 
had that property. The problem first arises in a logical context such that one wishes to 
refer directly and to make certain kinds of modal claims about these entities. As it 
happens, it appears that our linguistic conventions surrounding naming do allow one to be 
mistaken in sentences of the form 'N is the F.' The strictly logical observation about the 
modal profile of de re entities has no purchase on natural language without the 
concomitant (and often correct) observation about what speakers do.162 
There is nothing inconceivable or contradictory about a 'possible world' where speakers 
do not directly refer, but always use descriptions. (The language might be impoverished.) 
In reflecting on our use of language we return to 'intuition.' Indeed as Cumming's article 
shows 'unwanted necessity' qua modal-logical problem is not sufficient to show that the 
causal-historical intuition elicited by the Gödel-Schmidt case can ground the 'explanatory 
theory' proposed.163 At best it shows us an inadequacy between description and our uses 
of names. More systematic exploration of possible cases and responses to cases is 
required in order to understand the dimensions of proper name use. The problem with the 
traditional philosophy of language literature, one might say, is that it approaches the issue 
                                                 
161Max Deutsch, “Intuitions, Counterexamples, and Experimental Philosophy,” 459.  
162Unwanted necessity can be shown to generalize into a skeptical problem about a priori knowledge in 
toto (Derek Ball, “One Dogma of Millianism”). If this is correct, then Deutsch cannot both endorse 
unwanted necessity and the apriority of the putative counter-example. I will not develop this line further. 
163Deutsch neglects to mention that the causal-historical 'theory' has yet to be adequately fleshed out. 
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of cases in too haphazard a manner, relying on flashes of insight rather than a thorough 
investigation of use. 
If this is roughly correct, then experimental philosophy certainly has a mandate in 
philosophy of language, following the outline of the prima facie case I have already 
presented above. We have an ineliminable, evidential mental component in the context of 
theorizing that requires some account. 
What about Deutsch's other example, the Gettier case? Gettier is often treated as the 
paradigm case for reliable, indubitable a priori knowledge. Here it is important to 
separate out a normative and descriptive aspect of the case. The normative aspect is a 
question about what epistemic schema we ought to have. The descriptive aspect simply 
notes an unexpected conceptual distinction deriving from an application of ordinary 
logic: there are 'accidentally' true entailments of false beliefs. (We can substitute 
'accident' for some appropriately formalizable notion of 'relevance' if accident is too 
epistemically loaded.) 
A subject S could have a justified false belief that P. On this basis, S infers that P v Q. As 
it happens, Q is true. Therefore, P v Q is a justified true belief. The normative question: 
are these entailments instances of knowledge? The purely descriptive aspect of the 
scenario, which demarcates a conceptual distinction, is not a particularly interesting 
subject of intuitive evaluation. Rather, it describes a state of affairs: the possibility of 
'accidentally true entailments' (ATEs).164 Then we ask: is ATE=K? (Or, better: ought we 
say that ATE=K?) Here judgment does come into play, in many forms (including 
intuitive evaluation). 
Deutsch is right that the conceptual (call it provisionally intensional) distinction between 
ATEs and non-ATEs is not a matter of 'intuition.' The distinction is objective. It is less 
clear, however, that reflection on (Gettier, and Gettier-like) cases does not figure in our 
evaluation of the epistemic norms we 'ought' to adopt in the face of the puzzle. We have a 
                                                 
164Or, again, 'irrelevant entailments,' following the axioms schema of a suitably weak relevant logic, to be 
distinguished from 'non-irrelevant entailments.'  
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sense that something is epistemically amiss with the Gettier scenario, but it is surprisingly 
difficult to say what it is. Deutsch claims that the “disconnection between what causes 
Smith to believe and what makes Smith’s belief true justifies the judgment that Smith 
does not know,” thus 'grounding' the intuition.165 But this principle (call it disconnect) 
doesn't work as ‘grounds’: you can acquire knowledge from false belief. Or so it seems. 
Consider this case: 
Hans brings 100 copies of his handout to the talk. He wonders whether he brought 
enough for every attendee. He does a careful head-count, concludes there are 53 
attendees, and infers that his 100 copies suffice. But Hans’s head-count was 
wrong: there are only 52 attendees. One person, Franz, unobtrusively switched 
seats and got counted twice. 166 
According to Deutsch's principle, Hans does not know that he has enough handouts, 
because he infers this on the basis of a false belief. What to do about this case, though? 
Intuitively, Hans does know (I claim). Intuition is a causal route to the a priori. So is it 
that Deutsch's principle is in fact refuted by a genuine counter-example? Or was the 
original intuition the correct one, and Deutsch's 'grounds' (the disconnect principle) 
means that we should discard the intuition of the Hans case? It is clear that we cannot 
both defend the Gettier intuition on the basis of ‘disconnect’ and also have the intuition 
that 'Hans knows' which is a defeater for ‘disconnect.’ Here Deutsch's story falls apart. If 
the Hans case defeats ‘disconnect,’ then intuitions are evidence. Alternatively, if we 
accept Hans on the basis of some 'Hans-grounds' then we have directly conflicting 
grounds for two opposed instances of direct a priori knowledge.167 
                                                 
165Max Deutsch, “Intuitions, Counterexamples, and Experimental Philosophy,” 456. 
166John Turri, “Manifest Failure,” 2. 
167The 'Hans' case also applies, mutatis mutandis, to Deutsch's alternate proposal that the Gettier intuition 
is grounded in the principle that presence of a defeater entails lack of knowledge: Hans has a defeater for 
his belief that there are 53 people in the room, but still knows he has enough hand-outs. Now the Hans 
intuition might be criticized on the basis that the inference is not in fact made from a false belief: yes, Hans 
has a false belief about the number of people in the room, but a true belief that he has more than enough 
handouts because he also believes that if he had a mistake in counting, the mistake would not be large. I 
don’t think this objection works: Hans still relies on a false premise, even if we add another true one, which 
is enough to trigger Deutsch’s ‘disconnect’ principle. 
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Deutsch could perhaps maintain he has an 'intuition' that Hans does not know, and can 
provide grounds for that; but then we're back to the case I presented against Cappelen, 
which is that intuitions are at least the pre-theoretic sense of what is plausible, in turn 
structuring subsequent argument---which is enough to justify the prima facie case! 
There are many cases like 'Hans' in the literature surrounding Gettier.168 'Fake-barn' cases 
have the agent perceive veridically, but in a context where they are rather lucky to have 
done so. 'Barcelona' cases introduce a belief in the form of a disjunction with the one 
arbitrary disjunct true, and the justified one false. The 'Pen' case starts with a truth-maker 
(perception of a pen on a table), which is then replaced with an identical one; the agent 
has a justified true belief that their pen is on the table. These all differ along some axis.169 
It is simply undeniable that sifting through our intuitive judgments is an important part of 
methodology here, and so we again affirm the prima facie case.170 This is so even if 
argument and the process of giving reasons is also important. 
As I've suggested in section (2.1), mature subdisciplines tend to generate indirect modes 
of intuitive argument: consideration of multiple cases along many parametric dimensions 
constrains theoretical output in a 'best fit' model. Experimental philosophy's basic 
proposal is that we should add more dimensions in a systematic effort to achieve 
explanatory depth about the nature, structure, stability, etc., of our judgments. Deutsch, 
like Cappelen, thinks that because reasons can sometimes be given (almost always post 
faco), we can safely ignore the entire process of intuitive evaluation. This is a serious 
                                                 
168
“A wide range of thought-experiments are labelled 'Gettier cases' in contemporary epistemology … 
there might be as many Gettier cases as there are authors who have written on the topic.” (John Turri, 
“Knowledge Judgments in Gettier Cases,” 10). Blouw et al. argue that the diversity of Gettier and Gettier-
like cases “merits abandoning the notion of a 'Gettier case' in a favour of more finely grained terminology. 
We propose such terminology, and use it to effectively sort the myriad Gettier cases from the theoretical 
literature in a way that charts deep fault lines in ordinary judgments about knowledge.” Peter Blouw et al., 
“Gettier Cases: A Taxonomy,” 1.  
169John Turri, “Knowledge Judgments in Gettier Cases,” 15. 
170
“...a very popular litmus test for any proposed theory of knowledge is whether it correctly classifies a 
wide range of Gettier cases. The procedure of developing new theories of knowledge and then testing them 
against new Gettier cases has, as a result, become business as usual in epistemology. And make no mistake, 
there have been a lot of different Gettier cases proposed over the past fifty years.” Peter Blouw et al., 
“Gettier Cases: A Taxonomy,” 2. 
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mistake. Intuitions, at the very least, offer up prima facie plausibility and structure 
subsequent discussion; and, quite frequently, intuitions are used to constrain theories in 
more fundamental ways. 
I thus conclude that the 'eliminativism' of Deutsch and Cappelen fail. 
3.4 Summary 
Let's quickly recap. I first presented experimental philosophy as an empirical 
investigation into whatever mental phenomena underpins certain kinds of judgments, 
commonly termed 'intuitions,' as they appear in given examples of philosophical 
argument. I distinguished between a positive program that seeks explanatory depth, and a 
methodological program that applies the insights of the positive program to philosophical 
reliance on intuition (even if, historically, the latter preceded the former). 
In lieu of a definition of 'intuition,' I provided examples: Twin-Earth, the Gettier case, 
and Reverse Sobel Sequences. Each case, I argued, had an ineliminable mental element: 
an agent judges the case, and nothing can replace the agent. We later saw this pattern 
again when considering the Trolley / Transplant Case, Zombies, the Bathtub case, Gödel-
Schmidt and the many variations on Gettier. On this ground I built the prima facie case. 
In brief, the prima facie case argues that if 'intuitions' (however defined) are used as 
evidence in the course of philosophical theorizing, then we are owed some account of this 
type of evidence. 
The antecedent of the preceding conditional has been challenged. The eliminativist 
argument claims that philosophy does not rely on intuitions as evidence. I considered 
three versions: the first, due to Cappelen, argues that there are no intuitions at all, only 
careless 'intuition-talk.' The second, Williamson's, collapses 'intuition' within ordinary 
counterfactual evaluation. Finally, Deutsch's version interprets philosophical 'intuition' as 
a non-justificatory source of a priori knowledge, while distinguishing it from the 
psychological phenomena of 'intuitiveness.' 
I argued against all three versions of the eliminativist challenge. While the details 
differed in each case, two central points were constant. First, eliminativists generally 
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argued against a conception of intuition that was much too strong (as central, necessary, 
and foundational). As a result, they misdescribed both philosophical methodology and the 
aims of experimental philosophy. Second, eliminativist reconstruction of philosophical 
methodology did not manage to avoid commitment to the type of 'judgment' 
experimentalists are interested in. In sum, while it is true that concordance with intuitions 
is not a necessary condition for theoretical adequacy, this does not show that philosophy 
does not use intuitive evidence, or that experimental philosophy has nothing to study. 
These two central points underpinned the over-all discussion. It is perhaps worth 
recapitulating in more detail the arguments I presented against Williamson, Cappelen, 
and Deutsch. Below are the major claims I pressed against the eliminativist challenge: 
Positive Accounts. Eliminativists, if correct, must not only show that there are no 
intuitions in philosophy, but claim that extant positive accounts of intuitions in 
metaphilosophy are deeply confused. While possible, this is unlikely, and places a heavy 
burden of argument on the eliminativist. Cappelen takes the most thorough eliminativist 
position and argues philosophy does not, and has never, relied on intuition. Williamson 
and Deutsch concede that there are ‘intuitions,’ but either deny them a special status 
(Williamson) or deny they play a justificatory role (Deutsch). 
Negative Concordance. Eliminativists agree with many experimental philosophers that 
intuitions are not evidence in philosophy, apparently vindicating the negative wing of the 
methodological program (while leaving the positive program untouched). 
No Conceptual Analysis. Cappelen, following Williamson, claims not only that 
intuition-talk has been misdescribed at the meta-philosophical level, but  is committed to 
the more radical view that there are no conceptual truths and no analyticities, requiring a 
more substantive and less plausible revision of philosophical practice. 
No Analyticity. Williamson's argument against analytic truths does not contradict but is 
continuous with the positive program in experimental philosophy. Further, to the extent 
that Cappelen's argument is bound up in a controversial denial of the analytic/synthetic 
distinction his version of eliminativism loses force. 
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Thing Themselves. Williamson's argument that philosophical questions are about thing 
themselves, entirely unmediated by concepts, fails. He does not show that there are no 
metalinguistic elements present, and misunderstands the direction of ontological 
explanation in formal semantics. As a result, the view that philosophy is about direct a 
priori insight into 'things themselves' (like Knowledge, not our concept ‘knowledge’) 
rather than empirical facts about our concepts and their complex relation to reality is 
undermined.  
Against Skepticism. Williamson claims that experimental philosophy over-generates 
skepticism by requiring that intuitions (understood as 'counterfactual evaluation') be 
subject to empirical investigation. This is wrong: we do not over-generate skepticism in 
the context of theorizing about difficult cases by applying higher epistemic standards than 
in ordinary situations. 
Strong Method of Cases. Cappelen and Deutsch both claim that experimental 
philosophers assume that concordance with intuitions are a necessary condition for 
theoretical adequacy. This is incorrect. No experimental philosophers claim this, and, 
further, it is clear that intuitions have typically played a weaker role. 
Conditional Relevance. Cappelen claims that experimental philosophy's relevance to 
philosophy depends on assumption of the strong MOC and the ‘centrality’ of intuition.171 
This is not the case. Experimental philosophy's methodological project is significant even 
on a much weaker construal of the methodological role of intuitions. Furthermore, the 
importance of the 'positive program' is independent of any purported 'conditional 
relevance.' 
Case Studies. Cappelen and Deutsch's case studies fail to demonstrate that intuitions are 
not relied on. The opposite is true: in every case, appeal to pre-theoretic 'intuitive' 
judgment played a significant role in structuring subsequent discussion. 
                                                 
171Herman Cappelen, Philosophy Without Intuitions 220. Cappelen terms this the “conditional insight of 
experimental philosophy.” 
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Argument Excludes Intuition. Cappelen and Deutsch argue that because in many cases 
philosophical conclusions can be supported by argument, intuitions in fact played no role 
in establishing them. This is false: in many cases what seemed intuitively plausible 
shifted the burden of proof, structured debate, provided supporting evidence, or just 
posed a puzzle to be resolved. 
Opinion Polls. Deutsch claims that if philosophers used intuitions as evidence, they 
would obviously see the relevance of empirical data on intuitiveness. But they do not; so 
they do not rely on intuitions. This is not so. First, in some cases (particularly in the 
philosophy of language), the relevance of empirical data is explicitly admitted. The point 
can be generalized to other areas. Second, intuitions could be empirical but not amenable 
to survey, showing that the initial condition is false: philosophers might rely on intuition, 
but deny the direct relevance of survey work on other grounds. This reflects the 
methodology of experimental philosophers who generally seek explanatory depth in 
patterns of intuitive judgment and do not wish to read philosophical theories off survey 
data. 
Re-labeling. Deutsch claims that intuitions aren't used as evidence, but they are a 'causal 
route' to a priori knowledge. We can sensibly ask if the causal route is reliable 
(particularly when the secondary literature contains a large amount of variations on a 
case). This brings us back to the original question about intuition, and Deutsch's move is 
only a re-labeling.  
Grounds. Deutsch claims that the deliverances of the 'causal route' can be checked 
against various sorts of 'grounds.' While the methodological picture is itself strange, 
Deutsch does not in fact show that the 'grounds' themselves are completely free of any 
appeal to intuition, or that in each instance we can replace intuition with some 'ground.' 
Further, it is unclear what to do in cases of intuitive conflict.  
Based on these arguments, I conclude that eliminativism fails. Intuitions, broadly defined, 
do play various evidential roles in philosophical theorizing, which in turn show that the 
first premise of the prima facie case is correct. 
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Chapter 4  
4 The Language We Ought to Have 
4.1 Introduction: The Expertise Defense 
In this chapter I will consider the ‘expertise defense’ in the context of the philosophy of 
language. I will first describe the expertise defense in general terms, and argue that since 
the phenomenon of expertise is domain-specific, expertise defenses should be considered 
on a case-by-case basis. An ideal case study is provided by experimental philosophy’s 
research into semantic reference. I will present this research and discuss how the 
expertise defense has been deployed, before presenting a novel challenge to ‘expertise’ in 
philosophy of language. I will conclude with some general lessons about expertise 
defenses in philosophy. 
The ‘expertise defense’ offers a distinct challenge to experimental philosophy. While 
eliminativism denied that philosophers rely on intuition as a source of evidence, expertise 
defenses claim that we are justified in accepting the deliverances of philosophers’ 
intuitions in virtue of acquired expertise. The expertise defense thus accepts that 
intuitions are a source of evidence, and even that this source of evidence should be 
‘accounted for’ in some way (2.2). The difference lies with the type of account proposed: 
it is argued that no scientific account of intuitive judgment is required (premise 5, section 
2.2), as the acquired expertise and training of professional philosophers is enough to 
secure the reliability of intuition. As Steven Hales puts it, 
Intuitions are and should be sensitive to education and training in the relevant 
domain … the modal intuitions of professional philosophers are much more 
reliable than either those of inexperienced students or the ‘folk.’ In other words, 
philosophical intuitions are more like the physical intuitions of professional 
scientists than they are like Chomskian (sic) grammatical intuitions.  
Continues Hales, 
It frankly doesn’t matter what the surveys of non-philosophers show about … 
[the] Gettier case. These surveys shouldn’t lead us to dismiss the intuitions of 
philosophers any more than Richard Feynman would dismiss his intuitions about 
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quantum electrodynamics on the basis of polling his Introduction to Physics 
students.172 
This line is endorsed in roughly similar fashion by a wide variety of authors.173 The basic 
idea is straightforward, though as expressed in Hales and elsewhere it tackles a relatively 
simplistic conception of experimental philosophy’s aims. First, it seems only targeted at 
the ‘metaphilosophical’ project, which focuses on the reliability of appeal to intuition. As 
I noted earlier, the positive program can be pursued independently of such 
metaphilosophical scruples. Second, it construes the methodology of this 
metaphilosophical project as consisting largely in the generation of survey data, rather 
than in the conducting of experiment. The difference is important: a survey tabulates 
response, whereas an experiment seeks to understand and explain patterns of response 
under specified parameters. Experimental philosophers rarely, if ever, read theories off 
survey data; instead, they test specific hypotheses and infer conclusions from the results. 
Third, the expertise defense presented above treats philosophical intuitions as a uniform 
‘kind’: the intuitions of philosophers are like those of a physicist concerning physics. 
Philosophy appears as a less unified domain that physics, however: is there really 
something that brings together moral with logical with epistemic intuitions? And is 
philosophy relevantly akin to physics?  
Friends of the expertise defense have replies at hand to all these problems. In regards to 
the first, it is sometimes claimed that the ‘positive program’ is not philosophy, but a 
question for social science or experimental psychology.174 Indeed, if folk response is 
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 Steven Hales, Relativism and the Foundations of Philosophy, 171-172. Williamson also makes the 
analogy to physics: “we do not expect physicists to suspend their current projects … on the basis of 
evidence that undergraduates untrained in physics are bad at conducting laboratory experiments.” (Timothy 
Williamson, “Philosophical Expertise and the Burden of Proof,” 217.) As I argued in 2.1, though, the 
analogy to physics can be misleading, for philosophical thought-experiments must rely on an agent’s 
judgment about the case. There are no double-blind thought-experiments or instrumental versions of these 
cases. The appeal to the authority of physics is not a rhetorical accident, either. 
173Antti Kaupinnen, “The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy”; Kirk Ludwig, “The Epistemology of 
Thought-Experiments”; Timothy Williamson, “Philosophical Expertise and the Burden of Proof.”  
174Max Deutsch, “Intuitions, Counterexamples, and Experimental Philosophy,” 459; Antti Kauppinen, 
“The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy,” 108. 
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systematically different from expert response, the positive program will not achieve any 
interesting ‘explanatory depth’ about philosophical intuition, no matter the methodology 
(survey or experiment). Kauppinen has been forceful on this last point, arguing that the 
‘survey model’ can only deliver psychological facts about what he terms ‘surface 
intuitions’:  
…when philosophers claim that according to our intuitions, Gettier cases are not 
knowledge, they are not presenting a hypothesis about gut reactions  to 
counterfactual scenarios but, more narrowly, staking a claim of how competent 
and careful users … would pre-theoretically classify the case in suitable 
conditions. The claim … is not about what I will call surface intuitions but about 
robust intuitions which are bound to remain out of reach of the Survey Model of 
experimentalists.175 
This is because ‘robust intuitions’ are acquired via active participation in complex 
philosophical dialogue and reflection, the kind of thing philosophers specialize in. 
Philosophical training consists in exposure to these debates and reflections to improve 
one’s philosophical acumen generally and in specific domains. As Williamson puts it, 
…the expertise defense does not imply that a good philosophical education 
involves the cultivation of a mysterious sui generis faculty of rational intuitions, 
or anything of the sort. Rather, it is supposed to improve far more mundane skills, 
such as careful attention to details in the description of the scenario and their 
potential relevance to the questions at issue.176 
While one’s thinking is generally improved by philosophical training, more specific 
forms of expertise are critical. Exposure to debates in ethics, for instance, leads to 
improvement at thought-experiments with a moral component; studying logic improves 
one’s intuitions about modality; and so on. Ludwig argues that experts can be expected to 
be more reliable and less susceptible to ambiguities and sundry irrelevant factors in the 
formulation of thought experiments because of domain-specific forms of expertise, 
specifically “because they have some relevant expertise about hard-won distinctions 
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176Timothy Williamson, “Philosophical Expertise and the Burden of Proof,” 216. 
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developed in the field” conferring, if not immunity, then resistance to bias.177 This 
commonsense view should be enough to vindicate the expertise defense against the 
skepticism of experimentalists. 
In answering the expertise defense, experimental philosophers have generally responded 
that the phenomenon of ‘expertise’ is itself an object of empirical study. Experimentalists 
claim the burden of proof is on those who assert the reliability of expert intuitions; 
opponents claim the opposite. I will briefly discuss such moves and counter moves below 
(4.3), but will pursue an entirely different, and novel, line.  
One thing experimentalists and expertise defenders do agree on, however, is that 
‘expertise’ is, to a large extent, domain-specific: training and education in specific topics 
confers expertise in that topic, which does not readily translate to expertise in other 
areas.
178
 In order to determine whether expertise does confer reliability (an empirical 
question), we would do well, then, to consider specific cases. Thus I will focus on one 
‘domain’ of expertise, philosophy of language, and argue that in this domain the expertise 
defense backfires: far from securing reliability, acquired philosophical expertise 
systematically distorts intuitive judgment. The divergence between folk and expert 
intuition is then explained not by the lower reliability of untrained subjects, but the 
systematic distorting effect of philosophical training. 
The case I will consider concerns intuitions of reference. Empirical evidence collected by 
experimental philosophers has suggested that the 'canonical' referential intuitions elicited 
by Kripke's famous Gödel-Schmidt case are not universally shared between and within 
populations.179 This divergence was, in turn, predicted from independent cross-cultural 
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179Edoucard Machery et al., “Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style”; reproduced in Edouard Machery et al., 
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differences in cognitive ‘style,’ suggesting a deep interaction effect present. Since 
intuitions about cases are taken to constrain theories of reference this raises the question 
of how to proceed: whether to ascribe different theories of reference to distinct 
populations, for instance.180 In the present case, the expertise defense was brought to 
bear: it was argued that the intuitions of philosophers working in the philosophy of 
language should be privileged over those of 'the folk,' and that apparent variability in folk 
intuitions of reference need not affect philosophical theorizing.181  
I will argue that the 'expertise defense' fails to adequately respond to the data provided by 
experimental philosophers because of an ambiguity between descriptive and normative 
aspects of semantic theory. In effect, philosophical expertise in this domain consists in 
expertise at applying disciplinary norms acquired by philosophical training. These 
conventions are normatively-governed desiderata that reflect specific epistemic, logical 
and metaphysical commitments of philosophers. I will not argue against these directly. 
Instead I will claim that an adequate and explanatory theory of natural language meaning, 
which is what philosophers of language take themselves to be doing, should cover the 
actual usages of speakers—which requires empirical investigation of the sort done by 
experimentalists. Thus the expertise defense fails. 
In what follows I will describe the work of experimental philosophers on intuitions of 
reference. I will then outline the expertise defense in the case of reference and consider 
some extant responses. I will argue that the expertise defense is fatally committed to a 
view of the 'target phenomena' of semantic intuitions that is normative and discipline-
specific.  I will consider two such norms: the naturalness constraint and the modal 
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181Michael Devitt, “Experimental Semantics”; Kirk Ludwig, “The Epistemology of Thought 
Experiments,” Brian Weatherson, “What Good are Counter-Examples?”. 
95 
 
constraint, and argue they are not descriptive of natural language. Philosophy of language 
according to the proponents of the expertise defense, I will claim, are outlining a 
normative linguistic proposal as semantic theory; or, more charitably, conceive of 
semantic theory as a normative proposal for the language we 'ought' to have. I will go on 
to suggest in the conclusion that this type of problem might be specific to the philosophy 
of language. 
4.2 Reference (and Experiments on Reference) 
Let’s begin our discussion of experimental work on theories of reference with some 
general background. Reference is typically understood as a relation between expressions 
and what those expressions pick out in the world. The guiding philosophical assumption 
when theorizing about reference is that 
...contemporary philosophers use 'reference' as a natural kind term. Thus, it has no 
stipulative definition—instead, it is intended to pick out a semantic relation that 
(a) is a pretty good fit with respect to the traits and paradigms with which it is 
associated and (b) carves semantic reality neatly at its joints.182 
For example, I may use a name such as ‘Barack Obama’ to refer to a specific individual. 
How is this possible? How does reference work? The goal of a theory of reference is to 
answer these questions by giving an account of the ‘kind’ that underlies referential uses 
of language. What makes reference to Barack Obama possible via the words ‘Barack 
Obama’ is a relation that is ‘real’ in the sense that it can be the subject of a genuinely 
explanatory semantic theory. Reference is central to theories of meaning, and the key to 
semantics, so it is crucial we get it right, though I will remain agnostic on particulars.183 
Importantly, semantic theories here are understood as theories of natural language 
semantics; that is, of actual languages as they are spoken and used. Kripke, whose 
seminal work introduced the Gödel-Schmidt case later investigated by experimentalists, 
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writes in the preface to Naming and Necessity that he understands his work to be about 
names as they figure in ordinary language. Summing up the central semantic thesis of the 
book, he writes that “the natural intuition that the names of ordinary language are rigid 
designators can in fact be upheld,” while carefully distinguishing between what he terms 
“theses of philosophical logic” from “what we call ‘names’ in actual language,” stressing 
their independence.184 His main semantic goal in Naming and Necessity is to apply 
insights from modality to semantic theorizing about ordinary language. This is a project 
he takes as obvious and not worth much explicit discussion, though there are allusions: 
for example, when discussing use / mention errors, he writes that such “loose usages 
[have been] adduced as counterexamples to the applicability of the present theory to 
ordinary language,” and it is difficult to interpret such comments except in light of an 
explanatory project aimed at natural language meaning.185 
Kripke is right to think that the work a theory of reference does should apply to ordinary 
language. There is a historical dimension at play: philosophy of language, as Stainton 
cogently argues, “has long paid attention to facts about actual, spoken languages,” 
adducing several examples.186 It might be argued, nevertheless, that Kripke is wrong. 
Philosophy of language is not about ordinary languages as they are actually used, but 
about something else: languages are abstract entities and theories of language are about 
mind-independent logical truths about these entities. This line, as Stainton argues, doesn’t 
work either, for linguistic meaning is necessarily linked to mental phenomena: “some 
contents are out-and-out mentalistic,” and “in general, linguistic contents are linked 
necessarily with human psychology.”187 Erasing the mental leaves us with no means of 
working on (and distinguishing) language as a distinct topic from formal logic. So it is 
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crucial we understand philosophy of language—and theories of reference—as about 
natural language, and to keep this in mind as we proceed. 
So, to return to our earlier question: How does ‘Barack Obama’ manage to refer to 
Barack Obama? Theories of reference for proper names in analytic philosophy have been 
traditionally divided into descriptivist and causal-historical views. Descriptivist theories 
associate a number of properties with a term, and the referent is the object which best or 
uniquely satisfies the associated set of properties.188 Causal-historical theories suggest 
instead that certain terms, such as proper names and natural kinds, are introduced into a 
community of speakers for the purposes of referring to a specific object or individual (the 
initial baptism) and that successive users of the term directly refer via an unbroken causal 
chain of usage.189 Extending this picture for other classes of terms is an ongoing project. 
What is important for us is that descriptivist theories, despite being virtual philosophical 
orthodoxy for decades, were largely abandoned after a series of imagined cases showed 
descriptivism to have unforeseen counter-intuitive consequences. These cases were 
presented in Kripke's influential Naming and Necessity, landing a decisive blow to 
descriptivism. As experimental philosophers note, cases 
...played a crucial role in the challenge posed to traditional descriptivist theories 
of reference by the causal-historical theories championed by Kripke and others. 
Indeed, Kripke's masterstroke was to propose a number of cases that elicited 
widely shared intuitions that were inconsistent with traditional descriptivist 
theories.190 
One of the most famous of these cases is the 'Gödel-Schmidt' scenario. The case, so the 
argument goes, is taken to provide intuitive evidence that the referential prediction made 
by the descriptivist theory is falsified. The implicit methodology suggested is that the 
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correct theory of reference is the one that best supports the referential intuitions of 
competent speakers. 
Much like the earlier cases considered, cases involving reference require an agent to 
make a judgment. To see why a simple example might help. Consider a simple theory of 
reference for proper names we can call ‘naïve descriptivism’ (ND). For the ND theorist, a 
proper name is a label for a set of jointly necessary and sufficient properties. The object 
that has these properties is the referent of the name. Thus, ‘Barack Obama’ might be 
associated with a set of properties such as ‘human being; born in Hawaii; the 44th 
president of the United States’ and so on. An utterance of ‘Barack Obama’ refers to 
whatever object has all these properties. Under this construal, ND predicts that reference 
fails where no object in fact satisfies all the associated properties. 
Suppose a speaker associates ‘Barack Obama’ with the properties listed above, along 
with an idiosyncratic and false association such as ‘communist sleeper agent.’ Question: 
does the speaker fail to refer when, in the course of ordinary conversation about 
American politics, he uses the name ‘Barack Obama’? Intuitively, it appears not: for one 
thing, an interlocutor might be unaware that the speaker believes this, and still know who 
is being discussed. We can imagine talking to someone with some idiosyncratic beliefs 
about a person, and still both realize we are talking about the same person with no failure 
of reference involved—refuting ND ‘from the armchair.’ How do we really know that we 
are indeed successfully referring? It simply seems intuitively ‘obvious,’ and a problem 
for the theory.191  
The ‘cluster descriptivist’ theory taken to be falsified by Kripke’s case is more 
sophisticated than the naïve version above. As Kripke describes the view,  
To every name or designating expression ‘X’ there corresponds a cluster of 
properties, namely the family of those properties φ such that A believes ‘φX.’ 
                                                 
191Which is not to say that other considerations, imagined facts about the conversations, etc., could not be 
brought to bear; only that cases like these are readily available to the imagination, and we help ourselves to 
our intuitions about them. 
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[…] if most, or a weighted most, of the φ’s are satisfied by one unique object y, 
then y is the referent of ‘X’.192 
To unpack the theory: it states that for any proper name (such as ‘Barack Obama’) there 
exists a set of weighted properties that a speaker will associate with a name. When a 
speaker uses the name in ordinary circumstances, they are referring to whatever object 
has most, or a weighted most, of these properties. Cluster descriptivism is different from 
naïve descriptivism, then, in that it does not require that all associated properties be 
satisfied. If a speaker associated some idiosyncratic property with ‘Barack Obama’ that 
does not in fact hold, reference may still succeed, for Barack Obama still satisfies most of 
the rest of the properties. 
While cluster descriptivism obviously fares better than the naïve version in the Barack 
Obama case, Kripke provides another imagined scenario showing that it, too, must be 
incorrect. He begins by asking us to imagine a person for whom the only thing they’ve 
heard about Gödel is that he discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic. Kripke then 
asks whether or not it would be the case that “whoever discovered the incompleteness of 
arithmetic is the referent of ‘Gödel’,” which, given the parameters of the scenario, would 
be the prediction of cluster descriptivism.193 Then Kripke asks us to 
...imagine the following blatantly fictional situation ... Suppose that Gödel was 
not in fact the author of [the incompleteness theorem]. A man named `Schmidt', 
whose body was found in Vienna under mysterious circumstances many years 
ago, actually did the work in question. His friend Gödel somehow got hold of the 
manuscript and it was thereafter attributed to Gödel. On the view in question 
[descriptivism], then, when our ordinary man uses the name Gödel, he really 
means to refer to Schmidt, because Schmidt is the unique agent satisfying the 
description 'the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic' ... but it 
seems to me that we are not. We simply are not.194 
According to the scenario, the only thing our fictional speaker knows about Gödel is the 
one property: the prover of a certain theorem. Which object, Kripke asks, satisfies that 
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property, prover-of-this-theorem, in our imagined example? Well, Schmidt. 
Descriptivism predicts, then, that when our imagined man uses 'Gödel', he “really means 
to refer to Schmidt;” but, continues Kripke, “it seems to me we are not.”195 We'd want to 
say he is in fact talking about Gödel when using the name 'Gödel.' Therefore, this form of 
descriptivism gets it wrong. In its stead, Kripke proposes a picture of reference where 
causal links to the bearer of the name determine reference, in line with our referential 
intuitions.196  
'Our' intuitions? Who is 'us'? Does everyone share this intuition about the reference of 
proper names? There has been an increasing concern in the psychological sciences with 
the replication of experimental results across demographic groups. Psychological studies 
typically assay North American or European undergraduates; this is hardly a 'random' 
sample of our species. Rather, it is distinctly 'weird.'197 The worry is that the results 
obtained by studying this restricted group will be culturally-specific, and not general. To 
the extent that philosophy relies on intuition, the same worry applies—arguably, the 
situation is even more dire: as 'weird' as undergraduates are, professional philosophers are 
almost certainly stranger. What makes our intuitions correct and reliable rather than 
parochial or professionally conditioned? Should we expect the intuitions of philosophers 
to be universal or even widely shared?  
In light of all this, one hypothesis experimental philosophers explored was whether 
cultural differences in cognitive 'style' could predict response to cases such as the Gödel-
Schmidt.198 Experimental philosophers considered whether systematic differences 
uncovered in perceptual, memory, classificatory, attention, prediction, belief revision, 
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etc., tasks between ‘analytic’ and ‘holistic’ thinkers would also extend to reference. In 
particular, it seems that East Asians (EAs) tend towards ‘holistic’ thought, while 
Westerners (Ws) tend towards ‘analytic’ thought. If, as seems to be the case, human 
culture shapes aspects of cognition, we should like to know which cognitive tasks are 
prone to cultural effects and which, if any, are truly universal. Based on Nisbett’s work, 
experimental philosophers suspected that referential intuitions might well be culturally-
specific: 
Holistic thought … is characterized as “involving an orientation to the context or 
field as a whole, including attention to relationships between a focal object and 
the field, and a preference for explaining and predicting events on the basis of 
such relationships.” Analytic thought … is characterized as “involving 
detachment of the object from its context, a tendency to focus on attributes of the 
object in order to assign it to categories, and a preference for using rules about the 
categories to explain and predict the object’s behavior.”199 
The prediction the experimental philosophers made, on the basis of these differences, was 
that holistic thinkers would be more likely to have the ‘incorrect’ descriptivist intuition, 
while analytic thinkers would be more likely to share Kripke’s intuition about the case. 
This would reflect the focus of analytic thinkers on decontextualization and 
categorization, and that of holistic thinkers on contextual relationships in a larger field. 
As I argued earlier, the goal of experimental philosophy is not to tabulate response, but 
explain it. The hypothesis being tested is the existence of an interaction effect between 
cognitive style and referential intuition, which, in turn, could have implication for 
theories of meaning.  
To test the prediction that referential intuitions would reflect cognitive style of 
respondents, Machery et al. presented a series of probes to roughly 40 undergraduates 
and Rutgers and another 40 at the University of Hong Kong.200 These 'probes' were 
modeled on Kripke's Gödel-Schmidt; some were based on Kripke's original text, while 
others used examples that would be familiar to Chinese students. They all were presented 
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in English to both the Rutgers (W) and Hong Kong (EA) participants, with two possible 
answers: one for the descriptivist intuition, and another for the causal intuition. The 
results matched the initial predictions of the experimentalists: Ws were twice as likely as 
EAs to have causal-historical intuitions. This result has been replicated since, controlling 
for ambiguity in the vignettes, language used, and the speaker / semantic reference 
distinction.201 
The existence of a statistically significant difference in response between EAs and Ws 
scenario, the experimentalists argue, carries important methodological implications for 
philosophers who rely on intuition. It is not just that there existed differences in response, 
but that these differences could be predicted from measurable differences in cognitive 
style, that is, the different cognitive strategies deployed in the course of evaluation. The 
'cognitive style' hypothesis is that because Ws are more likely to make causation-based 
judgments generally they gravitated towards the Kripkean inuition. But if intuitions of 
reference are the product of cognitive processes that vary between cultures (and perhaps 
individuals, situations, etc.) then the reliability of such intuitions will ultimately be a 
function of the epistemic status of these processes. In particular, we'd have to affirm that 
one or other style is the 'correct' one for reasoning about semantics and the theory of 
reference: presumably the 'causal' style that predominates among professional 
philosophers.  
Alternatively perhaps it is the case that theories of meaning should reflect the relevant 
facts about cognitive style. Kripke claims that  
a symbol of any actual or hypothetical language that is not a rigid designator is so 
unlike the names of ordinary language that it ought not be called a ‘name.’202 
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If holistic thinkers are indeed ‘descriptivists’ about the reference of proper names, we 
may be forced to say theirs is a language with no ‘names’ strictly speaking, or where not 
all ‘names’ are names. Or, more radically still, systematic variation might force a re-
evaluation of the central role reference has played. The experimentalists discuss the 
possibilities without endorsing any particular conclusion save that caution is required.203   
Absent a justification for the privileging of a certain class of intuitions it is difficult to see 
how traditional philosophical theorizing about reference could proceed; why should we 
simply assume that philosophers have the 'correct' intuitions? Assuming the data is 
correct, if 'reference' is a semantic kind, as the common assumption goes, it would seem 
that populations with different referential intuitions are not using the same semantic 
categories in their respective languages ('referential pluralism)'; or that reference is not a 
semantic kind at all (various forms of pragmatism and internalism); or that we should be 
agnostic on the correct theory (referential skepticism). Worse still for philosophers, the 
'metaphysics of reference' that have been elaborated on the basis of the causal theory 
might be without adequate foundation on any of these options.204 
 
4.3 The Expertise Defense in Semantics 
As we’ve seen, one prima facie reason that we might be inclined to prefer the intuitions 
of philosophers is that philosophers are trained to be careful and deliberate thinkers, 
whose reflection on cases is more likely to be reliable than 'the folk.' Instead of worrying 
over adopting referential pluralism or skepticism, we discard the 'erroneous' folk 
intuitions in favor of those of trained semanticists or philosophers.205 As Devitt argues, 
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we should prefer the intuitions of semanticists, usually philosophers, because they 
are much more expert (which is not to say, very expert!). Just as the intuitions of 
paleontologists, physicists, and psychologists in their respective domains are 
likely to be better than those of the folk, so too the intuitions of the 
semanticists.206 
It is not just that general errors of inattention, bias, misconstrual, ignorance, and so on, 
are more likely to be caught and corrected by professional philosophers, but that the 
specific training of semanticists in the field of semantics results in a domain-specific 
expertise that is more likely to result in accurate judgments. We’ve discussed earlier 
Hales’ claims that 
…we should acknowledge that not all intuitions are created equal.... For example, 
the physical intuitions of professional scientists are much more trustworthy than 
those of undergraduates or random persons in a bus station.207 
Again, the claim is that expertise in a domain (for example, in physics) can be acquired 
via training, and this expertise translates into reliable 'intuitions' when considering cases. 
Ludwig, like Devitt, argues that in the specific case of semantics (e.g., reference) there is 
a domain-specific expertise to be acquired: 
We should not expect antecedently that untrained subjects should be in an 
especially good position to give judgments in response to scenarios involving 
difficult questions about the semantics of proper names, for this is a domain of 
considerable complexity where our ordinary vocabulary is not especially precise. 
We should instead expect that the relevant experts in the field of philosophical 
semantics will be better placed to give answers which focus on the right features 
of the cases and what they are supposed to be responding to.208 
While far from being the only objection to the studies on reference conducted by 
experimental philosophers, the expertise defense is widely endorsed and, by many, taken 
as self-evidently to be true: experts in general, including philosophers, are just going to 
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be 'better intuiters' in their domains of expertise. It follows, then, that we have a reason to 
prefer one class of intuitions in theorizing about reference. The apparent challenge posed 
by variability is thus defused, since the philosophical consensus has been that largely 
unanimous concerning the Gödel-Schmidt. 
In responding to the expertise defense, experimental philosophers have made two general 
moves. First, they claim that the phenomenon of expertise is itself an object of study, and 
offer evidence that alleged philosophical expertise does not translate into greater intuitive 
reliability. Second, they argue against the analogy between philosophical and other forms 
of expertise: while most forms of intuitive expertise can be 'calibrated' against 
independent data, it is not clear what, if any, external corrective is available to 
philosophers. I will describe these two counter-arguments briefly before moving on to my 
own objection to the expertise defense. 
First, there is the question of whether or not training in a relevant domain does in fact 
lead to a consensus of intuition on the 'correct' answer (the causal-historical intuition). 
Experimental philosophers have worried that 
…given the intense training and selection that undergraduate and graduate 
students in philosophy have to go through, there is good reason to suspect that the 
alleged reflective intuitions may be reinforced intuitions.209 
In other words, the worry is that ‘expertise’ may lead to reinforcement and selection bias 
instead of increased reliability. There is some evidence for this worry. Machery et al. 
asked 250 scholars from various disciplines a version of the Gödel-Schmidt case and 
found a significant difference between the answers of philosophers of language and 
colleagues from related fields: sociolinguists, historical linguists, anthropological 
linguists and discourse analysts were less likely to have the 'causal-historical' intuitions, 
possibly because their respective fields make them more sensitive to 'holistic' meaning 
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features. Perhaps they are wrong, too; in any event, if the expertise claim is just that 
academic expertise in a relevant domain (in this case, domains related to language) will 
make one more likely to have the 'right' intuition, this seems to falsify that claim.210 
One might argue in turn that the relevant intuitions are more specific, and those of 
philosophers of language and semanticists—who remain near-unanimous—are the 'real' 
experts. But, in the field of syntax, there is also empirical evidence that theoretical 
commitment makes one more likely to have 'intuitions' in line with one's theory.211 This 
is a form of bias that is hard to eliminate if one insists on only hewing to an 'expert' 
judgment. Nor is expertise a blanket against known forms of bias (ordering effects, 
framing effects, and so on): in Weinberg et al.'s wide-ranging survey of the literature on 
expertise across scientific domains, the authors state “we conclude that philosophers at 
this time cannot take it for granted that they are experts,” in virtue of the complex and 
difficult facts about bias and acquired expertise.212  
Furthermore, there are domains of professional activity in which 'expertise' of the sort 
under consideration yields no improvement in intuitive judgment.213 In many instances, 
expertise creates over-generalization from small sample sizes, resulting in decision-
making outcomes that are often as bad as novices—but for different reasons. With 
expertise, we 
…run a very real risk of introducing new systematic sources of error. For 
example, the expert’s extensive experience will make them even more likely to 
induce a general configural rule from a small sample and then overgeneralize.214  
                                                 
210Edouard Machery, Stephen Stich, “The Role of Experiment in the Philosophy of Language.” 
211Edouard Machery, “Expertise and Intuitions about Reference.” 
212
 For example, even very advanced chess players were susceptible to ordering effects when presented 
with a series of mating problems. Jonathan Weinberg, “Are Philosophers Expert Intuiters?” 335. 
213Jonathan Weinberg et al., “Are Philosophers Expert Intuiters?” 340. 
214Ibid. Over-generalization from small sample size of cases is, I think, a problem in philosophy generally; 
on this see Jaakko Hintikka, “The Emperor's New Intuitions.” 
107 
 
What we need is detailed empirical examination of 'philosophical expertise' in specific 
domains, the experimentalists contend; we can’t be confident until we test. 
A second, and in many ways more fundamental, counter-argument to the expertise 
defense is that philosophical expertise is manifestly disanalogous with expertise in other 
domains. Expertise is typically acquired from a feedback model where judgment is 
corrected by independent sources of evidence confirming or 'calibrating' the intuition. As 
Weinberg puts it, 
One of the most robust consensus findings of the study of expertise is that expert 
judgments can only become more reliable where experts are readily confronted 
with clear, reliable feedback on which to train.215 
Experts in scientific fields—from biology to medicine to physics—have access to the sort 
of independent feedback required for acquired expertise: a radiologist learning to 
interpret x-rays can point to independent diagnostic sources to 'confirm' and 'calibrate' 
their judgments and knowledge-claims across a wide-ranging set of cases in a short 
amount of time with great confidence in the accuracy of the feedback provided. What can 
a philosopher performing a thought-experiment point to? How do we find independent 
calibration of the intuition that the subject in a Gettier case does not know?  
As I argued in chapter 2, it seems distinctive of philosophical intuition that nothing can 
substitute for an agent’s judgment in generating ‘data’ that is pressed into service as a 
form of evidence. The difference is quite significant: the physicist’s intuitions can 
typically be subject to controlled experiment and, while they certainly play a role in what 
we may call the ‘context of discovery,’ are not taken to be part of the context of 
justification. Proponents of the expertise defense are not necessarily committed to the 
claim that intuitions are likewise part of the ‘context of justification,’ though if (1) 
intuitions do serve as evidence, (2) the intuitions of experts are reliable enough for 
serious theorizing and (3) cannot be independently calibrated, the combination of these 
commitments leads to a view of intuitions as part of the ‘context of justification.’ 
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As I noted earlier, the problem of feedback, or 'calibration,' was perhaps first raised in 
Cummins' “Reflections on Reflective Equilibrium,” but it is worth recapitulating his 
argument briefly. As suggested above, Cumming notes the profound difference between 
the 'instrument' of intuition in philosophy (when put to evidential usage) and instruments 
in science: 
Every scientific subdiscipline spends a good deal of effort identifying and 
correcting errors and artifacts. What is important for present purposes is that an 
observational technique is deemed acceptable just to the extent that it can be 
relied upon to produce accurate representations or indicators of its target.216 
Cummins points to a well-worn example in the philosophy of science: Galileo's 
telescopes. How to test whether or not the observations Galileo made when pointing the 
instrument at heavenly bodies were accurate or an artifact of the instrument? The proper 
response was to point the telescope at something of known size, shape, color, and so on 
to determine what distortions it introduced; to calibrate it, in short.217 
The problem is as follows: how are we to calibrate intuition? The targets of philosophical 
intuition are typically ineffable: it is not as if we can place an experimental subject in a 
Gettier scenario and wait to see if we can 'observe' knowledge using, say, an fMRI scan. 
We could calibrate against other experts, but this introduces a regress: against what are 
their intuitions calibrated? “Intuitions could be calibrated,” Cummins concludes, “but 
only on the assumption that there is some nonintuitive access to its targets.”218 This raises 
the question: what is the actual target of a referential intuition by philosophers? I will 
argue that it is a norm, not a fact. 
4.4 The Target Phenomena of Semantics 
Of course, many philosophers resist the idea that referential intuitions require calibration. 
Eliminativists deny that intuitions play an evidential role at all: if intuitions aren't 
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evidence, there is no instrument ('the faculty of intuition') to calibrate. Deutsch, for 
instance, argues that the relevant questions in semantics are a priori. Intuitions—and, 
especially, surveys of intuitions—are a posteriori. Speaking of 'intuitions as evidence' 
and 'calibrating the instrument' are simply a form of category mistake. The point 
generalizes, he argues, to all thought-experimentation in philosophy: 
Suppose we philosophers know that a subject in a Gettier case does not know. 
How do we know this? The traditional answer is: By thinking about the case. 
Giving this answer appears to commit one to the existence of a priori knowledge 
[...] for the philosopher who is not a skeptic about a priori knowledge, and who 
conceives of the philosophical method as including a significant a priori 
component, the results of the experimental philosophers’ surveys are irrelevant. 
For the surveys to be relevant, the philosophical questions upon which they 
allegedly bear must be conceived as being answerable via a posteriori methods. 
But non-skeptical philosophers do not conceive of the questions this way.219 
Intuitions, for Deutsch, might be the 'causal source' of a priori knowledge. However, it is 
not its being intuitive that somehow provides evidence that some judgment is true. 
Rather, according to Deutsch, 
Kripke’s argument against descriptivism succeeds if the Gödel case is a genuine 
counterexample. Whether it is an intuitive counterexample is not clearly relevant, 
and there is nothing in Kripke’s presentation of the case that would lead one to 
believe that Kripke thinks it is relevant.220 
How do we know whether or not a case is a 'genuine' counter-example? Deutsch's answer 
is the one already given above: we think about it. This is enough to acquire a priori 
knowledge. At least, if one is a philosophical expert. As I claimed in the previous 
chapter, this amounts of a re-labeling, from 'intuitive' to 'genuine,' without addressing the 
underlying epistemic issue. 
A similar move is to mark a distinction between 'genuine' and 'spurious' intuition. This 
has the same upshot. Whereas Deutsch wants 'genuine' a priori counter-examples, not 
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mere intuitions, Ludwig's ‘expertise defense’ of intuition claims that any variation in 
intuition is proof positive that not all intuitions are created equal: 
The very fact that in both the examples we considered there is variation in the 
subjects’ responses shows that, on the assumption that all the respondents are 
fully competent speakers of English and that there is no ambiguity in the terms 
used to describe the scenarios and in the questions posed, the responses are not 
data in the form of intuitions about the application conditions of the concepts 
involved in their judgments in response to the described scenarios. For identical 
competencies would yield identical judgments in response were the responses 
made solely on the basis of those competencies and identical understandings of 
the scenario, task, question, and adequate thought.221 
Giving the 'wrong' answer on a case, such as the Gödel-Schmidt, indicates that there was 
a failure of some kind: attention, bias, misunderstanding, pragmatic effects, and so on, 
and thus was not a real ‘intuition’ all along. There is, however, one correct answer, the 
genuinely intuitive one. Incorrect intuitions are not intuitions. 
At this point we might suspect a 'parting of the ways.' If one is not sympathetic to 
intuition, the obvious rejoinder to all this is to ask for criteria to differentiate 'genuine' 
intuitions and 'genuine' counter-examples from spurious, incorrect judgments. Many 
philosophers, in contrast, are simply baffled by continued skepticism. Surely it is obvious 
that a Gettier case isn't knowledge and that we refer to Gödel, not Schmidt? And equally 
obvious that answers to the contrary must be somehow confused? 
One way to move forward from this apparent impasse in both the eliminativist and 
expertise arguments would be to return to the issue of calibration and attempt to clarify 
what the target phenomena is. The point of calibration is to determine the relative 
reliability of an instrument by assessing its deliverances about some target phenomena 
via other means of acquaintance with the target. These other means don't necessarily need 
to be antecedently known to be reliable (though this is nice): it might be enough that 
independent means of observation converge to the same input data—on the assumption 
that both means of observation are not prey to the same 'errors and artifacts.' So what is 
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the 'target data' of semantic intuitions? After all, haven’t we already established that 
nothing that substitute for the agent’s judgment? 
Devitt suggests that referential intuitions can be checked against 'linguistic reality': 
A language is a system of representations or symbols, governed by rules that 
scientists sometimes posit in a species to explain its communicative behavior ... 
The 'linguistic reality' that concerns us here is the language in a particular 
community of humans. Each time members of the community speak the language, 
we have a piece of 'linguistic usage.'222 
Devitt claims that intuitions of reference are a form of indirect evidence, but that we can, 
by attending to 'linguistic reality,' acquire “direct evidence about the reference relations 
themselves” which are simply manifested in usage.223 It is not entirely clear how to read 
referential relations directly off usage, but we can leave that to the side; what is important 
for now is what linguistic reality consists in: a rule-governed representational system. On 
this, there is unanimity.  
Deutsch, too, wishes to ground 'the semantic' in roughly the same way: 
More generally, questions about who or what a speaker is ‘talking about’ in using 
a term, or questions about who or what a speaker ‘refers to’ in using a term, are 
ambiguous questions that can be interpreted as questions about the semantic 
reference of the term, i.e. the object assigned as referent by the conventions of the 
language to the term, or else as questions about the speaker’s reference of the 
term, i.e. the object to which the speaker intends to refer in using the term.224 
What is properly semantic, Deutsch and Devitt are saying, has to do with the rules, 
practices and conventions that govern language for a community of speakers. Ludwig, 
too, claims that semantics consists in “rules” which are “extractable from the practice for 
their use,” which is what Kripke’s case asks us to do: 
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Using one's own competence in this way to arrive at knowledge of public 
meanings depends on knowing that one's competence aligns with the norms of the 
public language ... where questions arise, further checking against the practice of 
relevant others in the community is called for.225 
For all three, semantic competence is ultimately grounded in the conventions of a shared 
language, which is required for communication; the commitment is likely inherited from 
Lewis' influential work. This construal of the 'target' provides a neat explanation of the 
apriority of referential intuitions (or judgments) for Deutsch: the consequences of rules, 
whether of language or chess (or chmess!) are discernable a priori.226 Reflecting on a 
hypothetical case is, effectively, to apply the (implicit) rules governing the usage of a 
term or class of terms to make explicit what the conventions, and their consequences, 
really are. Sometimes the results are surprising.227 
This leads us to the ambiguity I wished to exploit: philosophers take themselves to be 
carrying out a descriptive project when they are, in fact, engaged in a normative practice. 
None of the theorists defending referential intuition on the basis of expertise (or a priori 
knowledge, even if not understood as “intuition”) quoted above deny the possibility of, 
say, descriptivist names.228 Rather, they claim that as a matter of contingent fact, the 
causal-historical theory is for the most part true of our practices: 
If Kripke were wrong about the Gödel/Schmidt case, that would at most show that 
there are a few more descriptive names than we thought there were. But since the 
existence of some descriptive names is consistent with the causal-historical theory 
of reference, the existence of a few more is too ... the truth of the causal-historical 
theory of reference doesn’t turn on whether there are few descriptive names, or 
very few descriptive names.229 
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This applies not just to the correct theory of reference for proper names, but to other 
terms, such as natural kinds. As Frank Jackson writes, 
…we should agree that the word ‘water’ might have been used to refer to XYZ on 
Twin Earth and H20 on Earth. Hilary Putnam’s Twin Earth case isn’t an 
impossibility proof … [philosophers] find it intuitively compelling that ‘water’ 
doesn’t refer to XYZ.230 
The pleasing methodological conclusion is that philosophical expertise consists in 
expertise at discerning the norms, practices, and rules governing a given linguistic 
community—which, first, could have been otherwise, but, second, also admit of internal 
plasticity and malleability: there could be descriptivist ‘names,’ Devitt, Ichikawa et al., 
admit. Just very few in our language, as it turns out. These two features leave open the 
possibility that for some other language, there could be more ‘descriptivist’ names and, 
eo ipso, variation in the conventions surrounding semantic reference.  
The ‘expertise defense,’ on this interpretation, asserts that philosophers are experts at 
discerning the actual conventions that happen to govern our shared ordinary language 
(which could have been otherwise). I think this is incorrect. Philosophers of language 
take themselves to be describing norms; in contrast, I think they are applying norms. 
These norms reflect, in turn, metaphysical, epistemological, and modal commitments 
specifically acquired in philosophical training. Further, when theorizing about natural 
language, an appropriately explanatory theory should refrain from importing such 
commitments: as I argued in 4.2, Kripke himself took the explanatory task to be about 
describing the actual norms of ordinary language, and the accounts of the ‘target 
phenomena’ above suggest the same. Semantic theory should follow Wittgenstein's 
dictum: 'don't think, but look.'231 It has not done this; and philosophers of language have, 
instead, proposed languages we should be speaking. I will explain and defend both claims 
in the next section. 
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4.5 The Language We Ought to Have 
Philosophy of language, I contend, is concerned with the language philosophers seem to 
think we ought to have; or, at least, the language we would need to make certain kinds of 
philosophical claims. In particular, philosophers who theorize about language engage in 
idealizations that are specifically designed to facilitate philosophical theorizing. As 
Ludwig writes, in his defense of appeals to intuition, 
Thought-experiments are usually conducted under certain idealizations about 
language, namely, the terms used to describe scenarios and ask questions and 
which are to express the target concepts are all semantically complete and 
consistent. However, many natural language predicates are vague or in other 
respects semantically incomplete, or, alternatively, inconsistent.232 
The proposal is, roughly, that conceptual analysis should remove this undesirable 
vagueness and inconsistency, and the theories of language put forth by philosophers are 
the means to that end. The expertise of philosophers consists in the expertise of applying 
the normative ideals guiding this project. This has little to do, I submit, with a genuinely 
explanatory account of natural language. There is little evidence that natural languages 
are typically governed by the idealizations prevalent in philosophical analysis. 
Philosophy has given us a proposal for using language masquerading as a theory of 
language. 
We should note that the 'troublesome' features of natural language were apparent all the 
way back to Frege, and in fact served as one of the motivations for the elaboration of a 
formal alternative. Frege, however, did not think that the predicates of natural language 
were in need of theoretical correction. He was acutely aware of the “softness and 
instability of language which nevertheless is necessary for its versatility and potential for 
development,” and understood the development of formal systems as a way of 
introducing “a system of symbols from which every ambiguity is banned, which has a 
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strict logical form from which the content cannot escape.”233 But nowhere did Frege 
indicate that he thought natural language should be corrected: 
Whether features of a language count as virtues or defects will depend on the 
purpose for which we want to use the language. Features of natural language that 
are defects, given Frege’s specialized purposes, are desirable for other purposes. 
Begriffsschrift is not an ideal language. It is ‘a device invented for certain 
scientific purposes and one must not condemn it because it is not suited to others.’ 
[...] The demands that Frege identifies as the demands of truth should be seen as 
part of a regulative ideal for science. But there is no reason to assume that any 
sentences of natural language actually satisfy the demand.234 
What philosophers are doing when they claim that, for instance, modal desiderata 
impinge on the 'correct' theory of reference, is put demands to language that go well 
beyond the conventions of any naturally-formed group of speakers. It is not a theory of 
any natural language. It is, rather, the proposal that meaning should hew to a set of 
philosophically-inspired constraints. 
These are radical claims. I will make the following few points in defense of the claim that  
'expertise' in intuition is, in fact, expertise in a normative project of correcting perceived 
shortcomings of natural language. I will consider two components of the philosophical 
normative ideal, naturalness and logical form; and then argue that these norms are 
inessential to (and often empirically absent in) natural language. I will conclude that 
philosophical expertise consists in a form of trained expertise at these disciplinary norms, 
not expertise at discerning the conventional features of natural language.235 
4.5.1 Naturalness 
I will begin with ‘naturalness.’ While the Gödel-Schmidt case is about the reference of 
proper names, the guiding intuition of the case has been extended to ‘natural kind’ terms 
as well. The argument I wish to present is simpler in this instance and will serve as a 
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rough template for the apposite argument with regard to proper names. In brief I will 
argue that the ‘expert’ intuitions of philosophers in the domain of semantics are biased in 
favor of specific normative commitments and restrictions that result in descriptively 
inadequate semantic theories. 
The ‘naturalness’ constraint is this: many philosophers defending the use of intuitions 
believe that natural languages ought to be classificatory systems that aim to represent 
theoretically significant concepts. Sometimes the point is explicitly acknowledged; more 
often it is simply assumed. Frank Jackson is of the former camp: in a review of a 
collection of papers on experimental philosophy, he writes that 
One might have expected that ‘Gödel’ and ‘water’ had to refer to whatever has the 
properties that Gödel and water, respectively, are most famous for. Kripke and 
Putnam showed that this expectation is a mistake. They also showed that it would 
be good to have words that worked as sources of information about baptized 
objects and that picked out kinds, and this is true independently of whether or not 
some word is or is not doing its job.236 
In other words, the moral to be drawn from the Gödel-Schmidt and Twin-Earth thought-
experiments is, first, that descriptivism doesn’t necessarily hold of certain kinds of terms 
(not that causal-historical theories do hold); and second, that it might be good to have 
words operating in certain ways and this is so whether or not our terms are ‘doing their 
job.’ We can imagine a ‘bad’ language that ought to reform its names and predicates: 
there is nothing necessary about the semantic task words are put to. As I argued above 
(section 4.4) it is commonly granted that there could be ‘descriptivist’ words and 
‘functional’ predicates. Jackson here suggests that the upshot of thought-experiments is 
normative, telling us something about what would be ‘good’ in language. 
Other philosophers of language are less explicit, but the commitment is still detectable. 
For Devitt, while the direction of theoretical significance in semantics is primarily 
psychological, he still characterizes the “basic semantic task” as saying “what meanings 
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are.”
237
 To accomplish this task, Devitt proposes a methodology ‘for descriptive tasks in 
general.’ The question is, 
What constitutes some property we ascribe, being an F? … How then do we tell 
what is common and peculiar to F’s ‘in all possible worlds?’ … First we must 
identity some apparently uncontroversial examples of F’s and non-F’s. Second, 
we must examine the examples to determine the nature of being an F. … this 
second stage is a straightforwardly scientific one … thus we may conclude that 
some of the things identified as F’s are not; for example, whales are not fish.238 
The methodology here is that in identifying the ‘meanings’ of the terms of our language, 
we should reflect on necessary and sufficient properties across possible worlds, using 
scientific methodology to ascertain the nature of the thing itself—in other words, 
generating the relevant necessary a posteriori truths about being an F. This 'naturalness' 
restriction claims that the categories of language will, over time, evolve in the direction 
of theoretical significance; and systematically applying this method to elucidating the 
nature of being an F will accomplish this: for example, we will discover that whales are 
not fish and never were, and revise our language accordingly to accommodate this fact. 
Brian Weatherson makes the same point as Devitt, arguing for the naturalness restriction 
when appealing to intuition during conceptual analysis: 
...the concept so analyzed should be theoretically significant, and should be 
analyzed in other theoretically significant terms. This is why we now analyze 
'fish' in such a way that whales aren't fish, and ‘star’ in such a way that the sun is 
a star. This is not just an empirical fact about our language. Adopting such a 
constraint on categories is a precondition of building a serious classificatory 
scheme, so it is a constraint on languages, which are classificatory schemes par 
excellance. Even if I’m wrong about this, the fact that we do reform our language 
with the advance of science to make our predicates refer to theoretically more 
significant properties shows that we have a commitment to this restriction [...] 
When the ancients said “Whales are fish”, or “The sun is not a star”, they simply 
said false sentences.239 
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Again, the claim here is that ordinary language meanings are intended to track 
theoretically significant concepts, which is not ‘just an empirical fact,’ but something 
more, a ‘constraint’ on languages. Weatherson adverts to our apparent practices: we 
‘intend’ for our predicates to refer to natural properties, and reform our language 
accordingly. I will focus on Weatherson’s arguments in what follows, though the point 
generalizes. 
Linguistic intentions have always played an important role in the causal theory of 
reference: in The Meaning of Meaning, Putnam claims of the Twin-Earth case that ‘we’ 
intended ‘water’ to serve as a natural kind term, because our form of ostensive definition 
presupposes a theoretical relation of sameness across samples.240 But as I argued in 
section 2.1 and 3.3.2, intuition is what ultimately supports philosophers’ appeal to 
linguistic intent. And, if we do wish to affirm that the ‘target phenomena’ of semantics 
are the conventions of ordinary language used by actual speakers, the following 
conditional cannot be easily rejected: 
If it should turn out that only philosophers baulk at classifying XYZ as water, I 
am ready to defer in my usage to the non-philosophical majority and say that 
"water", like "glue", is not the name of a kind with a chemical essence.241 
That there are plenty of such ‘functional’ terms cannot be denied: the question is, why 
isn’t ‘water’ a functional term? It can’t be because there is a candidate essence: this 
denies the conventional nature of language that proponents of the expertise defense claim 
is their object of study (as we’ve already seen, the connection is not necessary). If it is a 
contingent fact about what speakers actually do, then we cannot assume the naturalness 
restriction always constrains meaning, and should instead conduct careful experimental 
investigation of actual speakers. If it is instead a normative project of rational 
reconstruction, then philosophers of language should not criticize experimental 
philosophy, for both are engaged in separate projects. 
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Consider, to make this perhaps more clear, Devitt’s and Weatherson’s example (above) 
that ‘whales are not fish,’ and that ‘the ancients’ were simply uttering false sentences. We 
should begin with the observation that the ancients, whoever is meant by that, certainly 
never said that whales were or were not fish. (They obviously never uttered the words 
‘whale’ or ‘fish.’) It is true that the ancient Greek word κῆτος (ketos) was used to denote 
any large creature that lived in the sea, including what we now consider 'fish' but also 
seals, sharks, whales, and sundry purported sea monsters and serpents. 'Ketos,' if the 
corpus of ancient Greek is any indication, was just a functional category like ‘glue,’ and 
not a 'kind' category.242 The ancients weren't wrong or saying ‘false sentences.’ More 
likely they had a different concept that cannot be assimilated to our own ‘fish’ and 
‘whale,’ and any usage-change would be driven by practical considerations.   
Why, then, the focus on naturalness? The 'naturalness' of a predicate of ordinary language 
is a constraint that was already seen, in the early days of the turn towards the causal-
historical theory, as a commitment required to make sense of the theory. David Lewis 
writes 
This constraint looks not to the speech and thought of those who refer, and not to 
their causal connections to the world, but rather to the referents themselves. 
Among all the countless things and classes that there are, most are miscellaneous, 
gerrymandered, ill-demarcated. Only an elite minority are carved at the joints, so 
that their boundaries are established by objective sameness and difference in 
nature. Only these elite things and classes are eligible to serve as referents. The 
world—any world—has the makings of many interpretations that satisfy many 
theories; but most of these interpretations are disqualified because they employ 
ineligible referents. When we limit ourselves to the eligible interpretations, the 
ones that respect the objective joints in nature, there is no longer any guarantee 
that (almost) any world can satisfy (almost) any theory. It becomes once again a 
worthy goal to discover a theory that will come true on an eligible interpretation, 
and it becomes a daring and risky hope that we are well on the way toward 
accomplishing this.243 
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Reflecting on Lewis' remarks here, it becomes perfectly clear that the kind of 'expertise' 
he has in mind is a normative exhortation to have certain kinds of predicates and concepts 
and not others.244 (Part of the motivation might have been to articulate an ontology that 
evaded some of Kuhn’s relativistic-sounding arguments in the philosophy of science: 
under a causal theory, reference is preserved across theory-change). But of course if we 
actually attend to natural language, it is perfectly clear that 'unnatural,' functional 
categories—vague, shifting, contextual categories that reflect local human interests—are 
everywhere, and perhaps predominate. Off the top of my head: chalk, rubber, fire, swim, 
fly, fruit, bug, vegetable, almost all intentional talk ('the computer wants, the internet 
thinks, the polls urge'---only the most pedantic squirm at such natural usages), ash, blue, 
slug, berry, and so on. 
To expand on just a few examples. 'Chalk' refers to any chalk-like substance, not just 
calcium carbonate but also magnesium silicates, calcium sulfates (blackboard chalk, 
technically a form of salt), and other functionally similar compounds. But according to 
the 'naturalness constraint', if I call my climber's chalk (pure magnesium carbonate) 
'chalk' I am speaking falsely, since 'chalk,' on analysis, ought carve at some theoretically 
significant property like CaCO3, not some gerrymandered functional description of 
superficial properties. (You could say "technically, X is not chalk, since 'chalk' is in fact 
Y," but the qualifier 'technically' is doing half the work by asserting a dubious 
philosophical norm—the correct response is "stop being a pedant.") We do, in fact, have 
a disambiguating vocabulary (that of chemistry). This does not mean we should drop the 
functional, non-kind definition of ‘chalk’ from our everyday language, which is perfectly 
suited to our interests, purposes, and lives. 
Another example: ‘Slug’ refers to any slug-like creature, not to a specific species or 
group of species. Rather, it is a polyphyletic term of ordinary language that brings 
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together various evolutionary lineages on the basis of superficial similarity. Within the 
domain of molecular biology polyphyletic classification is avoided, since it reduces 
predictive power (superficial similarity is typically the product of accidental convergent 
evolution). Thus ‘slug’ is not a natural kind term, or a term for which we should expect to 
find a ‘natural’ definition. Future linguists, hopefully, will not chastise us for falsely 
saying that l. maximus and a. vulgaris were the same sort of thing. 
Of course the philosopher could retort that their story is compatible with the existence of 
some, or many, non-kind concepts, and certainly doesn’t show that philosophical 
concepts are ‘unnatural.’245 But in the context of philosophy of language, this seemingly 
minor concession gives up too much: because then it becomes again an empirical matter 
of investigating which concepts are used in which way, and more importantly why. And if 
'use' carries the day, then we do need to ask people at bus stations what they think of 
'water' and 'XYZ.' Further, it becomes quite plausible indeed that the expertise of 
philosophers reflects theoretical commitment and training to these norms: analytic 
philosophers, because of their training, tend to over-apply these norms.  
A similar story can be told for rubber (synthetic rubber is still rubber, making the case 
similar to Twin-Earth: we have an XYZ for rubber, and still call both ‘rubber’). It is 
obvious that 'bug' does not aspire to carve joints but equally obvious it is in no need of 
linguistic reform. It is not obvious that XYZ wouldn't be called water should it be 
invented tomorrow (given a sufficient marketing budget); indeed, it is not clear that 
‘water’ in the ordinary sense is a natural kind: tea is chemically closer to H20 than 
seawater, but only the latter is water.246 Iceberg lettuce is, apparently, 96% H20, 
approximately the same as seawater. As Chomsky once argued, a water filter that uses 
teabags produces water, but a chemically identical cup of tea is tea, not water: “whether 
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something is water depends on special human interests and concerns,” at least in the non-
technical sense of ‘water.’247  
Again, all parties to the debate admit that, should intuitions align to the verdict that XYZ 
is water, then 'water' is not the name of a natural kind. The philosopher says it would be 
good to have such terms, and has the corresponding intuition about the referent in the 
Twin-Earth case. Why would it be good? Well, it’s good for science and classification. 
But even this is dubious. Passing familiarity with the jargon of any science shows a 
bewildering variety of kinds of terms. Geologists use the term tephra to refer to any 
material produced by volcanic eruption regardless of composition, size, and emplacement 
mechanism. 'Cerebral palsy' is an umbrella term for any motor impairment resulting from 
several different kinds of brain insult. Such examples can be multiplied endlessly.248 It is 
not an obvious requirement or desiderata of science to only have terms that carve at the 
joints, where joints are defined via considerations of naturalness.249 
How semantically widespread is unnaturalness? Opinions differ here. Paul Pietroski 
thinks most terms and predicates are ‘unnatural’:  
Since almost all natural language predicates are vague, this makes it hard to even 
say which function is alleged to be the valuation of a given predicate. This is often 
viewed as a sniggly point which does not really challenge the idea that the 
valuations of natural language predicates are functions. I find this attitude 
baffling.250 
Weatherson disagrees: 
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One occasionally hears people deride the assumption that there are necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the application of a term, as if this was the most 
preposterous piece of philosophy possible. Really, this assumption is no more 
than the assumption that dictionaries can be written.251  
What I wish to suggest is that when philosophers claim that natural language must follow 
some such theoretical convention in absence of careful investigation of linguistic 
practice, they are adopting substantive normative commitments, not describing ‘meaning’ 
in general terms. The fact is we are not sure how much naturalnesss is actually in 
language, under what conditions naturalness develops, and what factors and constraints 
affect semantic development. 
Sometimes the ‘naturalness’ issue is less clear because ordinary language practices allow 
for contextual sensitivity of reference and definition (as in the chemist’s definition of 
chalk versus ordinary usage). I will give another, somewhat mundane example, following 
Weatherson’s critique of Rosch et al.’s studies. Weatherson disputes that their 
experimental evidence demonstrates that ordinary terms like ‘fruit’ and ‘vegetable’ are 
Wittgensteinian cluster concepts. After all,  
It is not a brute fact language that tomatoes are a fruit. It is not just by magic that 
we happened to come to a shared meaning for fruit that includes tomatoes, and 
that if faced with a new kind of object, we would generally agree about whether it 
is a fruit … there will be a short list of necessary and sufficient conditions for 
being a fruit. But for this example … ‘fruit’ was relatively arbitrary, so there will 
be a short list of necessary and sufficient conditions for being an F, for pretty 
much any F.252 
Weatherson appeals to the authority of the Oxford English Dictionary as further 
evidence: here’s a definition, plain as day, which explains why tomatoes are fruit. But 
again here I think we have a case of a ‘technical’ definition running alongside an 
everyday definition: tomatoes are not a fruit until we cue the technical context, which is, 
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in fact, rather counter-intuitive to the ordinary speaker. There’s a culinary concept and a 
‘natural’ concept, and we shift between these two definitional axes with relative ease—
though in practice likely use the former more often than the latter.  
The two definitions are typically called ‘culinary’ and ‘botanical,’ acknowledged in 
reference works, dictionaries, and even enshrined in law: a unanimous 1893 United States 
Supreme Court decision ruled that the tomato was a vegetable for taxation purposes, 
while acknowledging its botanical status as a fruit. The decision is worth quoting:  
Botanically speaking, tomatoes are the fruit of a vine, just as are cucumbers, 
squashes, beans, and peas. But in the common language of the people, whether 
sellers or consumers of provisions, all these are vegetables which are grown in 
kitchen gardens, and which, whether eaten cooked or raw, are, like potatoes, 
carrots, parsnips, turnips, beets, cauliflower, cabbage, celery, and lettuce, usually 
served at dinner in, with, or after the soup, fish or meats which constitute the 
principal part of the repast, and not, like fruits generally, as dessert … this is the 
principle use to which they are put. Beyond the common knowledge we have on 
this subject, very little evidence is necessary, or can be produced. 253  
Presumably confusion could have been avoided if the botanists had introduced a new 
nomenclature instead of terms already coined. In any event no clearer evidence could be 
provided of a distinction between ordinary usage and technical definition. 
Consider another culinary example that might jar our intuitions: berries. Berries, as it 
turns out, have a nice botanical definition that provides necessary and sufficient 
conditions for berry-hood: a berry is “a fleshy fruit produced from a single flower and 
containing one ovary,” which provides us with a short list of conditions and a means of 
identifying what counts as a berry.254 Is this the meaning of berry in ordinary language? 
Only if strawberries, raspberries, blackberries and mulberries aren’t in fact berries, while 
avocados, bananas, watermelons, and pumpkins are berries. As the Oxford English 
Dictionary notes ‘berry’ most often means “any small globular or ovate juicy fruit, not 
having a stone,” even though per the botanical definition this implies that “many of the 
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fruits properly so called, are not berries” even though “botanically, the name … includes 
the cucumber, gourd, and even the orange and lemon.”255 Modern plant biology has 
discouraged use of the term berry in favor of more discriminate categories that reflect the 
development and structure of ‘fruit,’ and even this latter term is rife with controversy.  
The Encyclopedia Britannica discusses fruit as an ordinary language concept, contrasting 
it with the relevant scientific one (‘gymnosperm seed’): “the concept fruit,” the articles 
notes “is based on … an odd mixture of practical and theoretical considerations,” noting 
that it brings together a motley of variegated botanical phenomena.256 The article goes on 
to say,  
As strikingly exemplified by the word nut, popular terms often do not properly 
describe the botanical nature of certain fruits. A Brazil ‘nut,’ for example, is a 
thick-walled seed enclosed in a likewise thick-walled capsule along with several 
sister seeds. A coconut is a drupe (a stony-seeded fruit) with a fibrous outer part. 
A walnut is a drupe in which the pericarp has differentiated into a fleshy outer 
husk and an inner hard ‘shell;’ the ‘meat’ represents the seed … a peanut is an 
indehiscent legume fruit. An almond ‘nut’ is the ‘stone’ … botanically speaking, 
blackberries and raspberries are not ‘berries’ but aggregates of tiny drupes. A 
juniper ‘berry’ is comparable to a complete pine cone. A mulberry is a multiple 
fruit … a strawberry represents a much-swollen receptacle … bearing on its 
convex surface an aggregation of tiny achenes (small, single-seeded fruits).257 
Such caveats are a matter of routine in reference works, which carefully distinguish 
between the definitions of everyday usage and the specialized distinctions employed by 
specialists in the relevant field.258 Ordinary usage tracks human interests; if we stopped 
cooking and all became botanists, perhaps usage would shift. 
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In light of this, it is not clear that Weatherson’s appeal to the OED can sustain his views 
on naturalness restrictions in semantics. It seems more natural to the semantic facts that 
there are two concepts at play in the case of ‘berry,’ one a functional concept that is more 
widely used and the second a ‘natural kind’ concept that, while more theoretically 
significant is unwieldy and largely useless in everyday contexts. As is obvious, functional 
terms are rather distinct from natural kind terms in their modal profile: for example, if 
‘water’ was a functional term then it would not be the case that water is necessarily H20. 
Many of the cases I have just surveyed are clearly functional terms (chalk, slug, berry) in 
ordinary language; further, there are no compelling reasons to adopt alternative specialist 
definitions.  
The worry I am raising here is that expert intuitions about the meaning of terms will tend 
to favor specialist definitions over ordinary meanings, because of philosophical training 
and theoretical commitment. This is incompatible, I suggest, with the view that the target 
phenomena of semantic theory is ordinary language.  Far from idle speculation, there is 
compelling empirical evidence for this. The form of natural kind classification Devitt, 
Weatherson and Lewis are suggesting as 'distinctive' of language is, in fact, a peculiarity 
of modern times. Evidence from IQ testing over the last 125 years shows gains in scoring 
that can only be accounted for in terms of large-scale adoption of new cognitive norms 
that reflect the desiderata of the tests. Noting the rise in average IQ scores over the last 
century (dubbed the 'Flynn Effect') that would make the 'average agent' a dullard today, 
Flynn writes of the new norms that  
…the first distinction is that between pre-scientific and post-scientific operational 
thinking. A agent who views the world through pre-scientific spectacles thinks in 
terms of the categories that order perceived objects and functional relationships. 
When presented with a Similarities-type item such as ‘‘what do dogs and rabbits 
have in common,” Americans in 1900 would be likely to say, ‘‘You use dogs to 
hunt rabbits.’’ The correct answer, that they are both mammals, assumes that the 
important thing about the world is to classify it in terms of the categories of 
science. Even if the subject were aware of those categories, the correct answer 
would seem absurdly trivial. Who cares that they are both mammals? That is the 
least important thing about them from his point of view. What is important is 
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orientation in space and time, what things are useful, and what things are under 
one’s control, that is, what does one possess.259 
Standard IQ tests favour abstract classification, causal relationships, and analytic 
thinking. As we've gotten better at this—through training—our experience of what is 
intuitive has changed. And analytic philosophers are exceedingly well-trained in these 
kinds of cognitive norms.  
Such classification is only one of the things we can do with language, and it still does so 
in an often stilted, artificial way, as I argued above. But back a hundred years ago, it was 
not obvious at all that the naturalness constraint was distinctive of the semantics of 
language: 
Today we are so familiar with the categories of science that it seems obvious that 
the most important attribute things have in common is that they are both animate, 
or mammals, or chemical compounds. However, people attached to the concrete 
will not find those categories natural at all. First, they will be far more reluctant to 
classify. Second, when they do classify, they will have a strong preference for 
concrete similarities (two things look alike, two animals are functionally related, 
for example, one eats the other) over a similarity in terms of abstract 
categories.260 
It is important to remember that the 'low' average IQ scores of a hundred years ago do not 
reflect shortcomings in the intellectual ability of our close ancestors. By today's scores, 
the average agent in 1900 would have a score anywhere from 50-70, which, for 
diagnostic purposes, is considered mentally handicapped; but the average agent a hundred 
years ago was not so handicapped. They had not internalized the norms of 'scientific' 
intelligence testing, which share much in common with the proposed linguistics norms of 
the philosophical community. 
A dilemma presents itself to the philosophers committed to the naturalness constraint. To 
say the 'ancients' got it wrong, or were speaking falsely, with their predicate 'ketos' is, in 
effect, to claim that for most of human history most people were ignorant of the true 
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meaning of many terms in their language, since they had no idea what the ‘natural’ 
referents of their predicates in fact were. (Prior to this research, for instance, I was—
according to naturalness—mistaken in thinking of strawberries as berries and gourds as 
not-berries, and, I wager, so is everyone else who is not a plant biologist. Mutatis 
mutandis for other terms.) The other horn of the dilemma is to say that there are probably 
more functional terms that we’d like to admit, and that the ‘naturalness’ constraint is 
normative. The fact is we have no idea how many ordinary terms are functional, whether 
or not most of our concepts are ‘cluster-concepts,’ and to what extent meaning in other 
languages, synchronically and diachronically (natural language has been around for at 
least 50,000 years), exhibited degrees of naturalness. 
If we are genuinely interested in a descriptively adequate amount of meaning, we should 
take the second horn of the dilemma: most speakers are not speaking falsely, just as it is 
obvious that the average 19th-century person was not mentally handicapped. Again, we 
conclude that the theories presented by philosophers reflect normative constraints 
appropriate perhaps for a project of rational reconstruction. An adequate scientific theory 
of natural language in humans needs to go beyond such proposals and explain how 
natural languages are acquired and deployed. Reconstruction is not a project without its 
merits, yet a properly descriptive account of natural language should be able to tell us 
something useful about what kinds of norms are possible. 
4.5.2 Modal Constraints 
To get back to reference: the argument here is not that descriptivism is true or that the 
causal theory is false. What I am saying is that so-called philosophical 'expertise' reflects 
acquaintance with a sophisticated sort of linguistic proposal that can be justified in terms 
of its utility in carrying out certain kinds of endeavors. As such, philosophical expertise 
cannot be used to defend descriptive theses about 'ordinary language,' for the intuitions of 
philosophers are about disciplinary norms. Thus appeals to 'philosophical expertise' really 
only carry weight in the context of the normative proposal on offer.  I chose to focus on 
kinds (and 'naturalness') first because it illustrates the point vividly. But the same applies 
to proper names. Just as ‘naturalness’ asks us to assign ‘natural’ semantic values to terms 
and predicates, modal constraints ask us to consider modal truths when attempting to 
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understand the semantics of proper names. However, it seems clear that we can use 
names in ways that fundamentally violate any purported modal restrictions: semantic 
facts and modal facts come apart. 
Suppose I say: “Imagine Nixon, that man, had an identical twin.” But distinctness, like 
identity, is necessary in S5 modal logic.261 Monozygotic twinning, that is, spontaneous 
division of the zygote into two embryos, is a random, contingent event. If Nixon1 and his 
twin, Nixon2, are necessarily distinct as modal logic requires, then neither are identical to 
the sole Nixon in the possible world where the contingent event of twinning did not occur 
even if all three originated from the same zygote. For if the twins Nixon1 and Nixon2 are 
necessarily distinct from each other, neither can be identified with non-twin actual Nixon. 
(Imagine the reverse scenario: could the Olsen twins not have been twins? Well, the 
twinning event might not have occurred, and then only one child was born. In that world, 
which of our actual ‘twins’ corresponds to the possible single child? Choosing either 
seems arbitrary, and both violates distinctness: if a=c and b=c, by transitivity, a=b. 
‘Neither’ is the only viable option.) 
If 'Nixon,' in our language, is just a rigid designator, there is no possible world where that 
man had an identical twin. But it plainly makes sense to utter a sentence like “Imagine 
Nixon had an identical twin.” It is quite natural to think thoughts for which there is no 
corresponding possible world, strictly ('rigidly') speaking, and this tells us that the 
semantical framework is not adequate to the perversities of natural language. We switch 
between description and rigidity fluidly—it does not seem to be an important cognitive 
boundary. That suggests to me that the semantics on offer, even if it could emulate 
aspects of natural language, probably won't make for empirically adequate 
psycholinguistics. Whatever meaning is, it is insensitive to the modal-ontological facts.  
Stipulated psychic continuity also appears to violate modal restrictions: there are no 
possible worlds where the emperor Kuzco, a man, gets turned into a llama and remains 
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essentially the same person. Yet small children follow such stories, and concomitant 
referential attributions to Kuzco the man and Kuzco the llama, with no difficulty. What 
matters is not the metaphysics of modality, but the uses of the name and the conceptual 
resources we can bring to bear. This is particularly clear with place names. Chomsky 
writes that 
London is not a place. Rather, it is at a place, though it is not the things at that 
place, which could be radically changed or moved, leaving London intact. London 
could be destroyed and rebuilt, perhaps after millennia, still being Lonodn; 
Carthage could be rebuilt today, just as Tom Jones, though perfectly concrete, 
could be reincarnated as an insect or turned by a witch into a frog … but Tom 
Jones all along—concepts available to young children without instruction or 
relevant experience. The abstract character of London is crucial to its 
individuation. If London is reduced to dust, it–that is, London—can be rebuilt 
elsewhere and be the same city, London.262 
We need to separate out two ‘could’ questions: the linguistic from the modal. On the 
former reading, all the usages above are perfectly natural for a speaker, even if, on the 
latter ‘modal’ reading none of these ‘coulds’ represent legitimate possibilities. It could be 
objected to a story that, technically, Tom Jones cannot be turned into a frog, for Tom 
Jones is essentially a human being; though this would be to misunderstand the practice of 
story-telling and it would constitute a mistake to ‘reform’ language to exclude such 
usages. Likewise, one might endeavor to discover the modally correct ontology of cities, 
and in doing so discover that London could not be destroyed and rebuilt and be the 
‘same’ London; this has no bearing on whether or not we wish to say that London was 
destroyed and rebuilt (any more than the botanically correct definition of berry should 
convince me to refer to pumpkins as berries, but not strawberries). 
Indeed, the distinctions and entailments drawn in modal logic appear to place no real 
semantic constraints on speakers whatsoever, however useful these may be in 
metaphysical analysis. Yet as I argued above, Kripke argues as if he is engaged in a 
descriptive project: 
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I came to realize ... that the natural intuition that the names of ordinary language 
are rigid designators can be in fact be upheld ... it was a short step to realize that 
similar remarks applied to terms for natural kinds.263 
It is clear that, for Kripke and those working in his wake that they conceived of their 
project not as a proposal, but as a description of existing norms in 'language'. They speak, 
again and again, of 'ordinary,' 'actual,' and 'natural' language. But actual language is 
manifestly not beholden to the logical restrictions imagined by philosophers. Therefore, 
again I conclude that the expert intuitions of philosopher reflect theoretical commitments 
that bias their responses: because philosophers carefully consider the modal profiles of 
entities when determining what is semantically acceptable to say about them (viz., 3.3.3 
on the problem of ‘unwanted necessity’) they generate intuitions that are too restrictive. 
The anthropological evidence is clear that, without specific training and education into 
scientific norms, restrictions of naturalness and modality as conceived by contemporary 
philosophers are largely absent or modified by different epistemic norms: 
If the everyday world is your cognitive home, it is not natural to detach 
abstractions and logic and the hypothetical from their concrete referents. It is not 
that pre-scientific people did not use abstractions: the concept of hunting as 
distinct from fishing is an abstraction. They would use syllogistic logic all of the 
time: Basset hounds are good for hunting; that is a Basset hound; that dog would 
be good at hunting. They would of course use the hypothetical: if I had two dogs 
rather than only one, I could catch more rabbits. But the reference is always to the 
concrete relationships that dominate the everyday world. Today we have no 
difficulty freeing logic from concrete referents and reasoning about purely 
hypothetical situations.264 
It is not just that the classification norms were different, but the entailment relations 
within the language reflected practices incompatible with those proposed by 
philosophers. Consider the following exchange recorded by Soviet anthropologist 
Alexander Luria with Siberian peasants in the 1930s: 
Q: All bears are white where there is always snow; in Novaya Zemlya there is 
always snow; what color are the bears there? 
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 A: I have seen only black bears and I do not talk of what I have not seen. 
Q: But what do my words imply? 
A: If a person has not been there he cannot say anything on the basis of words. If 
a man was 60 or 80 and had seen a white bear there and told me about it, he could 
be believed.265 
Note the emphasis on testimonial evidence over abstract reasoning. Only direct 
experience can tell us about concrete facts, not logic; we could trust someone else's direct 
experience, perhaps. The logic of the words is irrelevant, and it would require the 
assumption of different conventions to draw out the conclusion desired. Which is not to 
say that the truth of modus ponens is conventional. What I am saying is that language 
does not need to acknowledge modus ponens for it to be a language. Thus the claim that 
predicates of ordinary language have crisp valuations that carve reality at the joints and 
obey classical logic, and that names follow modal restrictions, either makes pre-scientific 
peoples ignorant of much of their own language, or—as I am urging—is simply a 
proposed norm for the use of language in certain contexts.266 The norms appears 
seductive because they facilitate certain kinds of reasoning. What they are not is 
descriptive of the possibilities within natural language.  
I do not mean to advance deep theses about the nature of semantics. In responding to the 
expertise defense in the context of the philosophy of language my goal was to provide 
evidence that the intuitions of philosophers could well be theoretically biased. Training in 
formal logic, for instance, might lead philosophers to assume that referential practices 
‘should’ be modally coherent, and develop theories that reflect this constraint. For 
example, in the Nixon case I presented above, there corresponds no possible world where 
Nixon, rigidly designated, has an identical twin: a world where there are twin Nixons is a 
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world where our Nixon does not exist; we are thinking ‘descriptively,’ as it were: a world 
much like our own, with twin-Nixon ‘counterparts’ picked out via description. This can 
be figured out a priori, so it’s not a question of a metaphysically impossible yet 
epistemically possible world; rather, I can simply think of Nixon descriptively should the 
imagined situation require it, just as I can refer to Kuzco as a llama. But if this is so, then 
it raises the possibility of open-ended answers to cases such as the Gödel-Schmidt: it is 
not that some names ‘turn out to be descriptive’ (4.4) but that reference is contextualized 
to occasions of use, a possibility that had been excluded from intuitive consideration due 
to background assumptions in philosophy of language. More specifically it seems that for 
philosophers de re modal properties of referents trump other considerations: since any 
given individual might not have some associated descriptive property, these properties 
cannot secure reference. The question is whether this assumption is true of ordinary 
referential practices, or represents a normative constraint for rational reconstruction.   
 
4.6 Conclusion 
Let's recap. Experimental philosophers claim to have predicted, and then uncovered, 
statistically significant variation between (and within) populations' referential intuitions. 
This, they go on to suggest, jeopardizes philosophers' reliance on their own intuitions 
when theorizing, for they may be theoretically biased or not representative. Philosophers 
critical of this argument respond that the 'expert intuitions' of philosophers are more 
likely to be correct because of their training, not despite it. This is the 'expertise defense.' 
In response to the 'expertise defense,' I argued that philosophical expertise is expertise at 
the application of certain normative constraints (naturalness, modality) to language that 
reflect putative theoretical utility for certain scientific and metaphysical purposes. 
Philosophers of language, however, do not take themselves to be proposing norms of 
usage; they take themselves to be describing the conventions of ordinary language. If this 
were so, the conclusion would be that most speakers utter false sentences far more often 
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than they realize (about the extension of predicates and the modal properties of 
individuals);267 that they are ignorant of the meaning of many of the terms in their 
language; and are wrong about the correct entailment relations that hold between 
sentences. This, I think, is absurd. I conclude, therefore, that the 'expertise defense' fails 
to provide compelling reason to prefer the intuitions of philosophers when theorizing 
about natural language, for philosophers will tend to have intuitions about meaning that 
are sensitive to modal and ontological considerations speakers do not have. Rather, we 
should undertake careful examination of language-use across demographic groups 
without the prior assumption that the underlying meaning-generation practices follow 
these constraints. 
This argument does not show that the norms proposed by philosophers of language are 
'wrong.' Indeed they may be quite useful for the purposes they are intended. I do not wish 
even to deny that these norms are truth-conducive. Possibly they are; in this context we 
should certainly prefer the intuitions of philosophers. In fact, the definition of 
philosophical semantics typically incorporates a commitment to truth-conditional 
representation.268 If this is so, the enterprise of semantics is by definition the elaboration 
of linguistic conventions that serve this purpose. The extra step—that the conventions of 
ordinary languages follow these strictures—is empirically dubious.  
In arguing this way, perhaps I fail to distinguish Lewis’ ‘two topics’ in philosophy of 
language: 
First, the description of possible languages or grammars as abstract semantic 
systems whereby symbols are associated with aspects of the world; and second, 
the description of the psychological and sociological facts whereby a particular 
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one of these abstract semantic systems is the one used by a person or population. 
Only confusion comes of mixing these two topics.269 
Have I invited this confusion? I do not think so. The distinction I am drawing between 
ordinary usage and normatively-governed semantic theory is not about Lewis’ two topics. 
Rather, it has to do with the nature of representation: what ‘aspects of the world’ are 
associated with what ‘symbols.’ Philosophical ‘expertise,’ I am arguing, tends to bias the 
question of representation in directions that reflect metaphysical desiderata. The aspects 
of the world represented by symbols are assumed by philosophers to be theoretically 
significant, viz., natural predicates and modally-coherent names, since these are the 
important aspects to focus on for metaphysical theorizing (with proper names, we should 
want to be able to express all and only true claims about specific individuals). What is 
less clear is that speakers hew to these constraints, and that the resulting theories really 
are about ordinary language.  
All I wished to demonstrate was that these 'philosophical theories' are proposed norms of 
usage, not a theory of natural language meanings. To get such a theory requires empirical 
investigation into the different possible uses of language, which appear to outstrip purely 
formal constraints. In the particular case of the theory of reference, it may very well be 
that there is no 'theory' of reference—in the weakly internalist sense that only speakers 
refer. I take no position on this issue for now, though I suspect that empirical 
investigation will lend credence to the internalist hypothesis. For the time being it is 
enough that we are clearer now about what philosophical expertise is expertise of. 
The problem I outlined above appears peculiar to ordinary language (and hence to 
philosophy of language). Epistemology, for instance, can wear normativity on its sleeve: 
it is easier to argue that we are after the knowledge-practices we should have, not an 
analysis of the epistemic concepts we happen to have. Philosophy of language has tried to 
have it both ways: to provide an analysis of the language we ought to have and thereby 
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explain the one we do in fact have. These are incompatible projects, and the expertise 
defense fails because of it. 
The biasing power of theoretical commitment is less problematic outside of philosophy of 
language, and my brief against the expertise defense cannot be extended to other domains 
of philosophy without significant modification and weakening. I will then close with two 
brief thoughts on how this might proceed. First, it is clear that in cases where 
philosophical theories rely, implicitly or explicitly, on claims about ordinary concept-
possession we should certainly be on guard for theory-driven bias of the type I have been 
discussing. Second, however, when the target of philosophical theorizing consists in 
claims about the norms which should be adopted given some description of an extrinsic 
phenomena (Knowledge, itself, taking no stand on the well-formedness of this pursuit) 
theoretical bias is not as much of a liability. We may be left with other worries that could 
affect the evaluation of cases (framing and ordering effects, wording, and so on); I will 
not attempt to untangle the issues here. Rather, I wish to stress that the problem of 
theoretical bias—that is, the problem of philosophical expertise itself as a form of bias—
does not neatly apply outside of philosophy of language, reflecting the domain-specific 
nature of expertise and intuitive judgment. The interaction effect discovered by the 
experimentalists, therefore, cannot be dismissed on the basis of ‘expertise.’ 
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Chapter 5  
5 Conclusion: Defending Experimental Philosophy 
5.1 Summary 
Experimental philosophy, I have argued, has dual ambitions: a positive program 
continuous with cognitive science, and a methodological program concerned with the use 
of intuitions as a form evidence in philosophy. In reality the distinction is not so cut and 
dry: the methodological program requires input from the positive program, and, in turn, 
generates positive data of its own. Since the positive program is concerned with the 
nature of intuitive judgment, typically judgments of conceptual application or 
classification in general, however, its significance can be divorced from the 
methodological argument over the reliability of intuition.  
Critics have sometimes claimed that experimental philosophy proceeds as if all 
philosophy was ordinary language philosophy: that, by surveying response to cases, 
experimental philosophers propose to solve problems of philosophy by appealing to 
ordinary practices.270 I’ve argued that this misunderstands the positive project. The goal 
is to achieve explanatory depth about the nature of pre-theoretical judgment, not to 
tabulate survey results and read theory off the numbers. As Joshua Knobe stresses, 
experimental philosophy is not conceptual analysis by other means: a typical paper in 
experimental philosophy will not attempt to analyse a concept: “most typically, what you 
will find is an attempt to identify and explore a specific effect,” Knobe writes, in an effort 
to understand the cognitive processes that give rise to certain kinds of judgments 
performed under certain kinds of conditions.271 Reference provided us with a case study: 
the hypothesis was that culturally-specific differences in cognitive style would have an 
effect on intuitions of reference in the Gödel-Schmidt, and this is what experimentalists 
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found. How to interpret these results is another matter entirely; the authors of the study 
explore some possibilities, but do not directly endorse any.272 
The main thrust of my argument was to defend the prima facie case for experimental 
philosophy. The prima facie case makes the straightforward claim that sources of 
evidence require some accounting, and that in the case of intuitive evidence, one way to 
so account is via the methods of scientific investigation. I have also urged that the 
philosophical significance of experimental philosophy can be decoupled from the use of 
intuitions as evidence, to the extent that understanding intuition and pre-theoretic 
judgment is of intrinsic philosophical interest. While I believe this is so, my primary 
focus throughout was the prima facie case as developed in section 2.2.; and so I have 
defended it against two main objections, eliminativism about intuitions and the expertise 
defense. 
In defending the prima facie case against these objections, I declined to give a precise 
definition of intuition. Rather, I provided examples of their use, and used several words 
interchangeably: intuition, but also judgment, evaluation, and response. These capture the 
central fact about ‘intuition’: agents have intuitions, make judgments, evaluate scenarios, 
and respond to cases. Further, nothing can replace the agent. No apparatus can 
independently detect the presence or absence of knowledge in a Gettier scenario, just as 
no instrument can track causal chains of reference. It could be objected that this is a 
feature of all experiment: even in the laboratory, someone needs to operate the 
equipment, devise the protocol, and interpret the results. This is indeed so; the difference 
is that in a thought-experiment, the equipment and interpreter are one and the same. A 
temperature reading is as reliable as our knowledge of the thermometer, and even then it 
is better not to know what one is measuring, just in case (the double-blind experiment). 
Likewise, an intuition is only as reliable as our knowledge of the intuiter and of the 
intuitive faculties, and the situation is complex because one cannot help but know what 
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one is ‘measuring.’ There are no double-blind thought-experiments when we are asking 
ourselves the question. 
The case I considered (2.1) all shared this distinct agent-centric feature. Twin-Earth 
required a judgment about the meaning of ‘water’; Gettier about knowledge (or, possibly, 
Knowledge); and, in the more complex case of reverse Sobel sequences, several delicate 
pragmatic judgments reflecting ordering effects in counterfactual sentences. Later on we 
saw this feature again with Trolley cases and Zombies (3.2.4). Understanding intuition as 
a cognitive phenomenon allows for empirical purchase: again, the goal is not to tabulate 
response, but to explain judgment.  
The prima facie case then proposes to investigate intuition broadly understood as an 
agent-centric set of cognitive phenomena in the hopes of achieving explanatory depth 
about intuitive judgments. Nothing rides on whether or not 'intuitions' are a 'kind,' a 
special and distinct form of insight. It could very well be that the kinds of judgment that 
are deployed in moral philosophy differ significantly from 'intuition' in formal logic.  It 
could also be that some 'intuitions' are more reliable than others; or that certain intuitions 
are more amenable to empirical investigation than other types. These are issues to be 
sorted out by investigation, not fiat, and motivate rather than challenge the prima facie 
case. The broad theoretical vocabulary of intuition acknowledges this mentalistic 
component in ways that can guide our agent-centric heuristic as we proceed in the 
investigation.  
We can be fairly certain such an investigation is possible. Non-eliminativists—that is, 
those philosophers who have explicitly theorized about intuitions and their role in 
philosophy—have offered competing positive accounts of 'the intuitive.' Clusters of 
features have accrued to intuition, resulting in a sort of 'family resemblance' (meta-) 
concept that can be discerned from the literature. 
Below, I have sorted these 'clusters' of features in four distinct groups: epistemic features, 
material features, psychological features, and methodological role. Positive accounts of 
intuitions pick and choose some cluster of the features below, though there is widespread 
disagreement on which cluster is 'the' correct account (if there is one): 
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Epistemic Features. 
• Apriority: Intuitions are a priori or are a source of a priori knowledge. 
• Non-inferential: Intuitions are not 'inferred' from other premises in an argument. 
• Basic: Intuitions are 'brute,' 'bedrock,' and/or 'necessary.' 
• Commonsensical / pre-theoretical: An intuition is not tainted by other theoretical 
commitments; it is “what we'd say,” (the 'we' is sometimes imagined to be 'the 
folk.') 
Material features. 
• Unity: “...the intuitions of interest in philosophy constitute a single epistemic and 
psychological kind.”273 
• Modality: Intuitions are modal, counterfactual or have a “modal tie to truth.”274 
• Normative: An intuition has normative force to change our concepts. 
• Determinacy: Intuitions are about determinate concepts and/or things. 
Psychological features. 
• Judgment: An intuition is a type of judgment (of conceptual application, etc.)  
about a case. 
• Phenomenological: An intuition has a distinctive phenomenology in which it 
appears self-evident. 
• Conceptual Competence: Intuitions derive from a kind of conceptual competence. 
Methodological role. 
• Central: Intuitions are the typical way philosophical theorizing proceeds. 
• Distinctive: Intuitions are distinctive of philosophical theorizing. 
• Evidential: Intuitions are evidence for and against theories. 
• Casuistry: An intuition consists in testing the applicability of a concept to a case. 
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CSI Jenkins has independently argued in a similar vein.275 She distinguishes between 
four broad forms of 'clustering' these features of intuitions: one cluster identifies 
'intuitions' with 'common-sensicality’ (folk response, pre-theoretic judgment); another 
that identifies intuitions with features associated with 'apriority’ and necessity; a third 
with ‘immediacy’ either in the form of non-inferentiality or a sense of self-evidence or 
obviousness; a fourth cluster views intuitions as foundational, distinct, and a source of 
warrant.276 Jenkins warns that because of these competing clusters of features, 
philosophers run an appreciable risk of talking at cross-purposes: for instance, “a 
prioricity and commonsensicality differ significantly in extension,” though philosophers 
have sometimes been cavalier about the difference.277 The solution proposed is that 
‘intuition-talk’ is contextually sensitive between different intended meanings, 
demonstrated by the acceptability of a sentence such as “this is something I rationally 
intuit, but I admit that it is not pretheoretically intuitive.”278 
I agree with Jenkins’ diagnosis of the situation. Fortunately for experimental philosophy, 
it does not matter which cluster of features is the ‘correct’ one—if there is one—or 
whether ‘intuition’ is used contextually to pick out different clusters. This is because 
across all permutations the mental component remains, which is all we require for 
empirical investigation to proceed. This is so whether intuition is understood as the pre-
theoretic response or a priori knowledge (viz. my discussion of Deutsch in 3.3) or 
foundational insight; indeed, careful experiment can help us determine what sort of 
intuition is really in play. 
Jenkins is of the view that empirical investigation into intuition is not necessary, as we 
can be confident of their reliability. Two problems with this view. First, achieving 
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explanatory depth about the mental phenomena surrounding ‘intuition’ is important 
outside of reliability. Second, the argument for reliability is suspect, for reasons I’ve 
already outlined. Jenkins writes that  
To argue that intuitions are unreliable … on the grounds that intuition sometimes 
goes wrong is no better than to argue that vision is unreliable … on the grounds 
that we are sometimes subject to optical illusions.279 
As I indicated already (3.2.2.) in the context of fundamental theorizing, it is natural that 
higher epistemic standards should apply. A major reason for double-blind studies is 
precisely to prevent investigators from ‘seeing’ what they wish to see. We do not 
besmirch the basic reliability of vision when we ask that an investigator peering into a 
microscope not know which sample they are looking at. The analogy with optical 
illusions is potentially misleading as well: philosophical thought-experiments, because 
they go beyond the ordinary case, might be systematically deceptive. If we are sometimes 
subject to optical illusions, it would be nice to have a theory of vision that would help us 
avoid making mistakes: to know that they are illusions. Absent a good theory of 
intuitions, as the prima facie case asks us to do, we do not know the limits of reliability. 
Surely if philosophy is in the business of providing fundamental metaphysical insight it 
would only be of benefit to have a theory about the limits of intuition, even if it turns out 
appeal to intuition was innocuous all along. 
If there are no independent checks on intuition—recall that nothing can substitute for the 
agent—how do we achieve empirical purchase on the mental phenomena of ‘intuitive 
judgment’ to both understand it and gauge reliability? In 2.3, I discussed the positive 
program’s approach, arguing that understanding patterns of intuitive response can be 
helpful in solving, or dissolving, philosophical problems. An intuitive problem is often 
the starting point of philosophical discussion: in the example I presented, the conflict 
between moral luck and the principle that one is morally responsible only for things 
under one’s control. Unlucky outcomes seem to spur harsher moral judgment. But, it 
turns out, the intuitions might have been misdescribed: it is not that we intuitively 
                                                 
279
 Ibid, 20. 
143 
 
condemn unlucky outcomes more forcefully (in conflict with the control principle). 
Rather the primary driver of moral judgment appears to be mental-state assessments, 
more particularly evaluation of an agent’s justification for their belief that a bad outcome 
would not occur. This is a surprising result that took careful experimental investigation to 
discover. A better understanding of patterns of intuitive response then puts the problem of 
moral luck in a new light, allowing new theories to emerge. In this sort of case we are 
less interested in determining whether or not intuitions are reliable and concerned, 
instead, with understanding what the intuitions actually are. 
Reliability, the ostensive concern of the methodological program, must be approached 
indirectly. This is because, with few exceptions, for some intuition p the truth-maker of p 
isn’t that a majority of respondents assent to p under experimental conditions (one such 
partial exception, I’ve suggested, occurs in the philosophy of language). What makes p 
true is presumably the fact that p is the case. Without independent access to p, however, 
the best we can do is verify that p is robust, invariant, and generated by a trustworthy 
cognitive process. For example, if some intuition that p is robust under different 
conditions, this is evidence that p is genuinely intuitive and not the result of a subtle 
unconscious association, biasing or interaction effect, and so on. In turn p’s being 
robustly intuitive is evidence that the intuition is reliable. 
As I’ve emphasized, the idea is not to tabulate response (in the sense of an opinion poll) 
but to understand patterns of intuitive response. From these patterns one might conclude 
that an intuition is fairly reliable, not so reliable, reliable only under certain conditions, or 
simply misdescribed. Systematic investigation of patterns of intuitive response can then 
speak to the reliability question by separating the genuinely intuitive from the parochial 
or conditioned, and by providing an explanatory theory for the patterns that are found.  
A more direct argument against the prima facie case is that philosophers do not, and have 
never, relied on intuition. This is the view I dubbed ‘eliminativism,’ with two variants: 
Cappelen’s blunt version, which denied the existence of intuition altogether, and Deutsch 
more subtle form that did not deny intuition, only its use as a form of evidence. In 
arguing against eliminativism, I attempted to grant as much of my opponent’s case as I 
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could, and still show that the prima facie case went through. Cappelen’s reliance on 
Williamson’s metaphilosophy was not without problem; ultimately, however, it was 
Cappelen’s own case studies that demonstrated the role intuitions play in argument: the 
weakest plausible construal, as contributing to the context of discovery, still merited 
investigation due to intuition’s initial role in shaping subsequent investigation. 
Cappelen’s definition of intuition defined them out of the process entirely, an overly 
restrictive account that requires implausible re-reading of the literature. 
Deutsch, for his part, argued that philosophers do not rely on intuitions as evidence, 
understood as appeals to something’s being intuitive; rather, philosophers proceed on the 
basis of a priori knowledge of which intuitions are one potential causal source. Against 
his view I argued that sources of knowledge are valid targets of investigation, and the 
prima facie case goes through much the same. Deutsch was also wrong that 
psychological phenomena have no place in philosophical theories, at least in the case of 
semantics. Furthermore, Deutsch’s characterization of apriority meets much of the 
criteria of intuition (above), and amounts to a sort of re-labeling. 
Finally, both Cappelen and Deutsch make the mistake of supposing that since one can 
also support philosophical conclusions with argument that this means intuitions in fact 
played no role, and are dispensable. As I endeavored to show, many of these arguments 
rely on some implicit appeal to intuition-like phenomena; and, even if they did not, this 
does not mean that intuitions did not serve as an additional source of evidence for the 
claim.  
The eliminativist challenge thus answered, I considered the ‘expertise defense’ in the 
context of the philosophy of language. Since expertise is widely acknowledged to be 
domain-specific I considered the claim that philosophical expertise secures the reliability 
of appeals to intuition in semantics (taking the Gödel-Schmidt case as a starting point, but 
extending to referential intuitions generally). I argued that, far from securing greater 
reliability, philosophical expertise is more likely to be tainted by theoretical commitment. 
I offered two examples: naturalness and modality. In the case of the former, I claimed 
that philosophers of language, because of their training and dominant assumptions in the 
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field about the representational nature of language, are more likely to assume that 
predicates reflect ‘natural’ properties in the world. In the case of the latter, I argued that 
the referential intuitions of philosophers are more likely to reflect modal constraints, 
specifically a semantics that enables true modal claims about de re entities, while 
ordinary language appears to have no such constraint: ordinary referential practices do 
not obviously discriminate between rigid designation and descriptivist reference in many 
sorts of cases (mostly having to do with impossible worlds). Because of this, we cannot 
be certain that the ‘expert’ intuitions of philosophers are reliable guides to the 
conventions of ordinary language that is the purported explanatory target. Rather, these 
are intuitions about the language we ‘ought’ to have, much as epistemology is about the 
epistemic concepts we ‘ought’ to deploy. I take no position on this normative aspect, but 
only note the explanatory inadequacy such a normatively-governed theory inevitably has 
in relation to natural languages as they are spoken. It will take careful empirical 
investigation to produce a theory of the latter. It seems experimental philosophy has some 
work yet to do. 
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